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ABSTRACT
LEIBNIZ AND LOCKE ON THE ULTIMATE ORIGINATION OF THINGS
FEBRUARY 2006
MARCY P. LASCANO, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON SEATTLE
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Vere Chappell
This dissertation examines Locke's and Leibniz’ explanation of the origin and
nature of the world. As Leibniz writes in his “De Rerum Originatione Radicali,” which
is used as a guide to the issues addressed, this project involves answering two questions
“Why is there a world at all?” and “Why is the world the way it is?” Both Leibniz and
Locke answer the first question by way of a cosmological argument for the existence of
God as the first cause of the world. I explicate and criticize these arguments. I also
examine the metaphysical and theological presuppositions of the arguments. Leibniz’s
and Locke's views on the structure and intelligibility of the world answer the second
question.
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CHAPTR 1
THE ULTIMATE QUESTION
Introduction
This dissertation is an examination of Leibniz’s and Locke’s answers to two
questions: ( 1 ) Why is there a world? and (2) Why is the world the way that it is? But
first it is important to understand what is meant by these questions. Does it make sense
to ask such questions, and. if so, how could we possibly answer such questions? In
particular, one might think that the question “Why is there a world?” is really a
variation on the question “Why is there something rather than nothing?” Leibniz is
often credited with having been the first to pose the question “Why is there something
rather than nothing ?” This question, which may be called “the ultimate question,” has
been the subject of many philosophical writings since Leibniz. Philosophers such as
Martin Heidegger, Robert Nozick, and Derek Parfit have taken up the question.
However, this ultimate question also has been ridiculed by numerous philosophers as a
question that cannot possibly have an answer, or as a question that is somehow ill-
formed. The first part of this chapter will be devoted to disambiguating the ultimate
question and distinguishing various ways in which it might be answered.
The second pail of this chapter explains why I have chosen to examine Leibniz’s
and Locke’s answers to these questions. I will explain what I expect the contribution of
such a study to be, and briefly explain the issues addressed throughout the rest of the
dissertation. Finally. I will discuss the historical method that I employ in this
dissertation.
Why is there Something Rather than Nothing?
The ultimate question cannot be construed as asking why is there absolutely
anything at all. If there are eternal propositions, necessary truths, immaterial principles
or entities, or abstract entities, it can be argued that these things would “exist” even if
there were no world. Asking why a necessarily existing proposition exists is to ask an
illegitimate question. Instead of construing the question in this unrestricted sense, we
must understand it to be asking why does the world of material or physical beings exist?
It is this question that we seem to be pondering when we look out at the stars at night
and wonder at the existence of the universe. Why should these things exist? Why is
there anything physical at all? Since we seem to be able to imagine that there could
have been no physical universe, we wonder at its existence. This is the meaning of the
question "Why is there something rather than nothing?” But even given this narrower
question of why the physical world exists, some have argued that the question is still not
one with which we should be concerned.
There are several reasons why one might think that the question, "Why is there
something rather than nothing?” is not a question that one should be concerned with.
For instance, one might think that the question is ill-formed, and so unintelligible.
Another reason one might think that the question is not to be pursued is that although
the question is intelligible, it is unanswerable.
The reason one might think that the question is ill formed is that the answer it
seeks would have to exist outside the world. One might think that given that the world
is everything that exists, this is impossible. The question seems to be asking for a
causal explanation for the existence of the world. If we understand the 'world' as the
collection of all existents, then we are asking for the causal explanation of all existents.
Since a causal explanation is one in which one thing's existence is explained by the
action or existence of another thing, in order to give a causal explanation of the world,
we must say that there is some thing that caused the world to begin to exist. However,
whatever we invoke as the cause of the world will itself be a part of the world (since the
world is all that exists), and thus pail of the explandum. Thus, the question is somehow
ill-formed. We can ask for the explanation for any part of the world, but we cannot ask
for an explanation of the whole of the world. We can call this the “rejection” view.
Another objection to the question is that although the question is intelligible, it is
unanswerable. There are two reasons one might think that the question cannot be
answered. First, one might think that the cause of, or the reason for, the existence of the
universe is a mystery. That is, one might think that this question is intelligible, and
even important, but that any satisfactory answer to the question is beyond our reach.
We can call this the “mystery” view.
The second reason one might think the question intelligible, but unanswerable is
that one might think that there is no cause or reason for the existence of the world.
According to the proponent of this view, the question is indeed intelligible, but there is
no answer to it other than “just because.” There is no reason or cause of the world’s
existence. It is a brute fact that the world exists, and it is useless to seek any further
reason for its existence. We can call this the “brute fact” view.
The mystery view and the brute fact view both assert that the answer that we
seek is not to be found. According to these views, the fact that the question is
intelligible and important does not mean that it should be pursued. The attraction of
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these views is a certain prima facie plausibility. It does seem that seeking an answer for
the existence of the world is a difficult and daunting task, and it may indeed, ultimately,
be out of our reach. However, accepting either of these views means giving up the
search before it even begins. Accepting the existence of the world as a brute fact or as a
mystery is antithetic to our notions of science and philosophy. The fact that we do not
yet see how to go about answering the question is not a reason to think it unanswerable.
Nor does the fact that a question might be difficult or daunting to undertake give us a
principled reason for thinking it unanswerable.' The mystery and brute fact views are
last resorts. There is a reason why the ultimate question keeps coming up. We, as
rational beings, are disposed to seek just such explanations. This, of course, does not
mean that nature has to adhere to our demands for rational explanation. However, until
we have some better reason for thinking that the question is unanswerable, we are not
misguided when we keep exploring the possibilities for answering it. We should only
assume that something is a brute fact or a mystery after every reasonable means of
investigation has failed.
However, the rejection view, unlike the mystery and brute fact views, gives a
principled reason for why we cannot take the ultimate question seriously. Since the
question requires a causal answer for the existence of everything, the question is ill-
formed or unintelligible. The proponent of the rejection view asserts that (a) there is no
type of causal explanation of the existence of something other than substance causality.
I am reminded here of the Homeric saying “If something is difficult to do, it's not
worth doing.” The quote, of course, is not from the Greek poet, but from his more
prosaic contemporary namesake Homer Simpson.
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and (b) there is no substance outside of the world. In order to avoid this view, we must
reject either (a) or (b), or both.
Some people who take the question of the existence of the world seriously reject
(a). In doing so, they accept that there is a type of causation that is not substance
causation. The type of causation generally proposed is “principle causation,” or as one
proponent calls it "law causation” or "nomic causation.”' This sort of causation does
not take substances as the only entities capable of filling the role of causal relata, some
sort of law-like principle may also serve in the role. For example, Derek Parfit has
argued that an Axiarchic principle might be the cause of the world. ' According to this
principle, the world exists because its existence is good. The Axiarchic principle
necessitates the obtaining of all good possibilities. Nicholas Rescher has argued that a
Hylarchic principle might be the cause of the world.
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According to this principle, the
world exists because it is necessary that some non-empty world exists. Rescher’
s
Hylarchic principle is a principle that constrains the real possibilities to those that are
non-empty. A strong version of the Anthropic principle also might serve as an example
of a nomic principle. The strong Anthropic principle states that this world exists
Nicholas Rescher, The Riddle ofExistence (Lanham, MD: University Press of
America, 1984).
Derek Parfit, "The Puzzle of Reality: Why Does the Universe Exist?” Times Literary
Suppliment (July 3, 1992), 3-5.
Nicholas Rescher. The Riddle ofExistence (Lanham, MD: University Press of
America, 1984).
The weak version of the Anthropic principle merely states that it is a pre-condition for
asking the question of why the world exists that there be beings capable of rationality
and thought, and so a world capable of supporting such creatures must exist in order for
the question to arise. This principle, while true, does not give an explanation for why
5
because it is necessary that such a world exist in order for beings like us to exist. The
strong Anthropic principle claims that the existence of creatures who can ask why the
universe exists necessitates the existence of a universe suited for the survival of such
creatures. All of these principles give us an explanation for the existence of the world
without relying on substance causation. If nomic causation is possible, then we need
not accept the rejectionist argument. Richard Swinburne has argued that we have no
reason to accept nomic causation because we have no experience of it in the world.
However, the proponent of nomic causation can merely contend that although the vast
majority of our experience is of substance causation (perhaps even all of it), the cause of
the existence of the world is a special case and requires a special type of causation.
The other route to thwarting the rejection view is to deny (b) that there are no
substances outside the world. The theist who wants to answer the question of why the
world exists by arguing for the existence of an omnipotent God. who creates the world,
takes this option. The theist accepts that there is no type of causation other than
substance causation, but he argues that there is a substance that exists outside the world.
In virtue of this extramundane substance it is possible to answer the question of why the
world exists by means of our accepted causal notions.
Given that there seems to be no compelling reason to accept the claims of the
rejectionist that the question is unintelligible, we should accept that the question "Why
such a world obtains. It merely tells us that it must for us to be here - a fact that no one
disputes.
Richard Swinburne, "Response to Parfit” In Metaphysics: The Big Questions (Oxford:
Blackwell Publishing. 1998), 427-430. Of course, Swinburne is open to a tu quoque
argument. He accepts that the world exists because God. who exists outside of the
world, created it. One might object to this extramundane causation based on the fact
that we have no experience of it either.
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is there something rather than nothing?” as coherent and proper. However, even if we
do accept that the question is proper, we are not assured that any of the aforementioned
ways of answering the question is correct. In addition to the theistic and nomic
answers, there is one other possible way of answering the question, we can call it the
“Necessitarian” view.
The Necessitarian view is that the world exists because every possible world
exists. On this view, it is not possible for the world to fail to exist. The possibility of
nothingness is ruled out as logically impossible. One might think that certain views in
the contemporary metaphysics of modality and in contemporary cosmology are forms
of Necessitarianism. According to David Lewis’s view of modality, modal realism, for
any way in which a world can be there is a world that is that way.
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According to Lewis,
all of the possible worlds are actual and the collection of all the possible worlds, logical
space, exists as it is of necessity. It is not possible that no world obtain. Since every
possible world exists of necessity, our world exists of necessity. According to another
view in contemporary metaphysics. David Armstrong’s view of modality, which is a
g
naturalist combinatorialist view, it is also impossible for nothing to exist. According to
Armstrong, a very minimal world is possible, but an empty world is not. Possibility is
based upon actuality, and given that a world exists, it is not possible that one not exist.
In modern cosmology, Martin Rees has offered the theory of the Multiverse, which is
9 _ .
the scientific version of Necessitarianism. Rees argues that an infinity of universes
David K. Lewis. On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1986).
8
David Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory ofPossibility (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989).
Martin Rees, Before the Beginning (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, 1997).
/
exists. He argues that possibly for every way in which a universe could be, one has
come into existence (although spatiotemporally disconnected from the others), and so it
is necessary that our world exists.
If the question, “Why is there something rather than nothing?” is to be
answered, these are the only contenders, at the moment, for answers to it. Nomic
principles. Theism, and Necessitarianism are the current ways in which people attempt
to provide answers to the ultimate question. There may be other ways in which the
question might be answered that we have yet to discover, but in order to find these
ways, we must keep asking the question. Fortunately, the ultimate question is one that
we never seem to tire of asking. In this dissertation I look at the answers to the question
provided by Leibniz and Locke. Leibniz and Locke give theistic answers to the
question “Why does the world exist?” They both accept substance causation. They
both accept that God exists and creates the universe. Leibniz, at least, is explicit in
saying that God is extramundane. Locke, we must assume, believed likewise.
Leibniz tells us that answering the question “Why is there something rather than
nothing?” involves answering two questions: (1) Why is there a world at all? And (2)
Why is the world as it is? In the next section I will discuss why I have chosen to
examine the views of these philosophers in particular. I will then outline the ways in
which these two philosophers attempt to answer the two questions. This is an outline of
the project of the dissertation. Finally, I will discuss my historical method, and what I
hope to contribute to the field by undertaking this topic.
8
Leibniz and Locke on the World's Existence and Structure
In "De Rerum Originatione Radicali,” Leibniz tells us that he takes the question
“Why there is something rather than nothing?” to be asking why there is a world of
finite contingent things. Leibniz answers the question of why the world exists with a
cosmological argument for the existence of God. In Chapter 2, I formulate his
argument and discuss his assumptions in this argument. My purpose in doing so is to
examine critically the metaphysical principles and underpinnings of Leibniz’s
argument. Some of the problems that arise when we examine the argument take us deep
into Leibniz’s philosophical system. First, in order to understand why Leibniz believes
that no part of the world can explain the existence of the whole world. I examine
Leibniz’s account of explanation and his account of causation. I argue that Leibniz’s
use of final causation in his cosmological argument is question-begging. Leibniz
believes that final causation holds in the world because rational creatures have purposes
and ends. This is a perfectly acceptable account of explanation for certain occurrences
within the world. However, in an argument where one is seeking the cause, whatever it
may be, of the existence of the entire world, to say that it must be a final cause is simply
to assume that the world was created by a rational mind. This stacks the deck in God’s
favor by excluding any non-substance or part of the world from being the cause of the
world.
Another major issue involved with Leibniz's cosmological argument is the
problem of necessity and contingency. 1 discuss Leibniz's views on how it is that the
world could be contingent. I begin with Leibniz's denial that the eternal truths are
created. Leibniz maintains, against Descartes, that since the eternal truths cannot have
9
been other than they are, God does not freely create them. If the world were necessary,
like the eternal truths, God could not have freely created it. If the world obtains of
necessity, then no reason will be able to be given for its existence." Given Leibniz’s
views on God's nature and the requirement that an omnibenevolent being do only the
best, it seems that we might infer that God was necessitated to create the world. This
would undermine Leibniz’s reason for giving a cosmological argument in the first
place. So, in order to avoid the conclusion that the world obtains of necessity, Leibniz
must show how it is possible that the world is contingent. I criticize Nicholas Reseller's
attempt to secure the contingency of the world for Leibniz. I end the chapter with some
textual evidence that Leibniz nevertheless held that the world obtains of necessity.
However, in Chapter 3 I give my own account of how it is that Leibniz can ward
off the accusation of Necessitarianism. The problem arises from the necessity of God’s
goodness and the necessity of a perfectly good being's choosing to create the best
possible world. These claims would seem to lead us to the conclusion that the best
possible world, and every truth contained therein, exists of necessity. Yet Leibniz
denies the necessity of the world. How is this possible? I argue that Leibniz's view is
that it is not necessary for a perfectly good being to choose to create the best possible
world. According to Leibniz, God freely chooses to create the best. I offer an account
of God's freedom and the Principle of Perfection that renders God's choice of this
world free, and therefore contingent.
Also in Chapter 3, I discuss the relation of the Principle of Sufficient Reason
and the Principle of Perfection. I argue that the Principle of Perfection is not an
G VII 303 (AG 150).
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instance of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, as some have claimed. I also discuss the
role of these two principles, and of final and efficient causation, in how we gain
knowledge of the world. Finally, I discuss the structure of the world. Here I argue
against the view that God's concern in creating the metaphysically best world is to
create the world with the greatest number of essences possible. 1 also discuss the
relation between compossibility, expression, and harmony in the world, and how these
elements are supposed to combine to create a metaphysically and morally optimal
world.
Chapters 4 and 5 concern Locke’s answers to the questions “Why does the
world exist?” and "Why is the world the way that it is?” In Chapter 4, 1 begin with
Locke’s much maligned cosmological argument. Locke’s argument has been accused
of being not only unsound, but of being invalid. I offer a reconstruction of Locke’s
argument based on a careful reading of the text that renders the argument valid. I then
proceed to discuss Locke’s use of the principle Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit and his use of the
causal principle that whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence and gets all its
being and power from that same cause. I argue that Locke's attenuated acceptance of
Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit is justified, but that his causal principle cannot be known with the
intuitive certainty that is required for his cosmological argument. I also discuss Locke’s
account of the unity of God, and Leibniz’s criticisms of it. In the end. 1 conclude that
although we may render Locke’s argument valid, it is unsound because of the
aforementioned problems with the causal principle, for which no remedy can be found
in Locke’s system.
Chapter 5 begins with an explication of Locke's epistemology. I discuss the
well-known problem of our knowledge of the external world and raise further problems
for Locke's causal principle based on Locke's account of causation in general. 1 also
discuss Locke's views on the contingency of the world. In doing so. I examine his
account of God’s omnipotence, God’s freedom, and the eternal truths. 1 compare
Locke’s views on the eternal truths with the views of Descartes and Leibniz. I conclude
that although, according to Locke. God’s will is absolutely free, and in some sense God
does create the necessary truths, his view is not equivalent to Descartes’ view. Locke
does not hold that the so-called eternal truths are entities above and beyond their
instances in the world. God does, in one sense, create the eternal truths when he
chooses to create the world as it is. But he does not decree eternal truths separately
from decreeing the existence of the world. In this section, I also discuss Locke’s use of
conceivability as a guide to possibility. Locke freely uses conceivability claims
throughout the Essay. This gives us reason to believe that since we can conceive of the
world as being different, we can know that it is possible that it be so. The problem with
Locke's use of conceivability comes when he asserts, as he does at times, that what is
inconceivable is impossible. Locke explicitly states in several places in the Essay that
inconceivability does not entail impossibility. However, he uses inconceivability claims
as a means for ruling out the possibility that incogitative matter might be the cause of
the world in his cosmological argument. I argue that his appeal to inconceivability here
is not justified given his views about the limitations of our knowledge and God’s
omnipotence.
Finally. In Chapter 5, I discuss Locke's views on the structure of the world.
Locke, somewhat surprisingly, offers an account of the plentitude of the world.
According to Locke, we have good reason to believe that the world contains creatures
from the least perfect kind all the way up, by gradual steps, to the most perfectly perfect
being. Locke also asserts that it is by way of this belief that we can understand that
there are indefinitely many more intelligent creatures than ourselves in the world.
Locke’s view of our place in the world seems to be a rather dismal one. We are very
limited in our capacities to know the world, and God has made us this way. We have
no hope of a full understanding of the world. Worse yet, it seems that the limitations of
our knowledge have failed to guarantee the ground of the supposed “great
concernment” of our lives - morality. Given that Locke's argument for the existence of
God has failed to prove God’s existence based on intuitively known certain premises,
we cannot be certain that God exists to supply us with a moral law.
Historical Methodology
When working in the history of philosophy, one always has to be clear about
one’s aims and methodology. In general, one might approach the history of philosophy
in one of two ways: ( 1 ) by giving a close reading of the text, explaining why a
philosopher holds certain views, and trying to solve apparent difficulties that arise in
connection with those views within the historical context of that philosopher and by
availing oneself only of the assumptions of the philosopher in question; or (2) by
availing oneself of portions of a philosopher’s system in order to discuss a
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contemporary issue in philosophy, or discussing a philosopher’s views and deducing
what he should have said, given contemporary understandings of the issue at hand."
While each approach to the history of philosophy has its proponents and its
successes, I take the first approach. In looking at Leibniz’s and Locke's views on the
existence and structure of the world, I am not here concerned to use their views as
springboards into the contemporary literature. Nor am I concerned to solve the
difficulties I encounter in their views by means of contemporary philosophical theories.
I am concerned to give their views as clearly and concisely as possible based on the
textual evidence. In places, I find that I must try to interpret what the author was trying
to convey in a certain text or deduce what a philosopher might think on the basis of
what he has written about other similarly related issues. But these interpretations and
deductions, I believe, should always be based on finn textual evidence, and it should be
acknowledged wherever we depart from a text. Recalcitrant textual evidence must be
disclosed. Where there is no text, and we are left to merely ponder what a philosopher
might have said on a certain topic, we must admit that and not force a view upon him.
In criticizing the views of a philosopher. I seek to show that some assumption he
makes is false. But. 1 do not base my criticisms on contemporary philosophical or
scientific views. For instance, we might think that current views in quantum mechanics
show that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is false, but this could not have been a
reason for Leibniz to reject the principle. If a reason for rejecting the principle based on
" For a fine discussion of the types of historical methods and the key components of
each, see R. C. Sleigh's introduction to his book Leibniz and Arnauld: A Commentary
on Their Correspondence (New Haven. CT: Yale University Press, 1990), 2-6.
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the assumptions and reasoning available to Leibniz is to be had, then we might hold
Leibniz accountable for not considering it and trying to refute it.
Despite the fact that the historical method 1 employ is not one in which we can
always directly engage current philosophical debates, it is still a valuable one. There is
a value to understanding the philosophical systems of the past. Not only does it keep us
from re-inventing the wheel, it allows us to see philosophical progress and (at least
attempt) to understand the workings of great philosophical minds. I am not here
claiming that I completely understand Leibniz’s and Locke’s views on the topics I am
treating (nor on any other topic), but I believe that there is a value to working out, to the
best of our abilities, the philosophical systems that these great philosophers spent their
lives developing. I know that it has given me great pleasure, and I hope too, some
understanding.
Examining Leibniz’s and Locke's views on the ultimate question is, 1 believe,
intrinsically interesting. However, some might think that more value is attained by the
investigation of the metaphysical and theological views that these philosophers utilize
in answering the question. So be it. Looking at the ultimate question provides a new
vantage point from which to see these philosophers’ systems. In the case of Leibniz, it
may be argued that his entire philosophical system was developed from a preoccupation
with the questions of why the world exists and why the world exists as it is and not
some other way. In the case of Locke, where little scholarly work has been devoted to
his metaphysical and theological views, his answer to the question of why the world
exists provides an entry into his system. In each case, we gain valuable perspective on
15
two philosophical systems, which arc different in many ways, but have surprisin
similarities with respect to these questions.
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CHAPTER 2
LEIBNIZ ON WHY THERE IS ANYTHING AT ALL
Introduction
In his essay. “On the Ultimate Origination of Things,” 12 Leibniz seeks the
answers to two questions: ( 1 ) “Why is there a world at all?” and (2) “Why is the world
the way it is?” Although the essay is short, it touches on a myriad of central and deep
issues in Leibniz’s philosophy. The question of why the world exists at all leads one
into questions concerning God's existence and freedom, as well as issues concerning
causation, explanation, and possibility. This chapter focuses on Leibniz’s attempt to
answer the question of why the world exists by the use of a cosmological argument. I
show that once we examine the supporting reasons for the premises of the argument, we
see that Leibniz’s argument is flawed because the sufficient reason for the existence of
the world is found only through the determination of a final cause, rather than efficient
causes or some other type of reason. According to Leibniz, only a final cause will
exclude the sufficient reason of the world’s existence from being a part of the world
itself. However, Leibniz’s reason for holding that final causes exist in the world is that
every action in the world is produced by a rational mind toward some purpose. The
final cause for the existence of the world will have to be a rational being that has no
cause outside of itself, that is, it will have to be a necessary being. The insistence that
we look to final causes for the existence of the world stacks the deck in God's favor, so
1 G VII 302-8 (AG 149-54).
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to speak. If the cause of the world must be a rational mind that exists outside the
world. Leibniz has effectively ruled out all possibilities except God from the beginning.
However, the initial plausibility of claiming that there must a reason or cause of the
entire world rests on Leibniz's vagueness about what sort of “reason” the Principle of
Sufficient Reason requires.
The Short Answer?'
It seems obvious that the answer to why there is a world at all, for Leibniz, has
to do with the fact that God exists. God creates the world. This is the short answer. In
“On the Ultimate Origination of Things” Leibniz gives this answer in the first lines. He
writes.
Beyond the world, that is, beyond the collection of finite things, there is some
One Being who rules, not only as the soul is the ruler in me, or, better, as the self
is the ruler in my body, but also in a much higher sense. For the One Being who
rules the universe not only rules the world, but also fashions or creates it; he is
above the world, and, so to speak, extramundane, and therefore he is the
ultimate reason for things.
Following this, Leibniz launches into one of his most complete versions of the
cosmological argument. The main text of the argument is as follows:
I certainly grant that you can imagine that the world is eternal. However, since
you assume only a succession of states, and since no reason for the world can be
' There is an alternative very short story to be told in response to the questions “Why is
there a world?” and “Why is the world as it is?” for Leibniz. One might say that the
story that Leibniz has to tell is this: The ontological argument shows that God exists
and this why the world exists. Since God exists and is necessarily good and a
necessarily good being will create the best possible world, the best possible world
exists. This world is the best possible world, but that it is so, is a contingent matter
because which world is the best is a contingent matter. That this world is the best is
contingent is demonstrated by Leibniz’s theory of infinite analysis. This explains why
the world is the way that it is. This is a short story indeed. However, there are several
reasons to think it is not the whole story, and not the story that Leibniz wanted to tell.
The rest of this chapter and the next chapter recounts a longer story, but one which I
believe gives a more accurate account of Leibniz’s system.
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found in anyone of them whatsoever (indeed, assuming as many of them as you
like will not in any way help you to find a reason), it is obvious that the reason
must be found elsewhere. ...Therefore the reasons for the world lie hidden in
something extramundane, different from the chain of states, or from the series of
things, the collection of which constitutes the world. ...Therefore, since the
ultimate ground must be in something which is metaphysically necessary, and
since the reason for an existing thing must come from something that actually
exists, it follows that there must be some one entity of metaphysical necessity,
that is, there must be an entity whose essence is existence, and therefore
something must exist which differs from the plurality of things, which differs
from the world, which we have granted and shown is not of metaphysical
necessity.
14
The argument can be stated more formally as follows:
1 . Everything that exists must have a sufficient reason for existing, that is, it must
have a reason why it exists and is as it is.
2. The world exists.
3. Every state of the world and collection of individuals in it comes into existence
and goes out of existence, that is, everything in the world is contingent.
4. Therefore, the world is contingent.
5. Therefore, there is sufficient reason for the existence of the world.
6. No state of the world or individual in the world can be the sufficient reason for
the existence of the entire world.
7. Therefore, the sufficient reason for the world is outside the world, that is, it is
extramundane.
8. The sufficient reason for the existence of a necessary thing is not outside of that
thing, but is its own essence.
9. Therefore, in order for something to be the sufficient reason for the existence of
the world that thing must be a necessary existent.
10. Therefore the sufficient reason of the world is an extramundane necessary
existent, and this we call God.
G VII 303 (AG 150).
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Alas, many of these premises require substantial explication and argumentation, so the
short answer turns out not to be short at all.
The first premise of the argument is Leibniz's famous (or rather "infamous”)
Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). The Principle of Sufficient Reason has been a
persistent source of controversy, but Leibniz held its truth to be self-evident and
necessary. The discussion of this principle is in Chapter 3. For now, it is enough to say
that the principle's status is in doubt, especially given certain interpretations of quantum
mechanics. Premise (2) is also a self-evident truth for Leibniz. We can be certain that
the world exists since we have direct sensory experience of the world. But this premise
raises the question of what, exactly, does Leibniz mean here when he refers to "the
world?”
Possible Worlds as Collections of Concepts
What is a world? According to Leibniz the world is a collection of all of its
states. What does it mean to say that a world is a collection of its states, and why
should we think that such collections are possible? According to Leibniz, a possible
world is a collection of complete individual concepts, plus the laws of nature.' A
' The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle may have bearing on the Principle of Sufficient
Reason if it turns out that the principle tells us something about how the world actually
is rather than our inability to coordinate observations of it.
" This will hold even if, as some commentators have held, Leibniz is an idealist. He
writes in “On Truths, the Mind, God, and the Universe” (A IV 71, De Summa Rerum
, p.
57), "In my view, the primary truths are those which cannot be proved, such as "I have
such and such appearances’; also ‘A is A' and definitions. From the perception of
appearances it follows both that I exist and that there is a cause of the various
appearances, i.e., of the variety of perceptions, which is different from that whose form
I perceive when I perceive thought.”
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It actually is a bit more complicated. Sleigh writes that “In Leibniz’s framework,
each possible world seems to correspond to the following items: (a) a goal or plan that
2C
complete individual concept is an exclusive and exhaustive description of an individual;
it contains all the predicates that refer to an individual at every point during the
individual’s existence.
'
s
The actual world is the world where the collection of complete
individual concepts is exemplified by individuals. In merely possible worlds, the
concepts are not exemplified. Not just any set of complete individual concepts can
make a possible world. The existence of certain individuals is not compatible with the
existence of other individuals. So, collections including all these individuals must be
compossible. In addition, Leibniz holds that the greatest number of possible
individuals that are compossible will be involved in a possible world, so the collections
are maximal. So a possible world is a collection of complete individual concepts such
that the concepts are compossible and the collection is maximal. Leibniz maintains that
there are infinitely many of possible worlds. Why should we think that these
collections of complete individual concepts exist? The easiest argument for their
the world would uniquely bring to fruition were it actual; (b) a law (or set of laws) of
the general order that that world uniquely satisfies; (c) a concept of that world, which is
unique to that world and determined by the relevant laws of general order; and (d) a
unique set of concepts, one for each individual substance, that would be actual were that
world the chosen one.” R. C. Sleigh, Leibniz & Arnauld: A Commentary on their
Correspondence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990). 52.
1
8
What exactly is contained within the complete individual concept is highly
contentious. The main crux of the disagreement is whether complete individual
concepts contain all of an individual’s intrinsic properties, or whether it also includes all
of an individual’s essential properties. The first view called “superintrinsicalness” is
held by R. C. Sleigh and Robert Adams. The second view called “superessentialism” is
held by Fabrizio Mondadori. Here 1 tend to side with the more moderate position of
Sleigh and Adams, but I will not undertake a defense of that position here.
'
’ Grua 325. How individual are or are not compossible is a bit of a mystery - one with
which Leibniz gives very little help. He says only that the complete individual concepts
of individuals are compossible only if the existence of the individuals referred to by
those concepts is consistent with the existence of the others.
20 G III 572-73 (L 661-2).
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acceptance might be based on the fact that we believe that the world could have been
very different from the way that it is and that the existence of other possible worlds
gives us a way to explain how this can be so. However. I do not know of any place in
which Leibniz gives this reason for believing in other possible worlds. Leibniz’s use of
possible worlds is usually confined to his creation story. He does not use possible
worlds to give a semantics for modal logic.
'
But perhaps an explication of possible worlds is not necessary for a justification
of premise (2)? It seems that, at this point. Leibniz need only make the innocent claim
that the world is everything that exists in space and in time (past, present, and future)/
He writes in the Theodicy, “By ‘actual world’ I mean the whole series and the whole
collection of all existent things, lest one might say that several worlds exist at different
times and different places. For the whole collection must be reckoned all together as
one world, or if you will, as one universe.”
-
'
Necessary and Contingent Existents
Premise (3) of the cosmological argument states that all the states of the world and
the individuals in the world are contingent. We know' from experience that things in the
world come into existence and perish. Nothing in the world is everlasting it seems.
However, in order not to beg the question, Leibniz holds that even if the world were
Although Adams thinks that Leibniz comes close in “Necessary and Contingent
Truths.” See Robert M. Adams, Leibniz: Determinist, Theist
,
Idealist (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1994), 46-50.
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There is some controversy over what Leibniz means when he says that something
exists, given that he seems to say that something can be called an existent if it has more
perfection than any other incompatible alternative. For an illuminating discussion of
this matter see Adams ( 1994), 164-176.
'G VI 107 (H 128).
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eternal it would not make its existence necessary. Not every eternal thing is necessary,
although every necessary thing is eternal.
Let us consider premises (3) and (4) more closely - the claim is that the world is
contingent. Leibniz believes that it is possible that different people might have existed,
that the actual world might have been different from the one that exists. All the
possible worlds exist, in some sense, in the mind of God. What is it for something to be
possible? Something is a possible existent if it is the subject of a proposition that is not
self-contradictory. ' What is it for something to be necessary ? Something is a necessary
existent if its essence contains existence. According to Leibniz. God is the only
necessary existent. Other than God, all existent things are contingent. I will come back
at the end of the chapter to the specific issue of how it is that the world can be
contingent. For now, it suffices to say that Leibniz’s official view is that the world is
contingent. But even if we grant that the world is contingent, what reason do we have
for thinking that God is the only necessarily existent being?
Leibniz is often seen as holding Platonic views. We might wonder why, on his
account, there are not other things that could be said to exist necessarily - things other
than God. that is. Perhaps Leibniz is committed to eternally existing propositions, like
propositions about the Forms? For instance, the proposition that is expressed by the
sentence “the angles of a triangle equal 180°” might be an eternally true existing
proposition. That is, one might think that a proposition of this sort has the same
ontological status as God - as a necessarily existing entity. However. Leibniz holds that
24 G II 47-59 (L 331-8).
For an excellent discussion of Leibniz’s Platonism, see Christia Mercer's Leibniz's
Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 173-205.
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although these propositions are necessary, they do not exist as independent abstract
entities. He is a nominalist. The ideas on which the eternal truths depend exist in the
mind of God. and so the eternal truths are indeed eternal and necessary, but they are not
existents.
The Status of Eternal Truths
One of Leibniz’s major disputes with Cartesian metaphysics is Descartes's claim
that God creates the eternal truths. Leibniz vehemently attacks this doctrine in his essay
“Critical Remarks Concerning Descartes' Principles" 1 . Leibniz maintains that God
acts in accordance with the eternal truths. He thinks that the eternal truths are separate
and outside the world because if God created them, or if God created morality, he could
not be good. How could he be praiseworthy if no matter what he did, it would have
been good? Leibniz seems to think that this is a consequence of Descartes's view.
However, the exact status of the eternal truths for Leibniz is a bit puzzling. Leibniz
writes in Theodicy
,
For it is, in my judgment, the divine understanding which gives reality to the
eternal verities, albeit God’s will have no part in therein. All reality must be
founded on something existent. It is true that an atheist may be a geometrician:
but if there were no God. geometry would have no object. And without God.
not only would there be nothing existent, but there would be nothing possible/
If God did not exist and have this truth in mind, then 2 + 2 would not equal four.
But does this mean that the eternal truths are dependent upon God's existence and his
understanding? Leibniz gives an argument against Descartes’s claim that in order to
preserve God's freedom God must be the free cause of the eternal verities. He writes.
27
T 184. The reference to the atheist geometrician is in direct reply to Descartes's claim
in the Meditations that an atheist could not be a geometrician.
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But if the affirmations of necessary truths were actions of the will of the most
perfect mind, these actions would be anything but free, for there is nothing to
choose. It seems that Descartes did not declare himself sufficiently on the
nature of freedom, and that his conception of it was somewhat unusual: for he
extended it so far that he even held the affirmations of necessary truths to be free
in God. That was preserving only the name of freedom. 28
So, according to Leibniz, in order for God to freely create something, it must have
been possible for him to create it otherwise. The necessary truths cannot be otherwise,
as their denial creates a contradiction; therefore, God cannot freely create them. This
might seem like question-begging against Descartes. The whole point of Descartes's
view that God did freely create the necessary truths is to say that God could have made
it so that 2 + 2 = 5, and that if God had chosen to do so, then either it would not have
been a contradiction or contradictions would have held true in the world. Leibniz,
however, holds that this is logically impossible, and thus God cannot do it. The whole
of the debate might lie in whether one believes that omnipotence entails being able to
do the logically impossible. Descartes thinks that it does, Leibniz denies this.
However. Leibniz's explanation of the status of the eternal truths shows that his system
of possible worlds provides a w ay to explain what is freely chosen by God and what is
true regardless of his will.
Leibniz maintains that the eternal verities exist in the region of ideas - that is. where
the possibles exist. God understands them from all eternity. Moreover, they would not
exist, even as possibles, if God did not exist. He writes, “Moreover these very truths
can have no existence without an understanding to take cognizance of them; for they
would not exist if there were no divine understanding wherein they are realized, so to
s
T 186.
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speak. One way in which we might understand how it is that the eternal truths exist
in the mind of God without being subject to his will is as follows. Imagine that God
exists and then asks the question. "What is possible?” He sees all of logical space in his
mind - all the possibles, so to speak. In the possible worlds, he sees that there are
certain truths that hold in some worlds that fail to hold in others - these are the
contingent truths - the truths that actually would hold were he to actualize one of those
worlds in which it holds. He also sees that there are some truths that will hold
regardless of what world he chooses to create, that is, there are some truths which hold
in every possible w'orld - these are the necessary truths. ° So, God freely chooses which
world to create, and in doing so he chooses which creatures shall exist and all of the
contingent truths of that world. However, it is not up to God’s free choice to create the
eternal verities for no matter which world he freely creates these truths will hold. If
God creates nothing, these truths still hold in all possible worlds. Thus, they are subject
to God’s understanding but not his will.
The fact that the eternal verities are not subject to God’s will is something that
Leibniz thinks is important for our understanding of God’s goodness. He writes in the
Theodicy
,
Those who believe that God established good and evil by an arbitrary decree are
adopting that strange idea of mere indifference, and other absurdities still
stranger. They deprive God of the designation good: for what cause could one
70
T 189.
"
I do not here mean to say that this is Leibniz’s general account of necessity. Leibniz
uses truth in every world to talk of necessity, but only in theological contexts. More
commonly Leibniz defines necessity as that whose opposite implies a contradiction.
See C 17 (MP96).
26
have to praise him for what he does, if in doing something quite different he
would have done equally well? 1
In order for us to be certain that God is good, he must be good in relation to some
objective criterion of goodness (of course, he himself is at the top of the chart). If God
were to decide what constitutes good and evil, then we would have no reason to call
him good for no matter what he does it would be good. We can see that Leibniz takes
the position on the Euthyphro question that, “God does X because it is good", rather
than “X is good because God does it." In fact he writes in Theodicy
,
“...the rules of
goodness and justice are anterior to the decrees of God. ...I once read with enjoyment
the Euthyphro of Plato, who makes Socrates uphold the truth on that point...." Nor
would we have any guarantee that God would maintain the decrees that he has set down
if they are based on arbitrary will rather than the rules of reason. We would have no
guarantee of any of the truths of mathematics or morality if God arbitrarily chooses the
eternal verities. Leibniz writes.
For if justice was established arbitrarily and without any cause, if God came
upon it by a kind of hazard, as when one draws lots, his goodness and his
wisdom are not manifested in it, and there is nothing at all to attach him to it. If
it is by purely arbitrary decree, without any reason, that he has established or
created what we call justice and goodness, then he can annul them or change
their nature. Thus one would have no reason to assume that he will observe
them always, as it would be possible to say he will observe them on the
assumption that they are founded on reasons.
T 176.
T 182.
”T 176.
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Leibniz's further concern here seems to be that things done without reason have no
intelligibility for us as rational creatures. If we supposed that God could act without
reason, then we doom ourselves to uncertainty about the will of God.
Can The World Explain Itself?
Let us now return to the cosmological argument. In particular, let us examine
premise (6). There are several reasons to think that it might be false. For instance,
one might think that the world needs no explanation. For example, it might be the
case that the world has always existed. That is, it did not come into existence and so
there is no cause of its existence.
1 On the other hand, one might think that the
world is self-explaining. One possibility is that a part of the world really can, and
does, explain the existence of the whole world. Another way in which the world
might be self-explaining would be if the world were to come into existence via its
own essence, that is, if the world were to somehow create itself. Leibniz addresses
the claim that the world might be eternal and as such uncaused, since the world has
always been in existence. If this were true, then it might seem that God is not
needed to explain the existence of the world, as the world has always been. But
Leibniz gives several arguments to show that whether the world is eternal or not
there will still need to be a reason for or a cause of its existence. One of Leibniz’s
arguments is in “The Confession of Nature Against Atheists.”' Leibniz writes.
Either the body in question must be assumed to have been square from all
eternity, or it has been made square by the impact of another body - if, that is.
At the moment I put aside the worry that the world requires a cause to stay in
existence.
G IV 105-10 (L 1 1 1 ). See Part I. That Corporeal phenomena cannot be explained
without an incorporeal principle
,
that is God.
you refuse to resort to an incorporeal cause. If you say it has been square from
all eternity, you give no reason for it, for why should it not have been spherical
from all eternity? Eternity cannot be considered the cause of anything. But, if
you say that it was made square by the motion of another body, there remains
the question of why it should have had any determinate figure before such
motion acted upon it. And if you refer the reason for this, in turn, to the motion
of another body as cause, and so to infinity, each of your replies will again be
followed by a question through all infinity, and it will become apparent that this
basis for asking about the reason for each reason will never be removed, so that
no full reason for the figure will ever be given. Therefore it appears that the
reason for a certain figure and magnitude in bodies can never be found in the
nature of these bodies themselves.
'
Leibniz’s answer here seems to be that the fact that something has been a certain
way from all eternity does not explain its existence at all. He says that eternity is not
the cause of anything. However, it seems that Leibniz’s use of ‘cause’ here is
unwarranted. Surely, the person who claims that eternal things have no cause for
their existence is not claiming that the duration of its existence is the cause of its
existence. Rather, he is claiming that there is no cause. Perhaps this is so because
our notion of cause and effect seems to depend on the cause existing prior to the
effect temporally. If this were the objection, then it would be open for Leibniz to
claim that something’s existing from all eternity does not rule out the possibility of a
concurrent or instantaneous cause. However, this is not what Leibniz says here. A
better explication of Leibniz’s reasoning on this point is in “On the Ultimate
Origination of Things.” Leibniz writes.
Let us suppose that a book on the elements of geometry has always
existed, one copy always made from another. It is obvious that although
we can explain a present copy of the book from the previous book from
which it was copied, this will never lead us to a complete explanation, no
matter how many books back we go, since we can always wonder why
there have always been such books, why these books were written, and
36
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why they were written the way they were. What is true of these books is
also true of the different states of the world, for the state which follows
is, in a sense, copied from the preceding state, though in accordance with
certain laws of change. And so, however far back we might go into
previous states, we will never find in those states a complete explanation
for why, indeed there is any world at all, and why it is the way that it
is.
37
Leibniz’s argument can be stated as follows:
1. A sufficient reason for the existence of the world will tell us why it exists and
why it is the way that it is.
2. For every state of the world, we can give a reason for why that state exists and
why it is the way that it is, if we know the previous state of the world and the
laws.
3. The world is the collection of all of its states.
4. But there is no state of the world that can provide a sufficient reason for why all
the states of the world have existed and why they are the way that they are.
5. Therefore, no state of the world can be a sufficient reason for the existence of
the world.
So, Leibniz’s claim is that a sufficient reason cannot be had from the world itself.
We must seek an extramundane explanation. But should we accept this reasoning? In
particular, premise (4) needs further explication.
It might seem that premise (4) is false because it claims something akin to a
category mistake. Gilbert Ryle accused Descartes of making such a mistake with
respect to persons. The example that he uses to demonstrate a category mistake is
that of a university. Imagine that a prospective student were to ask, “Where is the
University?” He is then taken on a tour of campus. He is shown the art building, the
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business school, the computer science building, the playing fields, etc. After the tour is
over, however, he responds, ‘'Yeah, but where is the University?” It seems our hapless
student has made a mistake. There is no location of the University over and above the
location of the buildings. The student has erroneously thought that there is the
computer science building, the playing field, and the University, as if the University
were some other building of the same soil as the others. In fact the collection of the
buildings just is the University. The student has made a category mistake.
But is premise (4) really analogous to the case of the University? Imagine that
after the tour our student asks a different question. He asks, "Why is this the
University?” Now. it seems to me, that the student is not guilty of making a category
mistake. Rather, he has asked a legitimate question. Of course, we may have to
disambiguate several questions that the student might be asking here, such as “Why are
these the buildings that compose the University?” or “Why is this called the University
rather than some other collection of buildings?” Granted, these are not the usual
questions that one might ask after a campus tour, but perhaps our student is interested in
how universities come to be or how we differentiate the university from other
surrounding non-university facilities. It may very well be the case that an explanation
for the coming into existence of each building in the university will not answer the
questions “Why do these buildings compose the University?” or "Why is this collection
of buildings the University rather than some other collection?” This, I believe, is the
difference between premise (4) and the question of the location of the University.
When Leibniz maintains that the explanation for the existence of each part of the world
will not explain the existence of the whole of the world, he is not making a category
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mistake. Rather he is asking a question, the answer to which requires a comparison
between the existing collection and some other possible collection. "Why this one, or
these, rather than some other one, or those?”
Perhaps it will be objected here that premise (4) still does make a mistake
because the world is all that there is, so there is nothing to compare it with. In other
words, it cannot be that the question Leibniz is asking is “Why does this world exist
rather than some other?” because there are no other worlds. However, Leibniz holds
that this world is one of infinitely many possible worlds that could have been
actualized. Thus, we can ask the question, "Why this world rather than some other
world that could have existed instead?”
Against Striving Essences
Leibniz writes that in order to understand how contingent things arise from
necessary or eternal truths that we must say that “there is a certain urge for existence or
(so to speak) a straining toward existence in possible things or in possibility or essence
itself; in a word, essence in and of itself strives for existence.” 39 How are we to
understand this passage? It has been suggested by some commentators that essences
have the ability to become actual in and of themselves. 40 This would indeed seem to
make the role of God in creation rather superfluous. It is clear that Leibniz did not
mean that essences bring themselves into existence and God merely allows this to
happen or concurs in their actuality. Rather, if we take the last line of the paragraph just
quoted into consideration, we can see what Leibniz is aiming at. He writes.
39 G VII 303.
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Furthermore, it follows from this that all possibles, that is, everything that
expresses essenee or possible reality, strive with equal right for existence in
proportion to the amount of essenee or reality or the degree of perfection they
contain, for perfection is nothing but the amount of essence. :
Leibniz maintains that God must have a reason to create what he does. A good
reason to create one possible world over another is that one world is more perfect than
the other world. Essences can be said to have equal claim on God’s creative ability in
so far as they have an equal claim to perfection, that is, worlds that contain more
perfection give the creator more reason to create them over other worlds. In this sense
we can say that essences “strive” for existence in that they strive for perfection. But
they cannot bring themselves into existence, for only things that cannot be otherwise
exist by their own essence. If a possible world could bring itself into existence without
the creative power of God. then that world would have to be necessary, that is, its non-
existence would have to imply a contradiction. However, Leibniz maintains that it is
not a contradiction for even the best world not to exist. The best of all possible worlds
still requires God’s act of creation in order to become an actual world. The best of all
possible worlds, however, has the most pull on God. for it contains the highest degree of
perfection possible in a world, and will therefore give God the most and best reasons for
bringing it into existence.
Leibniz’s use of phrases such as the "urge,” “straining,” or “striving” for existence
must be read metaphorically, not literally. He does not mean to imply that essences
41 G VII 303.
4
Leibniz writes that all rational creatures strive for perfection; they follow the Principle
of Perfection (Fitness or Best) that says that all rational beings will to choose what is
best or appears best to them. Thus, all essences will strive for perfection in so far as
they are able. This principle will be more fully addressed at the end of the chapter.
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have the ability to create themselves. If they did. then they could provide their own
sufficient reason for existing, and Leibniz clearly believes that they do not. Nor does he
believe that the existence of any possible world is necessary, as is stated above. And he
clearly states that in order to have a sufficient reason for the existence of the world, we
must seek a necessarily existing object. Rather Leibniz uses the phrase “striving” for
existence to indicate what it is that makes one possible world better than another
possible world - the amount of perfection of the essences contained in that world. All
rational beings strive for the good, or the apparent good, according to Leibniz. So a
way to measure the overall perfection of a world is to ascertain how well the essences
that exist in that world attain the goal of goodness.
Explanation
But we might wonder why the sort of explanation we get from the past states of
the world (perhaps in conjunction with the laws of nature) does not constitute a
sufficient reason for the world's existence. What do we need in order for something to
count as a sufficient reason? It seems that a perfectly good answer for the existence of
an eternal or everlasting world might be a strictly causal account of the previous states
and the laws. But Leibniz rejects this as a sufficient reason. This why question,
namely, "Why is there any world at all?” is one that Leibniz believes requires a
different sort of answer. As was demonstrated by the case of the University, it seems
that, for Leibniz, an explanation for why the whole collection exists will require a
comparative explanation. The explanation of the world will not come from its essence
alone, but from a comparison with other things. Leibniz writes.
Moreover, the reason why some particular contingent thing exists, rather
than some others, should not be sought in its definition alone, but in
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comparison with other things. For. since there are an infinity of possible
things which, nevertheless, do not exist, the reason why these exist rather
than those should not be sought in their definition (for then nonexistence
would imply a contradiction, and those others would not be possible,
contrary to our hypothesis), but from an extrinsic source, namely, from
the fact that the ones that do exist are more perfect than the others. 43
The mechanical process of one state following from determinate laws to the next
will not give us a sufficient reason for the existence of the world. Why? We certainly
find causes for the states of the world. However, when we give the causal explanation
for a state of the world that includes the previous states of the world and the laws of
nature, we are still able to ask further questions. We can ask, “Yes, but why should this
collection of states exist?” or "Why these states, laws, and initial conditions rather than
some others?”
But what sort of answers are we looking for when we ask such questions about
the world? Leibniz holds that when we ask these ultimate questions, we are seeking
final causes - causes which he sometimes calls reasons [rationes]. Here is where
Leibniz’s cosmological argument runs into real trouble. In order to understand
Leibniz's view, I will first give an account of what a final cause is.
The account of final causation comes from the Greeks. As Benson Mates 44
explains, the Greek’s used “cause' to account for what is an answer to many sorts of
why questions. Only one of the uses of “cause' would correspond to what we now think
of as a cause, and Aristotle called this the “efficient cause.’ The three other types of
causes are the material cause, which might answer a why question like “Why is the
A II 275-78 (AG 19).
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house so solid?” with the answer that it is caused to be so by the brick front which it is
built: the formal cause, which is used to answer questions like "Why is house built in
such a way?” with the answer that it was caused to be because it was built according to
a certain blueprint; and the final cause, which answers questions like “Why did they
marry?” with the answer that they did so because they had the goal of happiness. The
final cause is the goal of a rational being or the purpose to which a rational being aims.
These last three types of “causes” do not correspond to our modern notion of cause, but
this way of talking about causes was handed down mainly through Aristotle to the
scholastics, especially Thomas Aquinas, and the Latin word causa was generally used
as a translation of the Greek word aitia.
This explains where Leibniz's account of final cause might have come from, but not
his reason for thinking that it is true. Why would Leibniz think that there are final
causes? Leibniz seems to be aware of the problem of using the single term ‘cause’ to
denote each of the Aristotelian four causes. Leibniz writes in the “Dissertation on the
Art of Combinations,” “It is very improbable that the term cause expresses an
unequivocal concept to cover efficient, material, formal and final causes.”
4
" This would
seem to indicate that Leibniz was aware of a possible equivocation in the Principle of
Sufficient Reason. For it seems that sometimes Leibniz uses the principle, which says
that everything that exists has a cause of its existence, to mean that everything that
exists has an efficient cause of its existence and sometimes to mean that everything that
exists has a final cause of its existence. The former was a fairly well accepted causal
G IV 32-33 (L 74).
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principle in the 17
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century, the latter was not." Regardless of whether Leibniz realized
that he might be utilizing several nonequivalent versions of the Principle of Sufficient
Reason, he must rely on the version that calls for final causes in his cosmological
argument. Otherwise, Leibniz would have no reason to reject a part of the world as a
cause of the world's existence. For if we are seeking only the efficient cause of the
world, it might be argued that the world is self-explanatory as each state of the world or
individual in the world is explained by the previous state.
Leibniz’s reason for holding that there are final causes in the world is that the only
actions in the world are the actions of substances, and that substances act for reasons.
He writes, “The essence of substance consists in the primitive force of action.”
4
And in
“On Nature Itself’ Leibniz writes, “[Ajctions belong to substances. And hence I hold it
also to be true that this is a reciprocal proposition, so that not only is everything that
acts an individual substance, but also every individual substance acts without
interruption....”
4 "
It is the nature of a created individual substance to act because it is a mind. God is a
mind. In fact, he is the most perfect mind, and thus God acts continuously and
productively. Leibniz tells us, “God is a certain substance, a person, a mind.” 4 As a
mind, God acts in accordance with reason for the good. Leibniz accepts a Thomistic
Spinoza, for instance, also held that there is a sullicient reason tor every existing
thing, but did not think that there were final causes in the world. For a discussion of
this, see Jonathan Bennett’sLearningfrom Six Philosophers (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001), vol. 1.
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account of free will in which reason moves the intellect toward the good (or the
perceived good in the case of human beings). " Leibniz writes in the Theodicy,
The will is never prompted to action save by the representation of the good,
which prevails over the opposite representations. This is admitted even in
relation to God. the good angels and the souls in bliss: and it is acknowledged
that they are none the less free in consequence of that.
1
Since substances always act on reasons and act towards the goal of what is best,
there will always be final causes in the world. Final causes are nothing more than the
reasons, goals, or purposes for which a substance acts. Leibniz writes in “Metaphysical
Consequences of the Principle of Reasoning,”
the whole of nature efficient causes correspond to final causes, because
everything proceeds from a cause which is not only powerful, but also wise; and
with the rule of power through efficient causes, there is involved a rule of
wisdom through final causes. '
And again in a letter to Christian Philipp,
The true philosophy, on the contrary, must give us an entirely different
conception of God’s perfection, one that will be of use in both physics and
ethics. For my part, I hold that far from excluding final causes from physics, as
Mr. Descartes tries to do in Part, I, Article 28, it is rather by means of them that
everything must be determined, since the efficient cause of things is intelligent,
having a will and therefore striving for the good.
Here it is easy to see that Leibniz’s appeal to final causes is based in the fact that the
world is constituted by rational minds and is ultimately created by a rational mind. God
creates the world with a purpose in mind and this purpose is manifested in the laws of
nature and in all of his created substances.
°
1 do not here mean to commit Leibniz to "faculty” talk, or to the existence of a
separate faculty for the intellect and the will.
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Leibniz in other places seems to provide a pragmatic reason for the use of final
causes. In the Discourse on Metaphysics he writes,
However. I find that the way of efficient causes, which is in fact deeper and in
some sense more immediate and a priori, is, on the other hand, quite difficult
when one comes to details, and I believe that, for the most part, our philosophers
are still far from it. But the way of final causes is easier, and is not infrequently
of use in divining important and useful truths which one would be a long time in
seeking by the other, more physical way. 1
And again in "Metaphysical Consequences of the Principle of Reason,’" “Further, it
is a fact that we can sometimes arrive at the truth about things through final causes,
when we cannot arrive at it easily through efficient causes.”"
In these passages, Leibniz extols the virtues of seeking final causes in science and
philosophy. However, it seems clear that at root the suggestion that final causes might
lead more easily to truth than efficient causes is based on Leibniz’s belief that God as
creator of the world has left the mark of reason on his works. Everything God does has
a purpose or an end. Thus, we can say that there is a final cause of the existence of the
world because God created it for a reason (a very good one too!). However, making use
of the notion of a final cause in an argument that is supposed to be seeking the
explanation of the world - whatever that explanation may be - seems to beg the
56
question.
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It has been suggested to me that even if there is a final cause for the world, this
supposition does not exclude the world itself from providing it. Might not there be
principles operating in the world that are eternal and productive? We can imagine an
Axiarchic principle at work in the world, such that it creates beings ex nihilo because it
is best that these things exist. The principle exists in the world and explains the
existence of the rest of the world - it is both the efficient and the final cause. It does not
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In Leibniz’s cosmological proof, the plausibility of The Principle of Sufficient
Reason as stated in premise ( 1 ) of the argument rests on the ambiguity of "reason.”
That everything has a reason for its existence, taking reason here to mean either
“rationale” or “cause” of some sort or other, seems plausible. However, when Leibniz
asserts in premise (6) that no state of the world or individual within the world can be the
reason for the world's existence, he rules out the ambiguity. He is now claiming that
only a final cause can be the sufficient reason of the world’s existence. This I believe is
the primary fault of Leibniz's cosmological argument. Since there can be a final cause
of the world only if the world is created by a rational substance, Leibniz equivocates on
"reason” in premises ( 1 ) and (6). By ruling out efficient causes of the existence of the
world, Leibniz has secured a place for God. But with no independent argument for the
exclusion of all types of causes or reasons other than final causes, Leibniz's argument
fails to prove the existence of God in a non-question-begging way.
Even if we were to accept premise ( 1 ) as stating that the world must have a final
cause for its existence, we might still object to Leibniz’s cosmological argument. In
order for the argument to get started, it must be agreed that the existence of the world
requires some sort of cause (even if it is final). However, if the world exists of
necessity, then according to Leibniz, it would not require a reason for its existence. If
the world’s existence were necessary, then the reason for its existence would be found
in its essence.
seem that Leibniz’s argument can rule out this possibility, nor am I able to find any
indication that he even considered it.
4C
In order to show that the world exists only contingently, Leibniz tries to demonstrate
that the world exists because God freely created it. I will now turn to a discussion of
God's freedom and the contingency of the world.
Does God Create Freely?
Why did God create? After all, it does not seem that God should have to create
anything at all. He does not need anything. He is a perfect being. So. his creation of
the world cannot in any way depend on a need of God's, or even on a desire - a desire
for glory or love. Nor can something in God's essence compel him to create a world, as
he is perfect on his own. Nor can he be compelled by anything at all to create the
world. Leibniz believes that it is God's free choice to create the world that he does. It
is a free expression of his goodness. Now it seems that we have two very salient
questions here: “Why does God create a world at all?” and “How is it, given God's
nature, that God's creation of the world is free ?” I would like to take up the second
question first.
Here is the problem: Given that God is omniscient, omnipotent, and
omnibenevolent, how, if he creates a world at all, could he create anything other than
the best possible world? Leibniz maintains that God does, in fact, create the best world.
Leibniz argues that there are infinitely many possible worlds that God could have
created. This world is the best of all the possible worlds, and God created it. But it was
not impossible for God to bring about one of the other possible worlds. If it were, then
against the original hypothesis, those worlds would not be possible. In order for God’s
creation to be free, it must have been possible for God to create any of the other
possible worlds. Otherwise. God would have had no choice in what he created.
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However, Leibniz holds that God freely chooses to create the best world and so that this
world that exists is contingent - that is, that it is not necessary that God, even if he does
or must create something, create this world. But how can this be? Is not God forced by
his very nature to create the best of all possible worlds? Leibniz writes, "For the
present world is physically or hypothetically necessary, but not absolutely or
metaphysically necessary.” But what could this mean? How can the best possible
world escape being a metaphysical necessity given that a perfect being created it? And
what does it mean to say that the world is physically or hypothetically necessary?
Perhaps the following passage will shed some light on the subject. Leibniz in "On the
Ultimate Origin of Things” writes about the creation of the world.
And so, we now have physical necessity derived from metaphysical necessity.
For even if the world is not metaphysically necessary, in the sense that its
contrary implies a contradiction or logical absurdity, it is, however, physically
necessary or determined, in the sense that its contrary implies imperfection or
moral absurdity. And just as possibility is the foundation of essence, so
perfection or degree of essence (through which the greatest number of things are
compossible) is the foundation of existence. From this it is at the same time
obvious how the Author of the World can be free, even though everything
happens determinately, since he acts from a principle of wisdom or perfection.
Indeed, indifference arises from ignorance, and the wiser one is, the more one is
determined to do that which is most perfect. "
It is clear that Leibniz wants to maintain that God’s choice of this world is not
metaphysically necessary, but that it is morally necessary. However it is not clear what
these distinctions amount to. In the next section I will consider Nicholas Reseller's
explanation of how it is that God's creation of the world is contingent.
G VII 303.
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Rescher on the Contingency of the World
Nicolas Rescher gives one explanation of Leibniz’s view of the contingency of the
world. Rescher claims that God’s choice to create this world is contingent because it
involves an infinite analysis. Further, he claims that God's first free decree, “to always
do the best," is contingent because it involves an infinite series of willings. Reseller's
explanation makes use of Leibniz’s two distinctions: the distinction between
metaphysical and moral necessity, and the distinction between something being
necessary by the necessitas consequentiae and something being necessary by the
necessitas consequentis (a distinction that Leibniz inherits from the Scholastics).
Rescher claims that the proposition “If w is the best possible world, then God actualizes
w" is only acceptable as necessary by the necessitas consequentiae, that is (U(p—»q), but
not by necessitas consequentis, or (p—>Dq). So the conclusion that it is necessary that
God actualize w (Dq) will only be attainable if it is necessary that w is the best possible
world, that is, if Dp, not merely p. So it is only if this world, our own, is necessarily the
best possible world that it will be necessary that God create it. Here is where the
distinction between what is “absolutely" or “metaphysically” necessary and what is
only “hypothetically” or “morally” necessary comes into play. Rescher argues that
while it is morally necessary that p, it is not metaphysically necessary that p. Thus the
consequent Dq will only hold with moral necessity. What is moral necessity? Leibniz
wants to maintain that God does not create the best possible world as a matter of his
nature, but as a result of his goodness. If God’s creation of the world were dependent
' Nicolas Rescher, "Leibniz on the World’s Contingency,” Studia Leibnitiana 33
(2002): 145-62. Reprinted in On Leibniz (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press,
2003), 45-67. Subsequent citations are to the reprint.
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upon his essence, then it would be metaphysically necessary that he create the best
possible world. However, God’s free choice of creating the world is not dependent
upon his essence, but upon his goodness and his will. Rescher writes,
For while Leibniz has it that God’s existence indeed follows from his essence by
a finite derivation - so that his metaphysical perfection is necessary - he
nevertheless insists that God's creative operation remains a contingent fact that
holds only of moral necessity. God's operation as creator of this world, while
indeed certain, is not an absolute metaphysical fact, but one whose necessity is
merely moral because an infinite analysis is entailed by the infinite complexity
of God’s creation choice. j(
Rescher cites the following text to support his claim that God’s free willings involve
an infinite analysis:
if someone asks one why God decided to create Adam, 1 reply, because he has
decided to do the most perfect thing. If you now ask why he decided to do the
most perfect things, or why he will the most perfect... I reply that he has willed it
freely, that is, because he willed it. So he wills because he willed to will, and so
on to infinity.
61
According to this passage. God’s initial choice to create a world involves his willing
to will, and his will to will to will. Rescher claims.
The basic point, which must never be lost sight of here, is that contingent
propositions are true solely because their truth status derives from God's free
choice to implement the principle of perfection. But this choice enmeshes the
whole process in the operation of an infinite analysis - an infinitely complex
comparison with alternatives. 62
Rescher claims that God’s first free decree - the decree to do what is best (the
principle of perfection) - is free because it involves an infinite series of willings.
According to Rescher, this infinite series of willings constitutes an infinite analysis.
Rescher is claiming that not only is each of God’s willings free due to the infinite
Rescher, Leibniz on the World's Contingency
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regress of his will, but also the individual will to create this world is free due to the
infinite analysis involved in the choice of this world as the best. Rescher writes.
To begin with, it is crucial to take account of the fact that for Leibniz
contingency roots in infinite analyticity. Whatever obtains only bv an argument
of infinite length - and is thereby a merely contingent fact. (Radix contingentiae
est in infinitum.) For Leibniz, it inheres in the very definition of truth that all
truths are analytically true. However, only finite analyticity need be absolutely
(metaphysically) necessary. This is the case only with finitely demonstrable
ones: those truths whose analytic demonstration requires an infinite number of
steps - because here an infinite comparison process of some sort is involved -
can and will ipso facto be contingent. And since this is the case with God’s
choice of this particular possible world for actualization, it follows that the
world’s existence is a contingent truth. And while God's moral perfection as
creator of this best of worlds is itself a morally necessary truth, it is emphatically
not metaphysically necessary.’
So, it turns out that to claim that the creation of the world is morally necessary is
another way of claiming that the creation of the world is contingent. Leibniz's account
of contingent truths is that although they are analytic, they require an infinite analysis to
demonstrate this, and since this cannot be completed (at least by any finite mind and
there is some indication that he thinks that God only surmises the containment of the
requisite predicate in the subject), these truths are distinguishable from the necessary
truths which require only a finite analysis to demonstrate the containment of the
predicate in the subject. According to Rescher. the fact that the creation of the world
requires a sort of infinite analysis then, will be enough to show that it is not a necessary
truth that this world is the best possible world.
According to Rescher, God’s choice to create the best possible world involves an
infinite analysis since there are infinitely many possible worlds and they can be judged
good in a number of ways. So God must carry out an infinite analysis comparing the
Rescher. Leibniz on the World's Contingency
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possible worlds in their many different aspects. Leibniz's writes of God’s criterion for
the best possible world. "God has chosen that world which is most perfect, that is to
say, which is at the same time the simplest in hypothesis and the richest in
phenomena.” 64 And in "On the Ultimate Origination of Things” Leibniz writes.
From this it is obvious that of the infinite combinations of possibilities and
possible series, the one that exists is the one through which the most essence or
possibility is brought into existence. In practical affairs one always follows the
decision rule in accordance with which one ought to seek the maximum or the
minimum: namely, one prefers the maximum effect at the minimum cost, so to
speak. 6
Leibniz does not hold that God creates all things possible; rather, he believes that
God seeks to create the maximum number of compossible things with the simplest laws.
Thus, not all things that are possible are actual, although they would be if all things
were jointly possible. However, Leibniz maintains that the existence of certain things
excludes the existence of other possible things and that God must choose to create the
ones that are maximally compossible with other existents.
I believe that there are two problems with Rescher’s interpretation of Leibniz's
account of contingency. First, the claim that God's choice to implement the principle of
perfection is free because it involves an infinite regress of willings cannot be correct.
Although Rescher cites a text in which Leibniz seems to be putting forth an account of
free will that involves infinite willings, Leibniz vehemently rejects this account of free
will in many other texts. Second, it is not an infinite analysis that makes something
contingent; rather, a contingent thing requires an infinite analysis in order to discover
G VII 303.
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how it is analytically true. So. Reseller's elaini that it is by God's infinite analysis of
the possible worlds that his choice of the best world is only morally necessary is not
right. Reseller has used Leibniz's account of the truth of contingent propositions (that
they require an infinite analysis in order to know that the predicate is contained in the
subject) as an account of what it is that makes a proposition contingent/'
Leibniz accepts the Thomistic account of free will. Thomas Aquinas says that
reason is the root of freedom/ That is, a free choice of a being is determined by what
appears best to him at the time of the choice, ceteris paribus. The will does not act
without a judgment of reason, and reason judges the best alternative for the individual.
Leibniz thinks that this account is correct for God, but that creatures, due to their
imperfections, can be muddled and not follow the most recent proclamation of reason,
even though they do follow what they take to be the judgment of reason as a whole.
That is, given all the pronouncements of reason - even those that are infected with
passion - the agent will act on what he takes to be the best overall reasons. Leibniz
writes, “...[Wjhen one speaks of the greater inclination of the will, one speaks of the
result of all inclinations.” 6 Even though we are flawed with respect to our actions, it is
still the case that human beings act in accordance with reason. Leibniz writes,
I am of the opinion that our will is exempt not only from constraint but also
from necessity. Aristotle has already observed that there are two things in
freedom, to wit, spontaneity and choice, and therein lies our mastery over our
actions. When we act freely we are not being forced, as would happen if we
were pushed on to a precipice and thrown from top to bottom; and we are not
For a criticism of Reseller’s argument as it appeared in his book Philosophy of
Leibniz
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prevented from having the mind free when we deliberate, as would happen if we
were given a draught to deprive us of discernment. There is contingency in a
thousand actions of Nature; but when there is no judgment in him who acts there
is nofreedom. And if we had judgment not accompanied by any inclination to
act, our soul would be an understanding without will.
So, human beings do operate according to reason, but only so far as our limited
ability allows us to do so. God. however, having perfect abilities, always acts in
accordance with reason. God always chooses to act in perfect accordance with perfect
reason. This may sound as if there is no free choice for God, but Leibniz maintains that
choosing in accordance with perfect reason is the ultimate expression of freedom.
"There is always a prevailing reason which prompts the will to its choice, and for the
maintenance of freedom for the will it suffices that this reason should incline without
necessitating.”
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The will is never prompted to action save by the representation of the good,
which prevails over the opposite representations. This is admitted even in
relation to God, the good angels and the souls in bliss: and it is acknowledged
that they are nonetheless in consequence of that. God fails not to choose the
best, but he is not constrained so to do: nay, more, there is no necessity in the
object of God's choice, for another sequence of things is equally possible. For
that very reason the choice is free and independent of necessity, because it is
made between several possibles, and the will is determined only by the
preponderating goodness of the object. This is therefore not a defect where God
and the saints are concerned: on the contrary, it would be a great defect, or
rather a manifest absurdity, were it otherwise, even in men here on earth, if they
were capable of acting without any inclining reason. Of such absurdity no
example will ever be found; and even supposing one takes a certain course out
of caprice, to demonstrate one's freedom, the pleasure or advantage one thinks
to find in this conceit is one of the reasons tending towards it. 72
God acts according to reason. Here we have a fairly clear indication that the
Principle of Sufficient Reason applies to the actions of creatures and the free actions of
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God. Leibniz claims that all beings act in accordance with reasons that incline the will.
Leibniz claims that no counter-example to this claim will ever be found. We can ask of
any action of a rational being “What was the reason for that action?” and expect to get
an answer - it will never be the case that there is no answer, even if the agent cannot
articulate it or if we cannot discover it. The root of freedom is in reason, and the
explanation for all contingent events lies in the free choices of beings, both created and
eternal. So when Leibniz claims that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is involved in
the explanation of all contingent truths, we can see that he means that all contingent
truths have their explanations in the free choices of beings. Some of these truths, the
truths of the laws, say, have their roots in the free choice of God. We may not be able
to discover the reasons for these truths, but we are assured that they exist. In much the
same way, there are reasons for our own actions, even if they are not always transparent
to us.
Leibniz is very clear that the will is moved by reason and not by an infinite regress
of willings. He writes in "On Freedom and Possibility,”
God produces the best not by necessity but because he wills it. Indeed if anyone
were to ask me whether God wills by necessity. I would request that he explain
what he means by necessity by adding more detail, that is. I would request that
he give a complete formulation of the question. For example, you might ask
whether God wills by necessity or whether he wills freely, that is, because of his
nature or because of his will. I respond that God. of course, cannot will
voluntarily, otherwise there would be a will for willing on to infinity.
The passage that I previously cited by Rescher seems to contradict this passage
dated around the same time. However, Leibniz continued to hold the view that the will
is determined by reason, and the passage that Rescher cites is the only one of its kind.
A VI II 275-78. Grua 287-91 (AG 20). This text is dated around the same time
( 1680-82?) as the text “Reflexions Sur Bellarmin” that Rescher cites.
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Leibniz writes in the Theodicy
,
“As for volition itself, to say that it is the object of free
will is incorrect. We will to act, strictly speaking, and we do not will to will; else we
could say that we will to have the will to will, and that would go on to infinity.”
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Although we cannot know the reasons for God’s free choice, since that would
require an infinite analysis on our part, it does not seem that God’s choice required an
infinite regress of willing on his part. God's free choices are based on reasons. These
reasons must be such that God has a choice among possibilities in order for his choice
to remain free. That God does freely choose to implement the Principle of Perfection is
without doubt, but it is only because he could have not implemented it that his choice to
do so was contingent or merely morally necessary.
Leibniz's account of contingent truths is notoriously difficult. It is clear that he held
that all truths must be such that the predicate is contained in the subject. And it is also
clear that he understood that this made it seem that all truths were thus necessary truths.
However, he maintained that we could differentiate necessary and contingent truths by
the means by which the analysis of the predicate in subject must proceed. Necessary
truths require only a finite analysis in order to see that the concept of the predicate is
contained in the concept of the subject. However, contingent truths, because of the
nature of the free choices on which they depend, require an infinite analysis in order to
show their concept containment. Rescher is correct in saying that the root of
contingency is infinity, in that it is only by an infinite analysis that we could know' with
certainty that any contingent truth holds. However, it is not the case that an infinite
analysis is what makes something a contingent truth. It is not that God must undertake
5C
an infinite analysis in order for his decrees to be free. Rather, his decrees are free
because they are the product of his will and goodness rather than a product of his
existence. Leibniz writes in his essay “On Freedom and Possibility,”
There are two primary propositions: one. the principle of necessary things, that
whatever implies a contradiction if false, and the other, the principle of
contingent things, that whatever is more perfect or has more reason is true.
...All truths contingent by their nature, which are necessary only on the
hypothesis of the volition of God or of some other being rest on the latter
principle.
It is true that God's tree choice to create this world depends on an infinite analysis
in that he must undertake such an analysis to determine which world is the best.
Moreover, the reason why some particular contingent thing exists, rather than
some others, should not be sought in its definition alone, but in comparison with
other things.
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But it is not in virtue of this that his choice is contingent.
But it cannot be demonstrated that God makes that which is most perfect, since
the contrary does not imply a contradiction; otherwise the contrary would not be
possible, contrary to the hypothesis.
It is hard to understand how it is that God freely chooses the best world without that
choice being mandated by his essence. However. Leibniz clearly maintained that since
God understood that there are alternative possibilities and that these possibilities exist in
his understanding, his choice is contingent. All that is required for a free choice is that
there be the possibility that something else be chosen. Reseller’s account, although an
admirable attempt at making sense of the contingency of the world, is clearly not the
account that Leibniz intended.
A VI II 275-78 (AG 19-22).
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Why Create at All?
Despite Leibniz's failure to produce a good cosmological argument for the existence
of God, an investigation of the proof provides deep insights into Leibniz’s philosophy.
Leibniz gives other proofs for the existence of God. including an ontological argument
and an argument from the existence of the eternal truths. However, suppose that one
were to grant to Leibniz that God did create the world; even so. one might still have
another question for Leibniz. God chose to create the world; that, according to Leibniz,
we know. We can also know, according to Leibniz, that if God creates a world, he will
create the best possible world. However, we do not know why God would choose to
create at all. As has been said, God is perfect. Any world that God creates will not be
perfect, as it will include the existence of imperfect creatures. So, why would God
choose to create anything? Why ruin perfection? "
Leibniz tells us that God’s first free decree is to implement the principle of
perfection, that is, always to do the best. However, this free decree is consistent with
God's not creating anything at all. So, the fact that God decrees to do what is best, does
not mean that he will do anything. In fact, Leibniz maintains that had there been two
worlds that were tied for best. God would not have created anything at all because he
would have had no reason to create one rather than the other. So, how does God's first
free decree help us understand why God creates at all? Leibniz seems to think that we
cannot hope to understand why God chooses to create. He writes in the Discourse on
Metaphysics
,
Therefore it is sufficient to have the confidence that God does everything for the
best and that nothing can harm those who love him. But to know in detail the
78
I will come back to this question in Chapter 3. as it involves the nature of the world.
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reasons that could have moved him to choose this order of the universe - to
allow sins, to dispense his saving grace in a certain way - surpasses the power of
a finite mind, especially when it has not yet attained the enjoyment of the vision
of God. 79
And in the next section he writes.
Thus one can say, in whatever manner God might have created the world, it
would always have been regular and in accordance with a certain general order.
But God has chosen the most perfect world, that is, the one that is at the same
time the simplest in hypotheses and the richest in phenomena, as might he a line
in geometry whose construction is easy and whose properties and effects are
extremely remarkable and widespread. I use these comparisons to sketch an
imperfect likeness of divine wisdom and to point out something that can at least
elevate our minds to conceive in some way what cannot be sufficiently
expressed. But I do not claim to explain in this way the great mystery upon
which the entire universe depends. 8
However, in private correspondence Leibniz’s views on why God creates seems
to have differed from the public stance that he takes in the Discourse on Metaphysics.
In a letter to Magnus Wedderkopf. Leibniz writes that there is a reason why God freely
chooses the world that he does. He does it because of his reason and his reason is
moved by the optimality of the possible world that he chooses. Here is the very
revealing passage:
What, therefore, is the ultimate reason for the divine will? The divine intellect.
For God wills the things which he understands to be best and most harmonious
and selects them, as it were, from an infinite number of all possibilities. What
then is the reason for the divine intellect ? The harmony of things.
What is the reason for the harmony of things? Nothing. For example, no reason
can be given for the ratio of 2to 4 being the same as that of 4 to 8, not even in
the divine will. This depends on the essence itself, or the idea of things. For the
essences of things are numbers, as it were, and contain the possibility of beings
which God does not make as he does existence, since these possibilities or ideas
of things coincide rather with God himself. Since God is the most perfect mind,
however, it is impossible for him not to be affected by the most perfect
harmony, and thus to be necessitated to do the best by the very ideality of things.
DM 5 (AG 38).
DM 6 (AG 39).
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This in no way detracts from his freedom. For it is the highest freedom to be
impelled to do the best by a right reason. Whoever desires any other freedom is
a fool. Hence it follows that whatever has happened, is happening, or will
happen is the best, and also necessary, but as I have said, with a necessity which
takes nothing away from freedom because it takes nothing away from the will
and from the use of reason. No one has the power to will what he wills, even
though he sometimes can do what he wills. Indeed, no one wants this liberty of
willing what to will for himself, but rather of willing the best. Why then do we
invent for God that which we do not want for ourselves? It is thus clear that an
absolute will which does not depend upon the goodness of things is a
monstrosity; there is, on the contrary, no permissive will in an omniscient being,
except insofar as God makes himself conform to the ideality or the optimality of
things.
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At the end of the letter to Wedderkopf, Leibniz writes, “But this is said to you; I
should not like to have it get abroad. For not even the most accurate remarks are
understood by everyone.” Leibniz is worried that this hard determinism will be taken to
impugn God's goodness. For God punishes sins that could not be helped, and he chose
to create the world where sins would occur. Leibniz’s official position is that the reason
for God's creation of the world is ultimately a mystery. Perhaps this is not what he
believed since he knew how difficult these positions are to reconcile. However, there
are many places where Leibniz says that God's choice to create is not necessitated by
the best possible world, and that his choice is free. In the next chapter I will try to
reconcile this position with Leibniz’s views on the nature and order of the world.
A II I 1 17-18 (L 146-47).
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CHAPTER 3
LEIBNIZ ON WHY THE WORLD IS THE WAY IT IS
Introduction
The second question Leibniz poses in "The Ultimate Origin of Things” is "Why
is the world the way that it is?” He says the answer to this question is “certainly to be
. . . , . . 8 ?
sought in the striving ol possibles lor existence.” ~ Although the striving of possibles
was discussed briefly in Chapter 2. here 1 will discuss how we should understand this
metaphor as an explanation of the nature of the best possible world. In doing this, 1 will
discuss Leibniz's views on the structure and knowability of the world. Three main
questions will be answered: ( 1 ) Could the world have been different from the way it is,
and, if so. in what way? (2) How do we gain knowledge of the world? And, finally, (3)
What is the nature or structure of the actual world?
God's Freedom and The Principle of Perfection
By ‘possibles' Leibniz means possible worlds, not possible individuals. Possible
worlds exist in God’s understanding. As I noted in the previous chapter, possible
worlds are collections of maximally compossible complete individual concepts and the
laws of nature. When Leibniz writes of the “striving of possibles for existence,” he is
saying each possible world has some claim on God to bring it into existence in so far as
the possible world contains some perfection, which it does. All being has some positive
goodness: Leibniz defines evil as the privation of being. Thus any world God could
create would be better than none at all since it would have some positive good
s: G VII 305.
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contained in it. In order to understand which possibles do come into existence, we must
understand God’s choice of the possible world he did create and whether he might have
created a different one.
Is it possible for God to have made a different world from this one? Leibniz
suggests that we cannot answer this question because to do so would require an infinite
analysis that cannot be completed by any finite mind. Leibniz’s theory of infinite
analysis in relation to God's creation has been discussed to some degree in the previous
chapter. In this chapter, I will investigate another path to understanding God’s choice
of this world, and in what sense that choice, according to Leibniz, is contingent.
Why Not Indifference?
One way in which God’s choice to create this world might be contingent, would
be for it not to be caused by any reason, i.e., for it to be indifferent. Previous
philosophers, Descartes most notably, argued that God's indifference to what he creates
is perfectly consistent with his other attributes, that is, his omnipotence, omniscience,
and his omnibenevolence. This view is a result of taking God's sovereignty very
seriously. In order for God to be in control of all things, he must be able to do anything.
In the previous chapter I discussed Descartes’s views on the creation of the eternal
truths and Leibniz’s response. Descartes holds that God freely creates the eternal truths
and is completely indifferent to the creation of the world.
It is self-contradictory to suppose that the will of God was not indifferent from
eternity with respect to everything which has happened or will ever happen; for
it is impossible to imagine that anything is thought of in the divine intellect as
DM 5. Leibniz writes, “But to have particular knowledge of the reasons which led
[God] to choose this arrangement of the universe, to allow sin, to dispense his saving
grace in a certain way, is beyond the power of a finite mind, especially when it has not
yet attained the delight of seeing God.”
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good or true, or worthy of belief or action or omission, prior to the decision of
the divine will to make it so. 1 am not speaking here of temporal priority: I
mean that there is not even any priority of order, or nature, or of ‘rationally
determined reason’ as they call it. such that God's idea of the good impelled him
to choose one thing rather than another. ... Thus the supreme indifference to be
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found in God is the supreme indication of his omnipotence.
While Descartes’s views about the creation of the world might coincide better
w ith articles of Christian faith than Leibniz’s views do. Leibniz found Descartes’ views
to be both metaphysically unsatisfying and theologically unacceptable. They are
metaphysically unsatisfying because they violate the principle of sufficient reason; and
they are theologically unacceptable in that they give us no reason to call God ‘good’ or
to trust in his wisdom or benevolence. Leibniz writes in the Theodicy (Reply to
Objection VIII),
If the will of God had not as its rule the principle of the best, it would
tend towards evil, which would be worst of all; or else it would be indifferent
somehow to good and to evil, and guided by chance. But a will that would
always drift along at random would scarcely be any better for the government of
the universe than the fortuitous concourse of corpuscles, without the existence of
divinity. And even though God should abandon himself to chance only in some
cases, and in a certain way (as he would if he did not always tend entirely
towards the best, and if he were capable of preferring a lesser good to a greater
good, that is, an evil to a good, since that which prevents a greater good is an
evil) he would be no less imperfect than the object of his choice. Then he would
not deserve absolute trust; he would act without reason in such a case, and the
government of the universe would be like certain games equally divided
85
between reason and luck.
The Principle of Sufficient Reason holds for all truths, but the Principle of
Sufficient Reason alone is not enough to guarantee the existence of the best possible
world. It is consistent with the Principle of Sufficient Reason merely that the world
have some cause or reason for its existence. God causing the existence of the world
CSM II 291-2.
T Reply to Objection VIII.
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should be enough to satisfy the Principle of Sufficient Reason, whether he has some
reason for creating it or not. If this were so. then Leibniz's view is compatible with
Descartes's indifference view of creation. According to Descartes’s view, the reason
why the world exists is that God created it. Why did God create it? There is no reason,
according to Descartes. Leibniz, however, wants to say the reason God created the
world is because it is the best world, and God has decreed always to do the best.
According to Leibniz, God could have created the world for many different reasons (it
is even logically possible for him to have done it for no reason at all if the Principle of
Sufficient Reason is not a necessary truth), but God freely chooses the principle of the
best.
For even if the world is not metaphysically necessary, in the sense that its
contrary implies a contradiction or a logical absurdity, it is, however, physically
necessary or determined, in the sense that its contrary implies imperfection or
moral absurdity. And just as possibility is the foundation of essence, so
perfection or degree of essence (through which the greatest number of things are
compossible) is the foundation of existence. From this it is at the same time
obvious how the Author of the World can be free, even though everything
happens determinately, since he acts from a principle of wisdom or perfection.
Indeed, indifference arises from ignorance, and the wiser one is, the more one is
determined to do that which is most perfect.
s
Leibniz rightly sees that God’s nature will determine him to some extent. The
reasons that God's infinite understanding supplies him in respect to his choices will
have some affect on his actions. He also sees that Descartes has placed too much
emphasis on divine power and will, and too little on divine understanding and goodness.
It is important for God to be able to act in accordance with his will. But in order for
God to be ‘good’ and worthy of praise he must also be wise and benevolent. God
creates the world that is both metaphysically most perfect and morally most perfect.
86 G VII 305 (AG 151).
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This is an objective matter for Leibniz. What God does must be good, not simply
because he has done it, but because he would not have done otherwise.
The Principle of Sufficient Reason guarantees that everything has a reason or
cause, but as we have seen this principle is not strong enough to guarantee the creation
of any particular world. Whatever world God had chosen would have had a cause, viz..
God's efficacious will. However, in order to guarantee that the best world is the one
chosen, it is necessary for God always to do what is best - metaphysically and morally.
It is Leibniz’s denial of libertarian freedom for God, his denial that God chooses the
eternal truths, his denial that God acts indifferently with respect to all the worlds, that
makes the Principle of Perfection important. The Principle of Perfection is what
determines our world, the actual world, as the metaphysically and morally best possible
world. Had God created as Descartes claims he does, then any world God chose would
have been good, as God tells us his creation is good. However, to Leibniz’s way of
thinking this account of creation does not guarantee that God could not have chosen
better than he did. Leibniz thinks choosing the best is the only choice befitting God’s
nature. Since Descartes’s view cannot provide this guarantee it is unacceptable.
While it is generally held by Leibniz scholars that the Principle of Sufficient
Reason, along with God’s nature, is enough to guarantee God's creation of the best
possible world, I do not believe Leibniz saw it that way. Leibniz often says that God's
first free decree is always to do what is best. That is, God's first free decree is to
implement the Principle of Perfection. It would not be contradictory for God to decree
something else first. It would not be contradictory for God never to decree the Principle
of Perfection. That is to say that it is not contradictory for God to do the best without
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decreeing to do the best - he could just do it. Since God could have freely decreed
other than he did. according to Leibniz, God's first decree to implement the Principle of
Perfection is free.
God's second free decree according to Leibniz is that creatures follow the
principle of perfection. That is. he decreed a world in which finite intellects act in
accordance with reason towards choosing the best, or at least what appears to them to be
the best (given their finite knowledge).
The Principle of Sufficient Reason and the Principle of Perfection
It seems that we can know certain things about why God chose to create as he did.
Leibniz writes that God's first free decree was to implement the Principle of
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Perfection . In the Discourse on Metaphysics Leibniz writes.
This sequence is based on the first free decree of God which was to do always
that which is the most perfect and upon the decree which God made following
the first one, regarding human nature, which is that men should always do,
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although freely, that which appears to be the best.
Likewise, he writes in "On Freedom and Possibility,”
And so we must hold that everything having some degree of perfection is
possible, and. moreover, that the possible that occurs is the one more perfect
than its opposite, and that this happens not because of its nature but because of
89
God's general resolve to create that which is most perfect.
The Principle of Perfection, every mind w ishes to choose what appears best to that
mind
.
as applied to God, who is omniscient and omnipotent, yields that God always
chooses what is best. We know God's first decree was to implement the Principle of
87
Leibniz sometimes refers to this principle as the "Principle of Fitness,” or "The
Principle of the Best.”
ss DM XIII.
89
A VI II 275-78.
6C
Perfection and his second decree was to choose the world in which rational creatures
best expressed this principle. So, we can know that God chose the world in which the
creatures best follow the Principle of Perfection.
It is fairly common among Leibniz scholars to hold that the Principle of Perfection
. , B 90
is derived from or is an instance of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. The argument
for this claim is that the Principle of Sufficient Reason requires a reason for any given
action or state of affairs. God's creation of the world is an action, and so requires a
reason for its occurrence. The reason for God's creation of the world is. because of his
nature, he always does what is best. But this argument requires us always to read the
Principle of Sufficient Reason in a particular way, that is, we must always read it as the
demand for a rationale rather than a physical cause, and assumes that they may not
always be the same. It is difficult to determine exactly what the Principle of Sufficient
Reason is. Leibniz gives several formulations of The Principle of Sufficient Reason.
Various versions of the Principle of Sufficient Reason as noted by Benson Mates
Nothing comes to pass without a reason.
There must be a sufficient reason for anything to exist, for any event to
. 92
occur, for any truth to obtain.
Nothing occurs for which it would be impossible for someone who had
enough knowledge of things to give a reason adequate to determine why the
thing is as it is and not otherwise.
For instance Parkinson and Mates seem to hold this view.
1
Benson Mates, The Philosophy of Leibniz: Metaphysics and Language (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1986), 155.
92 G VII 419 (L 717)
93 G VI 602 (L 639)
inlcue:
3.
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4. There is no proposition (other than identicals) in which the connection
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between subject and predicate cannot be distinctly explained.
5. The principle that a reason must be given is this: that every true proposition
not known per se has an a priori proof, or that a reason can be given for
. . 95
every truth, or, as is commonly said, everything has a cause.
6. Nothing exists without a reason. For nothing exists without the aggregate of
all its requisites. (A requisite is that without which the thing cannot exist; the
96
aggregate ot all requisites is the full cause of the thing.)
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7. Nothing exists without a reason, or there is no effect without a cause.
8. For everything that exists there is a reason why it exists as it does and not
otherwise.
Clearly, some of these various formulations of the Principle of Sufficient Reason
must be read as causal principles. However, even if this is true, we might still hold that
the Principle of Perfection is dependent upon the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Some
commentators seem to think that we should privilege some formulations of the Principle
of Sufficient Reason over others. For instance Parkinson thinks that the formulation
given in (5) is the true (logical) form of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and the other
formulations that Leibniz gives are merely common sense versions of the Principle or
are really instances of the Principle of Perfection. Parkinson writes in his introduction
to De Snmma Rerum:
G VII 309
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Grua 267.
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C 519, C 1 1, C 25.
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This is the way the principle is stated in "On the Ultimate Origin of Things.” See AG
152.
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In his later philosophy, Leibniz makes much use of a principle that he calls ‘the
principle of the best' [The Principle of Perfection). This may be regarded as a
specific form of the principle of sufficient reason; specific, in that it concerns
contingent things and truths only, whereas the principle of sufficient reason is
universal in its application, and also in that the ‘sufficient reason' is one that
. 99
determines God's choice in creating the universe.
However. I believe that Leibniz held the Principle of Perfection to be an independent
principle. I will discuss reasons for thinking this to be the case in what follows.
Parkinson on The Principle of Perfection
I (X)
Parkinson claims that Leibniz uses the term "Principle of Sufficient Reason" to
designate two distinct principles in his philosophy. One is the principle that the reason
any proposition, p, is true is that the concept of the predicate is contained in the concept
of the subject, or that every truth has an a priori proof. The other is the principle that
for any event (state of affairs, entity) there is a reason (or cause) why it exists as it does
and not otherwise. According to Parkinson, the first version of the Principle of
Sufficient Reason is derivable from Leibniz's logic, but the second is derived from
theological assumptions. hi order to keep clear which principle he is dealing with in
particular cases, Parkinson gives the first principle the name of the “Principle of
102
Sufficient Reason" and the second principle the "Principle of the Best." Parkinson
gives primacy to the principle derived from Leibniz's logic and reserves the title of
G.H.R. Parkinson, Introduction to De Summa Rerum: Metaphysical Papers , 1675-
1676 (New Haven: Yale University, 1992), xxv.
G.H.R. Parkinson. Logic and Reality in Leibniz’s Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1965).
G.H.R. Parkinson, Logic and Reality in Leibniz’s Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1965), 105.
1
Parkinson uses the term “Principle of the Best" for what I, and others, call the
"Principle of Perfection.”
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“Principle of Sufficient Reason" for it. When referring to the other principle,
Parkinson writes, “It is therefore unfortunate that Leibniz sometimes refers to this
principle as 'the principle of sufficient reason', since it has already been seen that a
principle of this name does follow from his logic.”"’ According to Parkinson then, the
Principle of Perfection is equivalent to the non logical formulation of the Principle of
Sufficient Reason.
While it is true that Leibniz seems to have two non-equivalent versions of the
Principle of Sufficient reason (actually, it seems he has many), I do not think the second
version Parkinson gives should be called the “Principle of Perfection,” since Leibniz
seems to have a completely separate principle in mind when he uses this title.
Leibniz often says that the Principle of Perfection is that God will always do what is
best, or that minds always tend towards the best, or the apparent best. The Principle of
Perfection is God's first free decree.
"
' The Principle of Sufficient Reason is a
necessary truth." And while one might argue that God’s decree makes the Principle of
Perfection a necessary truth as well, it differs from the Principle of Sufficient Reason in
that it is subject both to God’s will and to his understanding. The Principle of Sufficient
Reason, even in the non-logical forms, is subject only to God’s understanding. So. the
G.H.R. Parkinson, Logic and Reality in Leibniz's Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1965), 105.
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Leibniz writes at DM XIII, “This sequence is based on the first free decree of God
which was to do always that which is the most perfect and upon the decree which God
made following the first one, regarding human nature, which is that men should always
do, although freely, that which appears to be the best.”
" There is no text that I know of where Leibniz explicitly says this. He comes close in
On Contingency
,
1686 (AG 28-30). However, it is generally agreed by Leibniz scholars
that Leibniz held the principle as a necessary truth.
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two principles have different modal statuses. Since they have different modal statuses,
one is not an instance of the other. Since no contradiction would obtain if God never
decreed the Principle of Perfection, the Principle of Perfection is not entailed by the
Principle of Sufficient Reason.
Necessitarianism
In the first appendix to the Theodicy
, which is titled “Summary of the Controversy
Reduced to Formal Arguments,” Leibniz gives the following argument against his own
view as Objection VIII:
Whoever cannot fail to choose the best is not free.
God cannot fail to choose the best.
1 06
Therefore, God is not free.
. . 1 07
In his reply to the objection, he writes, “I deny the major of this argument." That
is, Leibniz denies that whoever cannot fail to choose the best is not free. Leibniz goes
on to say that it is true freedom always to be led to the good without internal or external
constraint. He explains God’s creation of the best things as follows: “He creates them
freely: but when he had set before himself an end. that of exercising his goodness, his
wisdom determined him to choose the means most appropriate for obtaining this
1 08
end.” Leibniz again affirms that God chooses to create the best (that is. he affirms the
Principle of Perfection), and then chooses the best possible world from among the
infinite possible worlds. The objection Leibniz is trying to answer is one that troubled
him throughout his career, namely, the objection that his view implies Necessitarianism.
T Reply to Objection VIII.
T Reply to Objection VIII.
T Reply to Objection VIII.
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Necessitarianism is that for any proposition p. if p, then necessarily p. How could
Leibniz's view lead to Necessitarianism? Leibniz clearly saw that something like the
. 109
following argument would get him in trouble:
1. It is necessary that God exists.
2. It is necessary that if God exists, then God is perfectly good.
3. Therefore, it is necessary that God is perfectly good. (1,2)
4. It is necessary that a perfectly good being always chooses to do the best.
5. If God creates worlds, it is necessary that he chooses to create the best possible
world.
6. God chose to create the actual world (since that is our world).
7. Therefore, it is necessary that God chose to create the best possible world. (4, 5,
6 )
8. Whichever world is the best is the best necessarily.
9. If it is necessary that God chose the best world, and that this world that is the
best is the best necessarily, then it is necessary that the best world, call it a.
obtains.
10. Therefore, it is necessary that the best possible world, call it alpha , obtains. (7,
8,9)
1 1 . If alpha obtains of necessity, then it is not possible for God to have created any
other world.
12. Therefore, nothing other than what happens in alpha can happen.
13. Therefore, for any proposition, p, if p is true in alpha , then p is necessarily true.
(M, 12)
This argument gets one to Necessitarianism rather quickly. The question is which
step of this argument would Leibniz reject and why? Leibniz gives two different
109
The basic argument on which this one is based was formulated and discussed in R. C.
Sleigh’s graduate seminar on Leibniz on Freedom, Spring 2005 at the University of
Massachusetts, Amherst.
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reasons for rejecting such an argument. Leibniz sometimes denies that it is necessary for
God to choose the best possible world. This would mean for the argument above that
Leibniz would reject premise 4. He does not reject that God does choose the best
possible world, but he rejects that God necessarily chooses the best possible world.
Leibniz’s rejection of premise 4 renders the inference to premise 7, as I have stated it,
invalid. At other times, Leibniz seems to reject the inference of the necessity of the
world from the necessity of God's choosing the best when what is best is the best of
necessity. In other words, Leibniz denies the following inference:
1 . It is necessary that God chose to create the best possible world.
2. It is necessary that alpha is the best possible world.
3. Therefore, it is necessary that alpha exists.
While the rejection of premise 4 seems to be a fair choice, the denial of the
inference of necessity from necessity might raise eyebrows (since that what is necessary
follows from what is necessary is a straightforward principle of modal logic). Reseller’s
attempt to show that Leibniz rejected premise 4 by claiming the infinite analysis
required for God’s decision renders his decision to create the best possible world
contingent and not necessary was discussed in the previous chapter. Now' I wish to
consider a reason for thinking Leibniz could reject both premise 4 and the inference of
the necessity of the conclusion above from the necessity of its premises, not by his
account of infinite analysis, but by his account of God’s freedom.
We must first determine how God’s decrees can be free. Here is the infamous
passage on freedom from the Theodicy 288. The pertinent part reads:
I have shown that freedom, such as is required by the schools of
theologians, consists in intelligence, which involves a clear knowledge
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of the object of deliberation, in spontaneity, whereby we determine, and
in contingency, that is, in the exclusion of logical or metaphysical
I 10
necessity.
In section 230 of the Theodicy, Leibniz writes.
The decree to create is free: God is prompted to all good: the
good, and even the best, inclines him to act; but it dos not compel him,
for his choice creates no impossibility in that which is distinct from the
best; it causes no implication of contradiction in that which God refrains
from doing. There is therefore in God a freedom that is exempt not only
from constraint but also from necessity. 1 mean this in respect of
metaphysical necessity; for it is a moral necessity that the wisest should
be bound to choose the best.'"
Again, in the Theodicy:
Nevertheless, although his will is always indefectible and always tends
towards the best, the evil or the lesser good which he rejects will still be
possible in itself. Otherwise the necessity of the good would be
geometrical (so to speak) or metaphysical, and altogether absolute; the
contingency of things would be destroyed, and there would be no choice.
But necessity of this kind, which does not destroy possibility of the
contrary, has the name by analogy only: it becomes effective not through
the mere essence of things, but through that which is outside them and
above them, that is, through the will of God. This necessity is called
moral, because for the wise what is necessary and what is owing are
equivalent things.
What, then, is needed for God’s decree to be free is that he choose from among
alternatives possible in themselves. A free act is one that (a) is determined by the
intellect of the agent as best, (b) is spontaneous, that is, not caused by anything external
1 10
1 1
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T 288.
T 230.
' T Reply to objection VIII.
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to the agent, and (c) precludes metaphysical or absolute necessity, that is, is performed
from among alternatives that are per se possible or non-contradictory."
God makes two free decrees according to Leibniz (I do not here mean to commit
Leibniz to the thesis that these are separate acts for God, nor that there is a temporal
ordering among them, but merely that they are conceptually separate acts of God).
First, God freely decrees to do the best, and second, God freely decrees that created
beings will always do what is. or seems to be, the best. Each of these decrees involves a
free action on God’s part. That is, each involves a choice among alternatives possible
in themselves. God could have decreed something else as his first free act - there is no
contradiction in thinking so. It is not logically or metaphysically necessary that God’s
first decree, or any of his decrees, be to always do what is best. Leibniz writes in the
Discourse, “It is reasonable and certain ...that God will always do the best, even though
what is less perfect does not imply a contradiction.”"
4
In the same way, God's choice of
the world is not necessary, as the world was chosen from among an infinite number of
worlds each of which is possible in itself. God’s choice of this world would have been
necessary if, for example, there had been only one possible world from which to choose
and he could not refrain from choosing that world. This would have failed to meet the
criterion for a free action as it fails to exclude metaphysical necessity.
God sets before himself a goal - do what is best, but he could have had any number
of goals, so the goal is established freely. Once the goal is established, his wisdom
directs him to the means for the goal, which world to “pick.” but the choice is made
" Note that one alternative that might be per se possible is the refraining from some
action.
" 4 DM 13.
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from among infinite worlds possible in themselves. The choice both of the goal and of
the means are free according to Leibniz.
According to Leibniz, since God’s action does not obtain with metaphysical
necessity, yet we all understand, given God’s nature, that there is some obligation to act
in accordance with goodness, we should say his action is “morally necessary.” Moral
necessity can be defined as follows: an act, x, is morally, but not metaphysically,
necessary if x is a free act on the part of the agent and x is determined by the agent's
nature as an act that ought to be done. I will now restate the first part of the argument
for Necessitarianism using Leibniz's modalities:
1. It is metaphysically necessary that God exist.
2. It is metaphysically necessary that if God exists, then God is perfectly good.
3. Therefore, it is metaphysically necessary that God is perfectly good. (1,2)
4. It is morally necessary that a perfectly good being choose to do the best.
5. If God creates, it is morally necessary for God to create the best possible world.
6. God creates (we exist).
7. Therefore, it is morally necessary for God to have created the best possible
world. (4. 5, 6)
So far the argument avoids the metaphysical necessity of the world. The creation of
the best possible world is only morally necessary. Of course there are many questions
about what exactly moral necessity amounts to. Leibniz denies that a necessarily good
agent will perform actions that are the best of necessity. Instead he claims that God
must make a further free choice to do what is best. It is difficult to see how this could
be the case given that God is omnipotent and omniscient and omnibenevolent. It seems
God is necessitated by his nature to perform the act that is best.
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However, we need to keep in mind God need not perform any acts. He will be
perfectly good no matter what. His first decree is the decree to act in accordance with
his goodness, that is, to determine the best act possible and to perform it. Were there no
best world to create, he would not create it. But he commits himself to creating a world,
if there is a single best world, by decreeing the Principle of Perfection.
We can see also that God's choice of which world to create is free, given Leibniz's
definition, because God has an infinity of worlds to deliberate and choose among. The
rest of the Necessitarian argument, with Leibniz's modalities, now goes as follows:
8. It is metaphysically necessary that the best world is the best.
9. If it is morally necessary that God created the best world and it is metaphysically
necessary that the best world is the best, then it is metaphysically necessary that
the best world, call it alpha , obtains.
10. Therefore, it is metaphysically necessary that the best world, call it alpha
,
obtains.
1 1. For any s, if s is metaphysically necessary, and s’s existence with some other
thing, r, would create a contradiction, then r is impossible.
12. Therefore, no world other than alpha is possible.
13. However, there is an infinity of possible worlds other than alpha.
14. Therefore, alpha does not obtain with metaphysical necessity.
15. Therefore, it is morally necessary that the best possible world, alpha , obtains.
16. Since alpha is not metaphysically necessary, other worlds are possible.
17. Therefore, not everything that happens in alpha is metaphysical necessity.
18. Therefore, for any p, if p is true in alpha , then p is not necessarily
metaphysically necessary.
Leibniz maintains that God’s decrees are free. Thus the world is contingent and
could have been otherwise. God could have created a different possible world if he had
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not decreed the Principle of Perfection. Moreover, even after having decreed to always
do what is best, the choice of the best world was still free since it was chosen from
among an infinity of other per se possible worlds. God’s free decrees and the
Leibnizian modalities allow Leibniz to escape this Necessitarian argument.'"
How Do VVe Know the World?
Leibniz holds that we can know the world to a great extent. We can use our reason,
if we proceed carefully, to understand both the general and the subordinate laws of the
world. But how is this is possible? When it comes to our knowledge of the world, it
seems that the Concept Containment account of truth will not be of much help. After
all, only necessary truths can be demonstrated in a finite number of steps, and only God
can see the containment of the predicate in the subject in the case of contingent truths,
truths in our world. So, how can we know the world?
We might first consider the Complete Individual Concepts of substances. It is true,
if we were we to know everything about psychological laws and a given individual, we
could make pretty good guesses about its future actions. Given that the world is a
collection of individual substances, we could, in principle, know the world through the
complete individual concepts of the individual substances in the world. Rutherford
expresses this view when he writes.
If understanding what any being is, and all that is potentially true of it, can be
reduced to an analysis of the essence or defining concept of that being, then we
in principle possess the means for comprehending everything there is to know
Here 1 have not considered how Leibniz's view of complete individual concepts is
another road to Necessitarianism. If every truth about an individual is contained in his
complete individual concept, then it seems that every truth about individuals is
necessary. It is possible that Leibniz’s views on freedom will suffice to mediate this
argument as well, but work on human freedom will have to be done another time.
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about the world, through our knowledge of the beings that constitute the
i i
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world.
However, this knowledge is not available to us in practice; as Rutherford notes, it is
available only in principle. For the free choices of individuals are contingent facts only
knowable via the infinite analysis which only God can perform. That this knowledge is
available in principle is important for God's choice about which world is the best, but it
cannot be the way we understand the world. Leibniz, remarking on his correspondence
with Arnauld, discusses the difference between knowing what is entailed by a general
concept, like that of a sphere, and knowing what is entailed by the specific concept of
an individual person, like himself. He writes, "The result is that, though it is easy to
determine that the number of feet in the diameter is not included in the notion of sphere
in general, it is not so easy to judge whether the trip I intend to make is included in my
notion; otherwise, it would be as easy for us to be prophets as to be geometers.”" We
have to seek other routes. Luckily there are some.
Final Causes and Efficient Causes
In "Principles of Nature and Grace,” Leibniz, speaking of the laws of motion,
writes, "For 1 have found that we have to bring in final causes, and that these general
laws do not depend on the principle of necessity, as logical, arithmetical, and
geometrical truths do, but on the principle of compatibility, the choices of wisdom, that
.
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In §7 of “Principles of Nature and Grace,” Leibniz talks about the Principle of
Sufficient Reason as a great principle that is very rarely used. He also says it is by
means of this principle that we climb from the physical to the metaphysical. The
Principle of Sufficient Reason is a great principle of our reasoning according to Leibniz.
It allows us to know that the universe is intelligible - there is always an explanation of
things because that is the way that rational beings operate. Rational beings operate
according to reason in so far as they are able.
In "Elements of Natural Science” Leibniz distinguishes between two kinds of a
priori ways of discovering causes in physics - one certain and one conjectural. He
writes, “The a priori method is certain if we can demonstrate from the known nature of
God the structure of the world which is in agreement with the divine reasons and from
119
this structure, can finally arrive at the principles ot sensible things.” Ot the
conjectural, he writes, “The conjectural method a priori proceeds by hypothesis,
assuming certain causes, perhaps, without proof, and showing that the things which now
1 20
happen would follow from these assumptions.” It seems fairly clear the certain
method of discovering causes in physics involves the principle of perfection. That is,
were we able to discern what is best, we would know what the causes in physics are.
The causes in physics are those belonging to the best possible world or, what amounts
to the same thing, those belonging to the world a perfectly good and rational being
would choose. However, since we created beings are imperfect, we cannot always
follow the certain route. We must use the principle of sufficient reason and proceed
I 19
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imperfectly by hypothesis - knowing only that there is some cause for every effect that
we observe in the world.
According to Leibniz, both efficient and final causes exist. He writes,
I even find that several effects of nature can be demonstrated doubly, that is, by
considering first the efficient cause and then by considering the final cause,
making use, for example, of God's decree always to produce his effect by the
easiest and most determinate ways, as I have shown elsewhere in accounting for
, I
7
1
the rules of catoptrics and dioptrics.
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Efficient causation corresponds to what we might ordinarily think of as physical
causation. For Leibniz, this takes the torm ol perceptions producing perceptions, “ or
at the phenomenal level, motions causing motions, or forces acting upon one another in
the world.
Since the world is filled with intelligences and God has created them so they always
act in accordance with reasons, we can find the cause of human actions by examining
their reasons. In addition, we can find the causes of physical effects through this means
since all things have been, in the end. created by an intelligence for a purpose. God
creates the physical laws, i.e., the subordinate laws, in order to achieve the best possible
world. Thus we can be certain the laws have reasons for their creation. Leibniz writes.
It is also obvious how God acts not only physically, but freely, how in him there
is not only the efficient cause of things, but the final cause, and how in him we
have not only the reason for the greatness or power in the mechanism of the
universe as now constituted, but also the reason for the goodness or wisdom in
. 123
constituting it.
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Whether, in fact, all efficient causation is ultimately reducible to tinal causation or
not, according to Leibniz, is not a question that I will explore here. It is sufficient to say
that Leibniz uses both terms, and at times he seems to express different uses for them.
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Moreover, it is unreasonable to introduce a supreme intelligence as orderer of
things and then, instead of using his wisdom, use only the properties of matter to
explain the phenomena. This is as if, in order to account for the conquest of an
important place by a great prince a historian were to claim that it occurred
because the small particles of gunpowder, set off by the contact of a spark,
escaped with sufficient speed to push a hard and heavy body against the walls of
place, while the little particles that make up the brass of the cannon were so
firmly interlaced that this speed did not separate them, instead of showing how
the foresight of the conqueror enabled him to choose the suitable means and
1 74
times and how his power overcame all obstacles.
"
Knowing that God has ordered the universe in accordance with supreme reason
and goodness, we can know that the world is in principle intelligible to rational beings if
they are careful in their reasonings. We can also know that God values principles that
are a priori knowable to us. We can know, for instance, that God will prefer a more
simple law to a more complicated one. We can know that there will be a preference for
a minimal number of general laws governing the universe rather than a larger number of
specific laws for different phenomena. We can also rule out hypotheses under
consideration that do not seem to conform to the laws of simplicity. Because it is
sometimes easier to rule out hypotheses based on the laws of simplicity, rather than on
known phenomena, Leibniz thinks it is often better to proceed by seeking final causes
rather than efficient causes.
However, 1 find that the way of efficient causes, which is in fact deeper and in
some sense more immediate and a priori , is, on the other hand, quite difficult
when it comes to details, and I believe that, for the most part, our philosophers
are still far from it. But the way of final causes is easier, and is not infrequently
of use in divining important and useful truths which one would be a long time in
125
seeking by the other, more physical way.
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The question of how it is that humans are able to know the world is answered by
the Principle of Perfection and the Principle of Sufficient Reason. The world is
knowable in principle, but it is difficult to know in practice. We, as rational beings, are
best suited to proceeding by way of seeking final causes. However, we must be careful
in our reasoning and we must conform our reasoning to empirical findings. Our
reasoning about the world should be in accord with the empirical findings of the
sciences since God's wisdom is evident in every part of his creation. The way of
seeking knowledge about the world through final causes and the way of seeking
knowledge about the world through efficient causes will lead us to the same
conclusions. Sometimes we find it easier to follow one rather than the other, but the
conclusions we reach by one path should never conflict with those we reach via the
other path. While Leibniz maintains there is no conceptual barrier to perfect knowledge
of the world, our limited minds and time keep us from obtaining it on an individual
basis. Through the cooperative undertaking of philosophy and science, it is possible,
over time, according to Leibniz, to know a great deal, perhaps even everything. As
Leibniz writes, in “On the Ultimate Origination of Things”, “Thus, progress never
comes to an end.
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The Structure of the World
Leibniz emphasizes several features of our world. One is that it is the best possible
world - both metaphysically and morally. It is therefore, according to Leibniz, the most
harmonious world. It is also the world containing the simplest laws and the largest
number of essences. Our world, according to Leibniz, contains the largest number of
126 AG 155.
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phenomena. In addition, every substance expresses its universe. But what does Leibniz
mean by “every substance expresses its universe,” “most harmonious,” “the largest
number of essences,” and “largest number of phenomena?” How should we understand
these features of our world ? In this section, I will examine several of the key notions
about the best possible world.
The World with the Most Essences?
Does Leibniz maintain that God creates the world containing the largest number of
essences possible? Leibniz maintains that all positive being contains some perfection,
so every essence contains some perfection. Given that God wants to create the best
possible world, that is, the world with the most perfection, it seems God should create
the world with the largest number of essences contained in it. C.D. Broad writes.
Granted that any universe is better than none at all, God has now only to decide
which one he will create. And here the decision is determined simply by the
relative amounts of metaphysical perfection in each. It is plain that the doctrine
comes in the end to this, that God will create as much as is logically possible for
him to create. Everything positive is wholly good; and the more there is of it,
and the greater the intensity of anything that has intensive magnitude, the more
goodness there will be.
'
Broad concludes by saying that since everything positive is logically compatible
with every other positive thing, it follows that God would create everything possible.
Thus, according to Broad, Leibniz should have accepted Spinoza's conclusion that
everything possible is actual.
Leibniz, of course, vehemently denies that all possible essences are created. His
often-repeated reason for saying that not all possibles are created is that not all possibles
C.D. Broad. Leibniz: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1975 ), 161 - 162 .
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are able to exist with each other, that is, not all possible substances are "compossible.”
He claims some substances “get in the way" of others.
How exactly some substances impede the existence of other substances, according
to Leibniz, is something of a mystery. “It is yet unknown to men, whence arises the
incompossibility of diverse things, or how it can happen that diverse essences are
opposed to each other, seeing that all purely positive terms seem to be compatible inter
se.” But Leibniz does not leave us in perplexity; instead, he offers a different
argument against the Spinozistic claim that everything possible is actual. In a letter to
Wolff from May 18, 1715 he writes,
I do not know whether it can be said more absolutely that the unlimited is more
perfect than the limited. The unlimited is a certain sort of chaos, but its
observation brings on discomfort, not pleasure. If the divine intellect were to
produce good things and bad in equal measure, it would remain unlimited, but it
would not remain perfect. It is more perfect for the better things among the
possibles alone to exist than for good and bad things to exist equally and
. . . 1 29
indiscriminately.
"
And, in a much earlier passage, Leibniz writes;
It is not useless to discuss the vacuum of forms, in order to show that not all
possibles per se can exist along with others; otherwise many absurdities would
follow. Nothing, however unreasonable, could be conceived which would not
be in the world, not merely monsters but evil and wretched minds, and
injustices, and there would be no reason for calling God good rather than evil,
just rather than unjust.'
°
The argument can be stated as follows:
1 . If all possible things are actual, then every possible evil will be actual.
2. It is better that not every possible evil be actual.
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3.
God has decreed to do the best.
4. God makes the possible actual.
5. Therefore, God will not make every possible thing actual.
We can see that the call for the greatest numbers of essences is tempered by what
results from the co-actualization of certain essences in a world. God does not want to
create a world with the largest number of essences if that world will manifest every
possible evil. It is better to create only the good things than to create all the good and all
the bad. Some individuals when co-actualized with others will produce unspeakable
evils. Thus, while it is true that every essence has some perfection in it, it is not true
that every essence is good, all things considered. An essence’s perfection can be
outweighed by the resulting evil it produces in the world. But what does this mean at
the metaphysical level?
According to Leibniz, evil, at the metaphysical level, is a privation of being or a
lack of clarity of perceptions in a being. So the evil that results when all the possible
individuals are created must result from either a lack of substances or a lack of clarity of
perceptions. The problem is that it seems that if God were to create all possible
substances, even if their perceptions were not of great clarity, given that some
perception is better than none, the greatest amount of good would be created. But
Leibniz denies that this is possible. It is not possible because not every substance that is
possible in itself, per se possible, is compossible with the others. The reason for this is
that while every substance expresses its universe, not every substance expresses every
other substance. That is, expression, which is the orderly relation of the contents of a
8C
substance's perceptions to the rest of its world, can fail to be a symmetric relation.'
'
When we add the symmetry requirement, we get compossibility. All substances that
express themselves as pail of the same spatiotemporally connected (phenomenal) world
are compossible.
God does want to create as many essences as possible in conjunction with as much
goodness as possible. Leibniz writes in "The Ultimate Origin of Things,”
And so, assuming that at some time being is to prevail over nonbeing, or that
there is a reason why something rather than nothing is to exist, or that something
is to pass from possibility to actuality, and if (etsi) nothing beyond this is
determined, it follows that there would be as much as there possibly can be,
given the capacity of time and space (that is, the capacity of the order of possible
. 1 32
existence).
If God were creating without any additional requirements over and above the mere
consideration that all per se possible substances are good in themselves to some degree,
then he would create everything possible. This is recognized by the qualification
Leibniz makes when he says “and if nothing beyond is determined” in the above
passage. However, there are additional requirements: God takes into consideration how
substances relate to one another and their well being. God chooses the world in which
the individuals express one another best, in which there are the simplest laws, in which
'
' Here I believe that I agree with Rutherford. As I understand Rutherford’s view, he
holds that while every substance expresses its world to some extent, it is logically
possible that two substances that express themselves as being part of the same world,
fail to express each other. In order for two individuals to be compossible, they must
express each other as part of the same spatiotemporal (phenomenal) world. When the
symmetry requirement is added to expression, then we get compossibility. See Donald
Rutherford, Leibniz and the Rationed Order ofNature (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995), 178-188.
' AG 151. Ariew and Garber translate the “etsi” as “although," but a more literal
translation renders it "and if.”
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essences best accommodate each other (are most harmonious), and in which rational
essences enjoy the most happiness possible.
Compossibility, Expression, and Harmony
In a recent article,' Catherine Wilson gives an account of the relationship
between compossibility, expression, and harmony (she sometimes refers to ‘harmony’
as ‘accommodation.’ I will use ‘harmony’). There is much debate among Leibniz
scholars as to exactly how these features are related in a world. R.C. Sleigh first raises
the problem of the relation of these features of possible worlds in his commentary on
1 14
the Leibniz and Amauld correspondence. There, Sleigh argues that harmony cannot
be a logical consequence of expression or compossibility (or the two combined), but
Sleigh concedes that further explication of the three factors in world-making is a
struggle he has lost. Wilson argues we should understand compossibility as an all or
nothing condition on worlds, but that expression and harmoy come in degrees. Both
expression and harmony are what she calls “value-adding” components of a world. Her
claim is that all possible worlds are maximal collections of compossible complete
individual concepts, and that all worlds have some degree of expression. She also notes
that it is impossible that in a world consisting solely of a compossible collection of
monads that those monads lack expression, since without expression there are no
relations between monads and thus no way for them to be unified into one world. Up
Catherine Wilson. “Compossibility, Expression, Accommodation” in Leibniz:
Nature and Freedom
,
edited by Donald Rutherford and J.A. Cover (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005), 108-120.
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Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990).
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until this point, I generally agree with Wilson.' However, according to Wilson, not all
worlds are harmonious. According to Wilson, it is simple substances or monads that
express one another. She calls expression “a symmetrical relation between first-story
substances.”' Wilson takes issue with Sleigh’s account of expression as a mere
correspondence between perceptions of substances. She argues that if this were the
case, then any sequence of perceptions could express any other, and this is not what
Leibniz had in mind. However, 1 disagree with Wilson’s objection to Sleigh. I believe,
as 1 noted above, that expression can fail to be a symmetric relation, and that any
sequence of perceptions can represent any other (albeit not very well). Leibniz writes
of expression.
Since all things have a connection with others, either mediately or immediately,
the consequence is that it is the nature of every substance to express the whole
universe by its power of acting and being acted on, that is by the series of its
own immanent operations [perceptions].'
7
In order for a substance to be per se possible, it must express itself and its
universe without contradiction. So there is a minimal level of expression required to
speak of a possible individual at all. But. that an individual’s perceptions are not
internally inconsistent does not mean that that substance is compossible with other
substances. Substances will be compossible only if they express each other in as
I disagree with her statement that harmony and expression are value-adding
requirements only because I believe that expression and harmony are tied more closely
than Wilson claims, and that while they can be value adding requirements, they are not
necessarily so.
'
(
Catherine Wilson. “Compossibility, Expression, Accommodation” in Leibniz:
Nature and Freedom , edited by Donald Rutherford and J.A. Cover (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005), 1 17.
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existing in the same spatiotemporally unified universe. Only in this way. will they be
able to express one another as pail of one world. Wilson does not explicitly define
expression. She does give an example of what expression is analogous to. She writes.
Two identical twin acrobats are facing each other a few feet apart. When one
raises her right ami. the other raises her left. When one takes a step backward
with her right foot, the other takes a step backward with her left foot. We
observers can see that they are expressing each other’s movements perfectly:
. ,,
1 38
call this imitative expression.
Wilson takes this to be an analogy to perfect expression. She notes that other
less direct, but still rule-based, examples might also be cases of expression. However,
she denies expression in cases where we can find no rule or pattern.
While Wilson maintains that some level of expression must obtain in every
possible world, harmony is only exemplified at the phenomenal or second-story level of
things. Wilson provides the following thought experiment to illustrate her view:
Consider a possible world consisting of only Leibniz and Locke and the monads
that composed their bodies. These ensembles would project into Leibniz and
Locke - the embodied human beings - but not in such a way as to guarantee
their accommodation. Since only they exist and, ex hypothesi. no other objects
or people [sic.], they cannot meet or exchange letters. They cannot interact in a
common space of things; they can only express one another. And that is why
Leibniz claims obscurely that 'the entire concept of space and time that we have
is based on this harmony’ (letter to Arnauld, October 9, 1687; LA 1 15, quoted
by Sleigh in 1990:178). Leibniz explains accommodation as follows. Because
‘substances impede or limit each other,’ one can say that ‘in this sense, they act
upon one another and are required, so to speak, to accommodate themselves to
one another’ (DM 15/AG 48). But Leibniz and Locke would not seem in this
condition to limit or impede one another, and so would not seem to act upon one
another, or to accommodate to one another either.'
Catherine Wilson. “Compossibility, Expression, Accommodation" in Leibniz:
Nature and Freedom
.
edited by Donald Rutherford and J.A. Cover (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005), 1 13.
1 *9
Catherine Wilson. “Compossibility, Expression. Accommodation” in Leibniz:
Nature and Freedom , edited by Donald Rutherford and J.A. Cover (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005), 1 16.
84
In the lines Wilson quotes above from the Discourse
,
it is clear that Leibniz is
trying to explain how it is that substances are said to act on one another in “common
usage.” Wilson believes that harmony is an emergent property. However, it is unclear
what she believes it emerges from. She maintains that the Leibniz and Locke world is
one in which there is perfect expression, but no harmony. But if harmony at the
phenomenal level is not based on expression at the monadic level, it is hard to imagine
exactly what it is based on. I believe that the rest of the passage that Wilson quotes
above shows that Leibniz held that expression and harmony are more closely related
than Wilson allows. Leibniz writes,
.
,.[W]e ascribe to ourselves - and with reason - the phenomena that we express
most perfectly and that we attribute to other substances the phenomena that each
expresses best. Thus, a substance, which is of infinite extension insofar as it
expresses everything, becomes limited in proportion to its more or less perfect
manner of expression. This, then, is how one can conceive that substances
impede or limit each other, and consequently one can say that, in this sense, they
act upon one and other and are required, so to speak, to accommodate
themselves to one another. For it can happen that a change that increases the
expression of one diminishes that of another. Now the efficacy a particular
substance has is to express well the glory of God, and it is by doing this that it is
less limited. And whenever something exercises its efficacy or power, that is,
when it acts, it improves and extends itself insofar as it acts.”
The connection between expression and harmony in this passage is strong.
However. Wilson wants to deny that the level of expression determines the level of
harmony in a world.
Wilson proposes a three-tiered system. At bottom, every world contains the
property of compossibility. If a possible world is a maximal compossible collection of
complete individual concepts, then in order to have a world at all. the complete
140
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individual concepts must be able to be co-actualized. But what makes a collection of
complete individual concepts compossible? Wilson never tells us. I maintain that in
order for substances to be compossible, they must not have contradictory predicates in
their complete individual concepts (the truths that arise from the contents of their
perceptions must not conflict with those that arise from the contents of the perceptions
of other substances in the world). For instance, we cannot transport our Adam who was
married to Eve and bore Cain and Abel (and others) to a world in which it is true he
married Eve. but in which Cain is the only child of Adam. For Adam's complete
individual concept contains the predicate of being the father of Abel and Cain. Adam
expresses himself as the father of Cain and Abel. In order for the transitive relation of
compossibility to hold it must be true that the complete individual concept of Adam,
which contains the predicate of being the father of Cain and Abel, is not in conflict with
the complete individual concept of Cain, which, in our supposed possible world,
contains the predicate of being the only child of Adam. Since these complete individual
concepts are not jointly compossible, they cannot be worldmates. As Mates notes, “In
short, if two individual concepts belong to a single possible world, then they are present
141
or absent together in every possible world.” But then, in order to determine whether
two individuals are worldmates we must know what each expresses.
Expression is the second tier in world-making according to Wilson. She rightly
notes that in every possible world there is some degree of expression. In order for two
individuals to be related to one another at all (given that all the denominations of
monads are intrinsic), they must express one another. Thus, I take it that on her view
141
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expression is a requisite for compossibility as well. It seems, however, that the degree
and quality of expression will determine the degree of harmony in a world. Wilson
denies this. She sees the third tier - harmony - as something that can be absent from a
world containing universal expression. Wilson’s example of the Locke and Leibniz
world is supposed to show there can be a world with universal expression, but which
lacks harmony. Her claim is that Locke and Leibniz never express themselves as
sharing any phenomenal experience in the world, and thus never interact or interfere
with one another. She argues that in the Locke and Leibniz world there would be no
space, nor time. However, since I hold that in order for two substances to be
compossible they must express themselves as inhabiting the same spatiotemporal world,
I hold the Locke and Leibniz world does have a spatiotemporal ordering (if it is a
possible world at all. of which I am doubtful). What it is for something to exist in
spatiotemporal relation to us, according to Leibniz, is for us to be able to say truthfully
142 . .
at some time "It exists now.” It seems obvious that Locke and Leibniz can truthfully
say this of one another in Wilson's world simply because they can express one another.
They must express one another if they are compossible. because on my view
compossibility is expression that is symmetrical. Thus they are spatiotemporally
related. It seems, then, there must be some degree of harmony in that world as well.
On Wilson's model, it is only corporeal substances that interfere with one
another. But how is this possible given that corporeal substances are merely
phenomena of the perceptions contained within the monads? In order for confusion or
In "Two Notations for Discussion with Spinoza.” Leibniz writes: "But existence as it
is conceived by us involves some determinate time, or we say that a thing exists
precisely if we can say about it at some definite moment of time. This thing exists
now.’” L 168; C 529-30.
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non-accommodation to happen at the phenomenal level, there must be some
corresponding lack of clarity of expression at the monadic level. What could there be
over and above expression to add the value of harmony to the world? It seems that the
only way to explain harmony in the world is to say that it varies in proportion to the
clarity of perceptions of the monads - that is, in proportion to how well substances
express one another. Leibniz writes.
Indeed, all individual created substances are different expressions of the same
universe and different expressions of the same universal cause, namely God.
But the expressions vary in perfection
,
just as different representations or
’
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drawings ot the same town from ditlerent points ot view do.
In this passage, Leibniz tells us that expressions vary in perfection. Harmony
also varies in perfection. All expression that is symmetric generates some level of
harmony. Leibniz maintains that there are infinitely many possible worlds containing
varying levels of perfection. God creates the world with the most perfection. But, this
is not just to say that God creates a world with absolute universal expression. Recall
that Leibniz’s view is that God actualizes a maximal collection of complete individual
concepts to create a world of actual individuals.
The immortality of the mind must be taken as proved at once by any method,
because it is possible within itself and compossible with all other things, or it
does not impede the course of things. For minds have no volume. My principle,
namely, is that whatever can exist and is compatible with other things does exist,
because the reason for existing in preference to other possibles cannot be limited
by any other consideration than that not all things are compatible. Thus there is
no other reason for determining existences than that the more perfect shall exist,
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that is, those things which involve the greatest possible reality.
In a letter to Louis Bourguet. dated December 1714, Leibniz writes:
AG 33. Emphasis mine.
C 530 (L 169).
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You add these words: “If one considers the universe as a collection, one cannot
say that there could be many worlds in it.” This would be true if the universe
were a collection of all possibles, but it is not, since all possibles are not
contpossible. Thus the universe is a collection of all the possibles that exist, that
is to say, those which form the richest composite. And since there are different
combinations of possibilities, some of them better than others, there are many
possible universes, each collection of compossibles making up one of them.
' 4
Each world is a maximal collection of contpossible individuals. The main
reason why Wilson's example of the Locke and Leibniz world fails to give us an
adequate account of harmony is that the Locke and Leibniz world is not a maximal
collection of individuals. There are many more beings compatible with the existence of
Locke and Leibniz, namely, all of us! Is it possible for there to be a world with just two
complete individual substances in it? I think that Leibniz might agree that it is possible,
but a maximal collection containing only two complete individual concepts is one in
which the individuals in question would have to be extremely limited in their
expressions. They are incompatible with practically everything else possible. Given
Leibniz’s thesis that evil is a privation of being, it seems that such a world would be less
good than almost any other possible world containing more creatures. It is not a world
that God would choose even if the two individuals did express one another universally.
The essences of these two individuals are not optimal. In addition, I see no reason why
there could not be a world with just one individual - “the maximally incompossible
146
possible,” if you will. If the maximally incompossible possible expresses his world
universally, it would be a world of maximal harmony given the capacity of the world
(assuming harmony to be an equivalence relation, that is, one that is transitive.
G III 572-576 (L 662).
In this case the symmetry requirement is fulfilled vacuously.
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symmetric, and reflexive). However it is a world with a highly undesirable individual
in it, in that it is an individual incompossible with every other possible individual. The
maximally incompossible possible is an individual who is only compatible with
privation, or the lack of being or goodness. It is an individual that expresses his
universe with no perceptions relating to other substances. Recall also, that Leibniz
defines harmony as unity in plurality. A world containing one maximally
incompossible possible has as much unity in plurality as it can have, but there isn't
much plurality to begin with.
Moreover, the reason why some particular contingent thing exists, rather than
others, should not be sought in its definition alone, but in a comparison with
other things. For, since there are an infinity of possible things which,
nevertheless, do not exist, the reason why these exist rather than those should
not be sought in their definition (for then nonexistence would imply a
contradiction, and those others would not be possible, contrary to our
hypothesis), but from an extrinsic source, namely, from the fact that the ones
147
that do exist are more perfect than the others.
This world, our world, is the best possible world because it contains the most
harmony that it can have, given the sequence of things, and it contains more essences
than any other universally expressive world.
Leibniz is not committed to the claim that God creates the world with the
greatest number of individuals in it. His form of optimalism is much more subtle. In the
end, for Leibniz, the three world-making properties are related as follows. Individuals
must express one another in the same spatiotemporal phenomenal universe to be
compossible. A world with universal expression is better than one without it. A world's
harmony is determined in two ways: ( 1 ) when we consider a world by itself, by the
amount of expression in that world, and (2) when comparing harmony across worlds, by
147
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the amount of expression in a world and by the essences in a world. When considering
the essences in a world, we must consider not just the number, but also the quality, of
essences. From among the worlds with universal expression. God will choose to create
the one that also contains the best essences.
The Moral Perfection of the World
As was said earlier. Leibniz held that not only is the actual world the most perfect
metaphysically, but it is the most perfect morally as well. He writes.
And lest anyone think that I am here confusing moral perfection or goodness
with metaphysical perfection or greatness, and grant the latter while denying the
former, one must realize that it follows from what I have said that not only is the
world physically (or, if you prefer, metaphysically) most perfect, that is, that the
series of things which has been brought forth is the one in which there is, in
actuality, the greatest amount of reality, but it also follows that the world is
morally most perfect, since moral perfection is in reality physical perfection
with respect to minds. From this it follows that the world is not only the most
admirable machine, but insofar as it is made up of minds, it is also the best
republic, the republic through which minds derive the greatest possible
. „ . 148
happiness and joy, in which their physical perfection consists.
That this follows from what Leibniz has said up to this point in “On the Ultimate
Origin of Things” is an exaggeration. Certainly it does not seem to follow logically
from what he has said, namely, that the world containing the most metaphysical
perfection contains the most moral perfection as well. At least it does not follow
without the addition of some premises stating Leibnizian definitions.
Recall that harmony comes in degrees of perfection. Physical harmony comes from
the quantity and quality of expression in the world. The more substances there are and
the more adequately and often those substances express the world, the more harmony in
the world. It is in this way that we can see how harmony can be described as unity in
AG 152-153.
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multiplicity, since the more unified the expressions of the multitude of monads, the
greater the harmony. Leibniz says in the passage above, “moral perfection is in reality
physical perfection with respect to minds.” He also holds that pleasure is derived from
the sensation of perfection. An interesting passage in a letter to Wolff sheds some light
on how Leibniz believed moral goodness is related to harmony.
In morals I set up our happiness as an end; this I define as a state of enduring
joy. Joy I define as an extraordinary predominance of pleasure, for in the midst
of joy we can sense certain sorrows, but sorrows which are hardly to be
considered in comparison with the pleasures, as, for example, if somewhere a
kingdom were granted to an ambitious person suffering hopelessly from gout.
Moreover, it is necessary that the joy be enduring, so that it not be withdrawn by
a subsequent greater sadness by chance. Furthermore, pleasure is the sensation
of perfection. Perfection is the harmony of things, or the state where everything
is worthy of being observed, that is, the state of agreement or identity in variety;
you can even say that it is the degree of contemplatibility. Indeed, order,
regularity, and harmony come to the same thing. You can even say that it is the
degree of essence, if essence is calculated from harmonizing properties, which
give essence weight and momentum, so to speak. Hence, it also follows quite
nicely that God, that is, the supreme mind, is endowed with perception, indeed
149
to the greatest degree; otherwise he would not care about the harmonies.
Of course, like many passages from Leibniz, this one, though suggesting answers,
brings up difficulties. Let me start with some of the answers it suggests. It is clear that
Leibniz takes human happiness to be the ultimate end, as far as morality is concerned.
This happiness consists in an enduring joy or pleasure.
Now, the most perfect of all beings, those that occupy the least volume, that is,
those that least interfere with one another, are minds, whose perfections consist
in the virtues. That is why we must not doubt that the happiness of minds is the
principal aim of God and that he puts this into practice to the extent that
. . . 150
harmony permits it.
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Pleasure, in turn, is derived from the perception of harmony. Harmony is the state
of agreement in variety. Thus, our pleasure, our happiness, our joy, is derived from the
agreement of perceptions that constitutes the metaphysical harmony of the world. With
these definitions in place, it would seem moral perfection is derived from metaphysical
perfection. Yet, our world seems to be filled with all sorts of pains, sorrows, and even,
evils. How is it then that this world is morally perfect? Why do we not take pleasure in
mere goodness rather than in unity in multiplicity? This is where the difficulties begin.
We might ask Leibniz, “Why is it that our world is not perfect from start to finish?”
Why do we need the bad parts in order to make a good world? For it seems that if our
world were the best possible world morally, then it should be morally perfect, since
such a world is conceivable. This, of course, is the troubling problem of evil. Leibniz
was well aware of this problem. He was also aware that his view of our world as the
best possible world seems primafacie false, in light of the evils contained within it.
However, Leibniz has two main lines of argument to show that a world containing sin,
in the end, is the best.
' '
Leibniz's first response to the problem of evil is a “greater good” defense. He often
uses the analogy with music. Leibniz reminds us that music containing some
dissonance can come into a greater harmony, and in the end be more beautiful, because
of notes that on their own would seem unpleasant. He also uses an analogy with
painting. The shadows, which viewed alone, are not beautiful, but when seen with the
rest of the painting, make the whole more pleasing. He writes,
11
I have no intention of giving a complete account and analysis of Leibniz's Theodicy.
That project is a dissertation in itself. 1 here only want to draw out the connections
between moral and metaphysical perfection in our world.
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Look at a very beautiful picture, and cover it up except for some small part.
What will it look like but some confused combination of colors, without delight,
without art; indeed the more closely we examine it the more it will look that
way. But as soon as the covering is removed, and you see the whole surface
from an appropriate place, you will understand that what looked like accidental
splotches on the canvas were made with consummate skill by the creator of the
work. What the eyes discover in the painting, the ears discover in music. Indeed,
the most distinguished masters of composition quite often mix dissonances with
consonances in order to arouse the listener, and pierce him, as it were, so that,
anxious about what is to happen, the listener might feel all the more pleasure
when order is soon restored, just as we delight in small dangers or in the
experience of misfortune for the very feeling or manifestation they provide of
our power or happiness, or just as we delight in the spectacle of ropewalkers or
sword dancing for their very ability to incite fear, or just as we ourselves
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laughingly half toss children, as if we are about to throw them oft.
The greater good defense has Haws. First, an omnipotent God should not have to
include any defects in order to achieve the greatest benefits. To say that it is not
possible for God to create a perfect world, a world without sin or pain, is to say that it is
logically impossible for such a world to exist. The greater good defense makes no such
claim. Second, one might object to the injustice of God’s utilitarian plan. God is
supposed to love every individual equally, but the greater good defense has God
sacrificing the well-being of some individuals in order to obtain best outcome for the
majority of individuals. Finally, while a greater good defense might account for natural
evil in the world, it cannot be used to justify moral evil. Theologians commonly hold
that it is not permissible to allow or commit a sin in order to bring about a greater good
- no matter how great that good is. Often cited are Paul’s letter to the Romans and the
Catholic Catechism, which say that no evil shall be committed to bring about good.' It
Paul in Romans 3:8: “Why not say—as we are being slanderously reported as saying
and as some claim we say— 'Let us do evil that good may result’? Their condemnation
is deserved.” From the Roman Catholic Catechism, 2 nd Edition, ( 1997), Part III,
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is unlikely that Leibniz would commit himself to the thesis that God chooses a world
with greater sin in order to achieve greater good. Sin must be accounted for in another
way.
Even though Leibniz offers a greater good defense, he has replies to all three of the
objections listed above. First, Leibniz maintains that God does not create the possible
worlds. What worlds are possible is not a matter of God’s will; rather, God merely
understands what worlds are possible. Second, Leibniz does not maintain that the
suffering of individuals is irrelevant as long as the whole of the world is abundantly
good. God is concerned with the welfare of each individual creature insofar as possible.
But what we said about the part, which can be disordered without detracting
from the harmony of the whole, should not be taken to mean that there is no
reason for the parts, or that it would be (as it were) sufficient for the world as a
whole to be perfect of its kind, even if the human race were miserable, and no
attention paid to justice in the universe, or no provision made for us, as certain
persons of poor judgment believe about the totality of things. For one must
realize that just as in the best constituted republic, care is taken that each
individual gets what is good for him, as much as possible, similarly, the universe
would be insufficiently perfect unless it took individuals into account as much as
could be done consistently with preserving the harmony of the universe. It is
impossible in this matter to find a better standard than the very law of justice,
which dictates that everyone should take part in the perfection of the universe
and in his own happiness in proportion to his own virtue and to the extent that
his will has thus contributed to the common good. This exonerates what we call
the charity and love of God, in which the entire force and power of the Christian
religion alone consists, in the judgment of wise theologians. Nor should the fact
that minds get such deference in the universe appear astonishing, since they are
produced in the exact image of the Supreme Creator, and relate to him not only
as machines to their builder (as other things do), but also as citizens to their
154
prince.
Section I, Chapter I, Article 6, Sub-section III, Paragraph 1789: “One may never do evil
so that good may result from it.”
154 AG 154.
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The “law of justice” Leibniz describes in the passage above is that every creature
will receive happiness in proportion to his or her virtue and contribution to the common
good. These rewards and punishments are given both in this life and in the next. In
addition, Leibniz maintains that afflictions affecting good people lead to greater goods.
He calls it “stepping back in order to leap forward with greater force.”'
5
Finally, Leibniz does have an account of sin not based on the greater good defense.
Leibniz holds that sin is the product of the limitations inherent in created beings. As
created and limited beings, we are not perfect, we are not God (the only perfect being),
and it is this lack of perfection that eventually leads to the production of sin in the
world. Recall that evil, for Leibniz, is a privation. Since sin is a lack or privation of
being, it cannot be something created by God. When God creates the world, privation
of perfection in his creation is the only evil - this evil is simply a lack of perfect
goodness. These limitations led us into error and sin. This is how sinful actions are
born. While all action in itself is good in so far as it is positive being, a specific act can
have bad consequences making it sinful. In this way, Leibniz maintains God is the
author of everything positive in the world, but he is not the author of sin. God chooses
which world to actualize, but he does not create which worlds are possible per se and he
is not responsible for the essences of created substances. Limitation is the nature of
created things. We lack infinite goodness, knowledge, and power, and thus there is no
collection of created things that are not liable to sin. (Although Leibniz does sometimes
claim that there are possible worlds without sin, we must conclude that in these worlds
155 AG 154.
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there is a lack of number or quality of essences, so that the resulting world is
disharmonious).
The identification of sin with privation of being fits well with Leibniz's optimalism.
God creates a maximal compossible collection of individuals that express each other as
much as possible, and in this way God minimizes the amount of privation in the world.
God cannot avoid creating a world with sin if he creates at all, but he can limit sin by
creating as much being with the clearest perceptions possible.
We can see that in both the metaphysical and the moral realms Leibniz propounds
principles of unity in variety. In the metaphysical realm, there is the unity of perception
amongst the infinity of monads. In the moral realm, Leibniz offers the following
“principle of delight." “Pleasure does not derive from uniformity for uniformity brings
forth disgust and makes us dull, not happy: this very principle is a law of delight."'
h
Variety brings pleasure. Whether variety is found in the observation of the harmony of
the universe, in the variations of notes in a symphony, or in the mingling of different
flavors in a meal, it brings forth pleasure. The rational mind delights in seeing the laws,
rules, or patterns in what may at first look like chaos. In order to appreciate any
sensation, even the sensation of pleasure, we need to contrast it with other sensations.
“On that same principle it is insipid to always eat sweet things; sharp, acidic, and even
bitter tastes should be mixed in to stimulate the palate. He who hasn't tasted bitter things
hasn't earned sweet things, nor. indeed, will he appreciate them.”'
156 AG 153.
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The Striving of Possibles for Existence
In the introduction to this chapter I quoted Leibniz’s contention from "The
Ultimate Origin of Things” that the reason why the world exists as it does rather than
I 58
some other way is "certainly to be sought in the striving of possibles for existence.”
Let us now compare this statement with a section from the letter to Wolff quoted earlier.
Leibniz writes that perfection can be thought of as degree of essence, “If essence is
calculated from harmonizing properties, which give essence weight and momentum, so
to speak.” The analogy of essences striving towards existence with other things striving
towards their place is one Leibniz used often. A stone with weight and momentum will
tend towards the ground in accordance with laws. But weight and momentum can be
ascribed to ideas as well. An idea with weight and momentum is one that causes action.
A possible world that is harmonious is a maximal collection of compossible individuals
that express one another to the greatest extent possible. A world such as this gives God
more reason to create it over other possible worlds that are less harmonious. In so far as
a possible world is harmonious, it has weight and momentum in the mind of God.
Leibniz’s striving essences constitute a multi-layered analogy. Weight and momentum
are features of the mechanical world. A physical object strives insofar as it has weight
and momentum. An idea in the mind strives insofar as it has weight and momentum.
The weight and momentum are the reasons for action. Leibniz’s striving essences
represent the idea that each essence in so far as it is a positive being contains some
perfection, and that each essence in so far as it is a rational being acts towards the good.
158 AG 152.
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Leibniz's claim that our world is the best possible world has been ridiculed, but
given certain theological assumptions, it is a tough one to deny. I have tried in this
chapter to outline the ways in which Leibniz considered this world the best. The
considerations he believes go into creating the best possible world are not those of
common sense. Our world is not free of sin. pain, and limit, but it is a world rationally
knowable, simple in its laws, abundant in quality and quantity of substance, joy, and
justice. Given the plurality of factors in God's plan, Leibniz feels confident that this
world is the best possible.
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CHAPTER 4
LOCKE ON WHY THERE IS A WORLD AT ALL
Introduction
Like Leibniz, Locke answers the question “Why is there a world at all?” by
saying that it was created by God. Also like Leibniz, his claim is backed by a
cosmological argument. It is the project of this chapter to explicate and criticize
Locke’s cosmological argument. Before criticizing the argument. I offer an original
reading of the passages in which the argument is given. My reading of these passages
and my reconstruction of the argument show that Locke is not guilty of many of the
philosophical mistakes attributed to him by commentators. I will discuss some of the
objections made against the argument by Michael Ayers and Jonathan Bennett, and
show how on my reading of Locke these objections may be dismissed. Then I will put
forth my own objections to the argument and evaluate the use of the metaphysical
principles that Locke employs in the argument. I conclude that while we may be able to
render a valid version of Locke's cosmological argument, the argument is without
question unsound.
Locke’s Cosmological Argument
In IV.x of the Essay, entitled “Of our Knowledge of the Existence of God,” Locke
gives his cosmological argument. He writes that, with “thought and attention” and “the
application of a regular deduction from some part of our intuitive knowledge,” he can
IOC
demonstrate the existence of God from the "undoubted knowledge we have of our own
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existence.
Many commentators, however, have thought that Locke was hopelessly
unsuccessful in his attempt to create a sound cosmological argument; in fact, most have
thought he failed to create even a valid argument. Most perspicuously, Locke's critics
accuse him of making the following logical mistake: (Vt) (3x) (x exists at t) —» (3x)
(Vt) (x exists at t). This move would clearly invalidate his proof. We cannot validly
conclude from the proposition that something exists at every time
,
that there is some
particular thing that exists at every time
.
just as we cannot conclude from the
proposition that everybody loves somebody
,
thatthere exists some one person whom
everyone loves. Nevertheless, I think we need not attribute this error in reasoning to
Locke. Locke’s argument can be reconstructed in a more charitable and, I believe,
accurate way. Although Locke's initial brief statement of the argument needs filling in.
a valid version of Locke's cosmological argument can be constructed without
impugning the integrity of Locke’s written text.
Jonathan Bennett in a recent commentary on Essay IV.x claims "Locke’s principal
argument for the existence of a god rests on three philosophical mistakes, all crammed
into his argument in [sections] 3 and 4 for the thesis that some eternal being has caused
the existence of everything else.”
160
According to Bennett, Locke’s three philosophical
mistakes are; (1 ) using 'Nothing’ as the name of something, (2) making the fallacious
159
Essay W.x. 1,619.
' Jonathan Bennett, "God and Matter in Locke; An Exposition of Essay 4. 10." In
Early Modern Philosophy: Mind, Matter, and Metaphysics
,
edited by Christia Mercer
and Eileen O'Neill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 162.
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logical move from "at every past time something existed” to "there is something which
existed at every past time,” and (3) making the fallacious move from there being one
eternal thing that exits to there being one eternal thing that is the cause of everything
else.
Bennett is not alone in his assessment of Locke's argument. Nicolas Wolterstorff
writes of Locke's argument.
When compared to other variants, and formulations of variants, of the
cosmological argument for God's existence, this is surely among the weakest,
making use at several points of premises whose questionableness Locke's
subsequent discussion does nothing to eliminate, and making moves that are
either fallacious or dependent upon unstated and dubious premises."
'
And Michael Ayers writes, “Philosophical criticism of Locke’s proof can be brief,
but it may help us to grasp its character if we identify its weaknesses. Crudely, it is
162 .
either invalid or circular.” " Ayers goes on to explain that Locke s argument is a
conflation of the traditional cosmological and design arguments, or at least a conflation
of the cosmological and teleological arguments. Neither the design nor the teleological
argument is a deductive argument, but is rather a probabilistic argument, and Locke's
attempt to make a deductively valid argument from such an argument (on Ayer’s
interpretation) fails. Ayers' discussion of Locke's argument is detailed and his
interpretation of Locke’s argument as borrowed heavily from Ralph Cudworth is
certainly historically accurate. However. 1 think the logical and explicative structure of
Essay IV. x and the argument contained therein have been misread by Bennett. Ayers,
and many others.
6
Nicolas Wolterstorf, "Locke's Philosophy of Religion” in the Cambridge
Companion to Locke
.
edited by Vere Chappell (Cambridge, 1994), 189.
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The passage where Locke begins his cosmological argument in the Essay is as
follows:
I think it is beyond Question, that Man has a clear Perception ofhis own
Being ; he knows certainly, that he exists, and that he is something... In
the next place. Man knows by an intuitive Certainty, that bare nothing
can no more produce any real Being, than it can he equal to two right
Angles... If therefore we know there is some real Being, and that Non-
entity cannot produce any real Being, it is an evident demonstration, that
from Eternity there has been something; Since what was not from
Eternity, had a beginning; and what had a Beginning, must be produced
by something else.'
A common reconstruction of Locke’s cosmological argument in the passage
above is as follows:
1. I exist.
2. Non-entity cannot produce real being.
3. There exists some real being.
4. If non-entity cannot produce real being and there is some real being, then something
must have existed at all times from eternity.
5. Therefore, something has existed at all times from eternity.
This part of the proof is logically valid. However, Locke continues:
Next, it is evident, that what had its Being and Beginning from another, must
also have all that which is in, and belongs to its Being from another too. All the
Powers it has, must be owing to, and received from the same Source. This
eternal Source of all being must also be the Source and Original of all Power;
and so this eternal Being must also be the most powerful.'
4
Here we can see the alleged problem with Locke’s argument. It seems Locke now
continues the argument as follows:
6. Whatever is caused to exist by another gets all its being and power from that cause.
Essay IV.x.1-3, 619-20.
Essay IV.x.4, 620.
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7. Therefore, the eternal cause of all real being is also all powerful.
The move from step 5 to step 7 is fallacious. Locke's reasoning here is said to be,
since nothing can come from nothing, and something exists, there must have existed
something always. However, from this, it does not follow there is one thing which has
existed always, as premise 7 indicates. We can only validly conclude that there is
something existing at all times, we cannot say whether there is one thing, two things, or
infinitely many things. Thus, it seems Locke's argument for the existence of an eternal
being is invalid.
There is no question that this appears to be the argument that Locke gives in
sections 2-4 in Chapter x. However, I think Locke goes quite a way to fill in the
missing premises in the remainder of the chapter. Before turning to a detailed
examination of Locke’s justification of the premises in this argument, I want to address
the first of the philosophical mistakes that Jonathan Bennett accuses Locke of making -
that of turning nothing into something.
Ex Nihilo Nil Fit
Bennett claims that Locke is guilty of turning nothing into a something. " The
passage that Bennett takes issue with is the following:
Man knows by an intuitive certainty that bare nothing can no more produce any
real being than it can be equal to two right angles. If a man knows not that non-
entity, or the absence of all being, cannot be equal to two right angles, it is
impossible that he should know any demonstration in Euclid.
ut
Jonathan Bennett, “God and Matter in Locke: An Exposition of Essay 4. 10.” In
Early Modern Philosophy: Mind. Matter, and Metaphysics , edited by Christia Mercer
and Eileen O'Neill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 162-163.
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Bennett claims that Locke's denial of the mere possibility of something’s
beginning to exist from nothing is not merely the denial of brute facts. That is, Bennett
claims that Locke is not saying merely that nothing happens without a cause, but that it
is logically impossible for something to happen without a cause. Bennett writes,
Locke might reasonably hold, as Leibniz did, that there are absolutely no brute
facts, that whatever is the case is explainable; which implies that whatever
happens is caused to do so. That causal kind of “explanatory rationalism” is
respectable; but Locke claims further that it is intuitively certain - something a
little reflection will make blindingly obvious."
7
Bennett notes that perhaps Locke is correct that all actual events are caused, but
it is not absurd to claim they might not have been.
'
s
So Locke’s claim that nothing can
come from nothing is too strong. In addition, Bennett argues that Locke's mistake is
the result of treating nothing as a substantive. Bennett writes,
This is purely an error. The form “Happen is caused by nothing” is not “N
causes Happen,” where “N” stands for a name, but rather “for no x: x causes
Happen.” For Happen to be caused by nothing is for it to occur uncaused.
Perhaps all actual events are caused, but it is not absurd to suppose otherwise, as
Locke implies. He repeats the mistake in [section] 8, contending that “a time
wherein there was perfectly nothing” is a “manifest contradiction” because it is
“of all absurdities the greatest, to imagine that pure nothing, the perfect negation
and absence of all beings, should ever produce any real existence,” and again
when he speaks of the impossibility “that nothing should of itself produce
matter” ([section] 10) and "that nothing, or the negation of all being, should
produce a positive being, or matter” ([section] 1 1 ). This mistake enables him to
ignore the possibility that matter should come into existence ex Nihilo without
being produced at all.
Jonathan Bennett, “God and Matter in Locke: An Exposition of Essay 4. 10.” In
Early Modern Philosophy: Mind
,
Matter, and Metaphysics , edited by Christia Mercer
and Eileen O’Neill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 162.
" Of course, Leibniz holds that it is impossible for something to happen without a
sufficient reason or cause.
" Jonathan Bennett, “God and Matter in Locke: An Exposition of Essay 4.10." In
Early Modern Philosophy: Mind, Matter, and Metaphysics , edited by Christia Mercer
and Eileen O'Neill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 163.
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The difficulty of writing about nothing is notorious and the tendency to sound as
if one is making nothing into something is pervasive in the literature on the subject.
However, does Locke genuinely think that to be “caused by nothing” is to have a non-
entity as a cause? I do not think that this is an accurate reading of Locke's text. I offer
several reasons to believe that this is not Locke's view. First, Locke is generally careful
in the text to say “nothing, non-entity,” which would seem to indicate that he is aware
of the fact that it sounds as if “nothing” were the name of an entity. Second, Locke’s
acceptance of Ex Nihilo, nihil fit is not unqualified. For Locke, the claim that non-entity
cannot produce anything is not the denial of brute facts. In the cosmological argument,
Locke is talking about a special case of existent; viz., things that begin to exist. Locke
holds that for any thing that begins to exist, there is a cause for that thing's beginning to
exist.' ' This still leaves room for something that always existed having no cause of its
existence. An eternal being or a being without beginning might exist uncaused. So,
unlike Leibniz, Locke does not insist that even if the world is eternal or without
beginning it must still have a cause of its existence. Nevertheless, according to
Locke,' ' our ideas concerning causation are such that for any effect we assume there
must be a cause - even if we cannot discover the cause. This is so because our notions
of cause and effect are derived entirely from our ideas received from sensation and
reflection, and we can have no clear idea of eternity. Because all our experience tells us
Locke does make use of a seemingly stronger causal principle in the second part of
the argument that would apply to eternal beings. See Essay IV.x. 10. 624.
171
Essay Il.xvii.20, 221.
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that things come into existence and are caused to do so by something else, we have the
notion that for every effect there is a cause. Locke writes.
Thus a Man is generated, a Picture is made, and either of them altered, when any
new sensible Quality, or simple Idea, is produced in either of them, which was
not there before; and the things thus made to exist, which were not there before,
are Effects; and those things, which operated to the Existence, Causes. In
which, and all other Cases, we may observe, that the Notion of Cause and
Effect, has its rise from Ideas, received by Sensation or Reflection; and that this
Relation, how comprehensive soever, terminates at last in them. For to have the
Idea of Cause and Effect, it suffices to consider any simple Idea, or Substance,
as beginning to exist, by the Operation of some other, without knowing the
manner of that Operation.'
As we can see from the above quoted passages, for every thing that begins to
exist, there is a cause. The cause may not be discernible or knowable to us, but it is
clear that Locke accepts this causal maxim. Further, Locke holds that this maxim is an
intuitively certain immediately perceived relation between our ideas.
Locke's cosmological proof starts with the intuitively certain fact “I exist.” This
may seem to indicate that Locke is looking for the cause of a particular man, namely,
himself, and the cause and effect relation in question is one of generation rather than
creation. Generation is a type of causation that involves material that is already in
existence in the world in some form or other, while creation involves the coming into
existence of new material or substance, no part of which was in existence before. How
these particles (or materials or substances, etc.) began to exist in the first place is the
question at hand in the cosmological argument. That the particles began to exist out of
nothing is possible, that they began to exist by nothing
,
that is, without any cause, is
what Locke denies. Bennett's claim that Locke's holding of Ex nihilo nihil fit is based
on the mistake of making nothing into something is false. Locke does allow that it is
Essay II.xxvi.2, 325.
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conceivable that something should exist without a cause. However, he denies that
something should begin to exist without a cause. When considering beings that begin to
exist, Locke distinguishes between the possibility of creation out of nothing and the
impossibility of creation by nothing.
Giving Flesh to the Bare Bones
The most serious problem with Locke's cosmological argument is the apparent
invalidity of the argument. As the argument is given in sections 2-4, its validity is, at
best, suspect. However, the best way to read these passages, I suggest, is to see Locke
as giving the argument in a condensed or outline form here. Locke goes on to give
more a more detailed version of the argument in sections 8-12. The statement at the end
of section 7 lends credence to this reading. Locke writes,
Though our own Being furnishes us, as I have shewn, with an evident, and
incontestable proof of a Deity; And 1 believe no Body can avoid the Cogency of
it. w ho will but as carefully attend to it. as to any other Demonstration of so
many parts: Yet this being so fundamental a Truth, and of that Consequence,
that all Religion and genuine Morality depend thereon, I doubt not but 1 shall be
forgiven by my Reader, if I go over some pails of this Argument again, and
enlarge a little more upon them.'
Locke's writing that the argument has “so many parts” would be odd if the
whole of the argument were given in sections 2-4, since that argument (as we have
seen) can be rendered in just a few premises. This claim of complexity makes much
more sense if we read Locke as referring to the entire argument with the missing
premises that he is about to supply in the following sections. Locke’s claim that he is
going to "enlarge a little more upon” some parts of the argument seems to support this
reading as well. Some commentators, Bennett included, claim that Locke does not
m
Essay IV. x. 7, 622.
108
enlarge his argument here; rather, he “repeats previous arguments without enlarging on
them, arriving again at the conclusion that “something must be from eternity” and
174
asking what kind ot thing that must be.” 1 disagree. I propose to take Locke at his
word in this section, and I believe that doing so renders a more philosophically
satisfying argument.
We should note that Locke says he is going to expand on “some pails” of the
argument. He does not claim to give additional support for every premise because some
of the premises have been discussed in previous sections of the Essay. Locke skips
giving justification for his first premise, namely, that he exists, because he has already
covered his reasons for taking this premise as intuitively certain in Chapter ix. In that
chapter he gives the following “Cogito”'
7
style of reasoning in support of the premise:
As for our own Existence
,
we perceive it so plainly, and so certainly, that it
neither needs, nor is capable of any proof. 1 think, 1 reason, Ifeel Pleasure and
Pain: Can any of these be more evident to me, than my own Existence? If I
doubt of all other Things, that very doubt makes me perceive my own Existence ,
and will not suffer me to doubt of that. For if I know Ifeel Pain , it is evident. I
have as certain a Perception of my own Existence, as of the Existence of the
Pain 1 feel: Or if I know / doubt
,
I have as certain a Perception of the Existence
of the thing doubting, as of that Thought, which I call doubt. Experience then
convinces us, that we have an intuitive Knowledge ofour own Existence, and an
internal infallible Perception that we are.'
Locke begins Section 8 by recounting the portion of his argument that concludes
something must have existedfor all timesfrom eternity (whether that something is one
thing or many is not determined here). This section of the argument is obviously valid.
Jonathan Bennett, “God and Matter in Locke: An Exposition of Essay 4.10." In
Early Modern Philosophy: Mind, Matter, and Metaphysics, edited by Christia Mercer
and Eileen O'Neill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 166.
i7? CSM II 16-20.
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Essay IV.ix.3, 618.
and Locke does not need to provide an expansion or justification for this section. Locke
seems certain that no one, not even a materialist atheist, will dispute this portion of his
argument. He writes.
There is no Truth more evident, than that something must be from Eternity. I
never yet heard of any one so unreasonable, or that could suppose so manifest a
Contradiction, as a Time wherein there was perfectly nothing. This being of all
Absurdities the greatest, to imagine that pure nothing, the perfect Negation and
Absence of all Beings, should ever produce any real Existence.'
Here we see Locke confirming what I have construed as premises 2-5 of his
argument. Given Ex nihilo nihil fit. and the existence of something, we are driven to the
conclusion that something (and we should note that Locke's language does not commit
him to this something’s being only one thing) has existed from all eternity. Sections 9
and 10 concern the portions of the argument that seem, at least in the initial rendition.
invalid; that is, the move from premise 5 to premise 7 as I have rendered the argument.
Recall that Locke is looking for the cause of the creation of things (the coming
into existence out of previously non-existing being, matter, etc). His first move, which
comprises the whole of section 9, is to divide all beings into two sorts. He writes.
First. Such as are purely material, without Sense, Perception, or Thought, as the
clippings of our Beards, and pairing of our Nails.
Secondly, Sensible, thinking, perceiving Beings, such as we find our selves to
be, which if you please, we will hereafter call cogitative and incogitative Beings;
which to our present purpose, if for nothing else, are, perhaps, better Terms, than
material and immaterial.
1 x
Note that Locke does not assume the sensible, thinking, perceiving beings are
immaterial. He remains agnostic on that at this point. He merely notes there are some
Essay lV.x.8, 622.
Essay IV.x.9, 623.
material beings that seem to lack these qualities and there are some beings that do have
these qualities - whether the sensible, thinking, perceiving beings are material or
immaterial remains to be seen.
The first line of section 10, immediately after the above quoted passages, reads,
“If then there must be something eternal, let us see what sort of Being it must be.”'
7 *
Here I think we must read Locke as neutral as to what “something” means. He is not
assuming it is one thing that exists from all eternity. On the contrary, he is about to give
the supporting argument for the claim that there is one eternal being. In addition, we
should not read "Being” as a particular being, rather we should read it as a type (or as
Locke writes “sort”) of being, that is, either cogitative being or incogitative being,
without reference to the number of beings. We cannot give undue significance to the
fact that Locke uses “Being” with a capital B' since Locke often used initial capitals on
common nouns.
Locke proceeds to argue there is one cogitative being rather than one
incogitative being or a multiplicity of incogitative beings or cognitive beings. He does
this by arguing via his causal principle that the alternatives cannot cause the effects that
we know to exist in the world. The argument starts with the fact that at least one
cogitative being exists in the world. Whatever is the cause of the existing cogitative
being must be capable of producing thought. Locke's causal principle that whatever is
the cause of an effect must have all the properties or perfection contained in the effect is
revealed here. It is the causal principle that guarantees the existence of a single being as
the cause of all created beings. The principle in full as stated in section 4 is “what had
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its Being and Beginning from another, must also have all that whieh is in, and belongs
to its Being from another too. All the Powers it has, must be owing to, and received
1 80
from the same Source.” We may restate the principle in one sentence as follows:
w hatever begins to exist must have a cause for its existence, and must get all its being
and powerfrom that same cause.
But why should we think that each thing cannot be caused by some other thing
and that thing in turn by another ad infinitum ? Locke does not defend the move to one
eternal cause explicitly in this argument. In order to understand why Locke would
assume such an important premise in his argument to be self-evident to his readers, we
must consider the historical background surrounding the possibility of infinite causal
chains. There is a strong tradition in Western philosophy, stalling with Aristotle, that
certain causal chains cannot be infinite. In Aristotle’s Metaphysics he writes.
One thing cannot proceed from another, as from matter, ad infinitum... nor can
the sources of movement form an endless series. Similarly the final causes
cannot go on ad infinitum. And the case of the essence [formal causes] is
similar. For in the case of intermediates, whieh have a last term and a term prior
to them, the prior must be the cause of the later terms. For if we had to say
whieh of the three is the cause, we should say the first: surely not the last, for the
final term is the cause of none; nor even the intermediate, for it is the cause of
only one. But of series that are infinite in this way, ...all of the parts down to
that now present are alike intermediates, so that if there is no first there is no
i. '81
cause at all.
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Essay IV.x.4, 620. Compare with Descartes: “Now it is manifest by the natural light
that there must be at least as much <reality> in the efficient and total cause as in the
effect of that cause. For where, I ask, could the effect get its reality from, if not from
the cause? And how could the cause give it to the effect unless it possessed it? It
follows both from this that something cannot arise from nothing, and also that what is
more perfect - that is, contains in itself more reality - cannot arise from what is less
perfect.” CSM II 28.
1 8
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Aristotle, The Basic Works ofAristotle, edited by R. McKeon (New York: Random
House, 1941 ), 994a2-19. Aristotle explains the theory of the four causes (material,
moving or efficient, formal, and final) in the Physics.
Aristotle contends that none of his four types of causes can he infinite in
succession. Since we do have evidence that Locke read Aristotle. ' we might conclude
that Locke held infinite causal chains to be impossible as it is necessary to have a first
cause in order for there to be a cause at all, as Aristotle seems to claim in the passage
above. But Locke did recognize infinite chains of number, duration, and space
(although he believed our ideas of infinite duration and space to be negative ideas).
While the idea of infinite number may not be causal, the idea of infinite space or
duration does seem to be causal in nature. We believe that later times are caused by
earlier times, nor could there be a one millionth yard without the preceding 999,999
yards. Locke never mentions the necessity of a first time or a starting point of space in
the Essay.
It seems more likely that Locke would have held a view that Aristotle’s medieval
followers held, namely, that only certain causal chains cannot be infinite - even though
In the introduction to Essays on the Laws ofNature and Associated Writings , section
5, page 35, W. Von Leyden writes. In his first essay Locke quotes two passages from
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics concerning the rational nature of man and the
distinction between legal and natural justice. Certain passages in the Ethics and in
Aristotle's works on logic probably suggested to him the arguments concerning the
principles of reasoning contained in his third essay. Since information about Locke's
early training in Aristotelian philosophy at Oxford is scanty, the two or three manifest
examples of it in his essays should not be overlooked. They show that it was the
original text, not the Aristotle of the schoolmen, that interested him; they also show that
his alleged reaction against Aristotelianism is not an altogether accurate description of
his bent of mind at the time when he wrote the essays.
some can and are. This view can be found in the works of Aquinas, Suarez, and others,
many of which Locke was familiar.
In Patterson Brown's paper “Infinite Causal Regression,”
IM
Brown argues that that
Aristotle’s medieval followers held that certain infinite causal chains were possible, but
that others were not. Brown claims that Aquinas and Scotus held that causal orderings
per accidens could be infinite, but that causal orderings per se cannot be infinite. I
propose that we understand the claim in Locke's argument above as saying the de se
causal chain of “x creates y” cannot be infinite, as opposed to the per accidens causal
chain “x begets y,” which can be infinite. So, while in one sense there can be an infinite
chain of contingent beings, in the sense of one contingent being begeting another, this is
not the type of cause that Locke is after in the cosmological argument.
In order to understand this claim and how it could help Locke's argument, we need
to make a distinction between de se causal chains and per accidens causal chains. Duns
Scotus provides a detailed account of the difference in the following paragraph:
In the Introduction to the Essay on the Laws of Nature and Associated Writings , W.
von Leyden writes, “Turning to Locke's only reference to St. Thomas Aquinas, which
occurs in his first essay, we find that what he cites there as a statement by St. Thomas
concerning the eternal law is a paraphrase by Richard Hooker of passages in the Summa
Theologica. Yet we are justified, it seems, in assuming that Locke did read St. Thomas
in the original, for a number of Thomistic arguments, especially in his seventh essay,
can be traced to definite passages in the Summa Theologica. Besides, the opening
paragraph of the first essay, where Locke discusses man's nature and his relation to God
and the universe, and also the way in which he formulates the titles of his essays - all
this betrays Thomist influence. Surely we need not be surprised at finding scholastic
influences in Locke's essays, which were written early and for the most part in a
conventional style: we find such influences even in his mature writings, in which his
thought is more independent and novel. Admittedly, however, it is difficult to decide
whether for any of his scholastic notions Locke was indebted to St. Thomas rather than
to Hooker or Suarez.
Patterson Brown, “Infinite Causal Regression” The Philosophical Review
, 75, 4
(1966): 510-25.
Per se or essentially ordered causes differ from accidentally ordered causes. In
essentially ordered causes, the second depends upon the first precisely in its act
of causation. In accidentally ordered causes this is not the case, although the
second may depend upon the first for its existence, or in some other way. Thus
a son depends upon his father for existence but is not dependent upon him in
exercising his own causality, since he can act just as well whether his father be
living or dead.'
s
“A causal chain that is de se or essential is one in which each member of the
chain (except perhaps for the first and last, if there be such) is causally dependent upon
its predecessor for its own causal efficacy regarding its successor.”
IM
Aquinas’s
example of a de se causal chain is one in which a ball is moved by a stick, the stick
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having been moved by a hand, the hand having been moved by the mind of a man.
The claim is that these types of causal chains cannot be infinite in nature, as they are
somehow dependent upon a first mover for their own causal efficacy. In a per accidens
causal, each member of the chain is independent regarding its own causal efficacy.
Aquinas’s example of a causal chain that is per accidens involves man's generation of
man. For example. Joseph’s begetting Abraham and Abraham's begetting Isaac and
Isaac’s begetting Jacob. In such a causal chain each member is not dependent upon the
previous member for his ability to produce the next member of the chain. These types
of causal chains can be infinite.
Brow n suggests, and I agree, that the important feature of de se causal chains is
that the constituent relations are transitive. That is, if the hand moves the stick, and the
Duns Scotus, Duns Scotus: Philosophical Writings, edited by A Wolter. (Edinburgh:
Nelson, 1962): 40-1. This passage is quoted by Brown on page 513.
IS6
Patterson Brown. “Infinite Causal Regression” The Philosophical Review, 75, 4
(1966): 516.
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St. Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theological
,
Q. 46, Art. 2, ad. 7.
stick moves the stone, then the hand moves the stone by means of the stick. The
intermediate causes do not generate their own causal efficacy, but rather pass it along
from the first cause. Aquinas writes.
If that which was given as moved locally is moved by the nearest mover which
is increased, and that again is moved by something which is altered, and that
again is moved by something which is moved in place, then that which is moved
with respect to place will be moved more by the first thing which is moved with
respect to place than by the second thing which is altered or by the third thing
1 88
which is increased.
Brown goes on to claim that the reason that de se casual chains cannot be
infinite according to the Aristotelian view of the world, is that infinite causal chains
... 1 89
provide no means for satisfactory explanations on the Aristotelian view. “The
Aristotelian scientific model says that all motions are to be given causal explanations,
and these explanations arc to be of the form ‘x moves y’.”'
We can imagine a de se casual chain in which a is moved by b, b is moved by c,
c is moved by d, and so on, ad infinitum. In order to give a satisfactory explanation of
what moves a, we must be able to give an answer in the form of “x moves a.” One
answer might be that “b moves a." But this will not be a complete answer, as b is, in
turn, moved by c, so that by transitivity “c moves a”. If the chain is infinite there will
be no answer to the question “what moves a?” because there will be no first or efficient
cause.
188 St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary On Aristotle's “ Physics
,
” edited by Richard J.
Spath. Richard J. Thirlkel, and W. Edmund (London: Routledge. Kegan, Paul, 1963).
Bk. VIII, lec. 9, #1047.
1 89 Patterson Brown, “Infinite Causal Regression” The Philosophical Review
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(1966): 523.
The question, then, is why is it not satisfactory to say that b causes a, with
respect to a tie se casual chain? Brown writes, "It is precisely the sense of a cause as
responsible for its effect - as against its being merely a concomitant of its effect -
which entails that b's being moved by c renders the true statement "b moves a”
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unacceptable as the Aristotelian explanation of a’s motion.” Because in a de se causal
chain, the causal power of each member in the chain is dependent upon the
predecessor’s power, there is a notion of responsibility for that causal power that is
carried back by means of transitivity to the first cause. Brown illustrates this point
nicely with an analogy involving a car accident, which I will here recount in my own
i
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words.
We can imagine that there has been a multiple car accident. In this accident, a
car. Alpha, sitting in an intersection was hit from behind by another car. Beta. Beta was
hit from behind by still another car. Gamma, and Gamma was hit from behind by yet
another car. Delta. In some sense. Beta caused the damage to Alpha’s car, but were
Alpha to try to sue Beta in court Beta would be acquitted on the grounds that he was
caused to hit Alpha by Gamma. Likewise. Alpha and Beta could not sue Gamma for
damages because Gamma would be acquitted on the grounds that he was caused to hit
them by Delta. In this way, we can see that Beta and Gamma are merely instrumental
causes, rather than first or efficient causes. If it is the case that Delta is the first cause of
the accident. Alpha, Beta, and Gamma could successfully sue Delta, as he is would be
'
' Patterson Brown, “Infinite Causal Regression” The Philosophical Review , 75, 4
(1966): 524.
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responsible for the entire chain of damage. However, if the accident involved an
infinite chain of cars, such as there is no first car or cause, then it would be impossible
to ascribe blame.
I maintain that Locke held that a causal chain of the type "x creates y” was a de
se causal chain, and therefore, could not be an infinite causal chain. A de se causal
chain must begin with a first or efficient cause, which is responsible for the existence of
the entire chain. Locke writes of efficient causes in several places, a couple of which I
shall here mention.
Further, regarding obligation, it must be noted that some things bind efficiently,
others only terminatevely, i.e., by delimination. That thing binds efficiently
which is the prime cause of all obligation, and from which springs the formal
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cause ot obligation, namely the will ol a superior.
If your lordship asks, what makes them men? Your lordship used the word,
making, in the proper sense for the effcient cause, and in that sense it were true,
that the essence of a man, i.e. the specific essence of that species, made a man; it
would undoubtedly follow, that this specific essence had a reality beyond that of
.
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being only a general abstract idea in the mind.
It seems clear that Locke understood efficient or first causes in Aristotle's sense
of creator or cause of movement. To be the efficient or first cause of a chain of beings
would be to be responsible for their formal, material, and final causes, as God is
supposed to be. In Locke's cosmological proof, we must read “cause” as efficient or
first cause. Locke must be saying that everything that exists has a first or efficient
cause, and that first or efficient cause cannot be nothing, nor can it be an infinite causal
chain.
John Locke, Essay on the Laws ofNature, edited by W. von Leyden (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1954). 6.
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In addition to solving the problem of making valid Locke's argument for the
existence of an eternal being, reading “cause" as a first or efficient cause also resolves
some problems in the later pail of his proof where Locke attempts to prove that the
eternal being is also most powerful, knowing and wise being. With this notion of
efficient cause in place, we can now return to Locke's expanded proof and see what soil
of being the efficient cause must be.
Locke takes up the possibility that the first, or eternal, type of being is
incogitative material being. He argues that because it is inconceivable that an
incogitative material being alone should produce thinking intelligent being, it is
impossible for an incogitative material being alone to be the first, or eternal, type of
being. Locke claims that material being alone cannot produce even motion in itself.
His reasoning is as follows: if incogitative material being is the source of all being, and
it is intuitively certain motion exists, then either the motion has existed from all eternity
or it was produced by some being at least as powerful than incogitative material being,
since incogitative material being of its own power could not have created motion. For
according to the causal principle, whatever is the cause of motion must have motion in
it to “give" to that which it creates. Next he supposes that some people might claim that
incogitative material being and motion have existed from eternity. If this is so, Locke
argues, then either thought has existed from all eternity or it was added by some being
more powerful than incogitative material being. So either material being is cogitative
from all eternity (contrary to his hypothesis) or thought has been added to material
being by something more powerful than incogitative material being. Either conclusion
shows that incogitative material being cannot be the cause of cogitative being in the
world.
Here is the text from which I take this argument:
If. then, there must be something eternal, let us see what sort of being it must be.
And to that it is very obvious to reason, that it must necessarily be a cogitative
being. For it is as impossible to conceive that ever bare incogitative matter
should produce a thinking intelligent being, as that nothing should of itself
produce matter. Let us suppose any parcel of matter eternal, great or small, we
shall find it, in itself, able to produce nothing. For example: let us suppose the
matter of the next pebble we meet with eternal, closely united, and the parts
firmly at rest together; if there were no other being in the world, must it not
eternally remain so, a dead inactive lump? Is it possible to conceive it can add
motion to itself
\
being purely matter, or produce anything? Matter, then, by its
own strength, cannot produce in itself so much as motion: the motion it has must
also befrom eternity , or else be produced, and added to matter by some other
being more powerful than matter; matter, as is evident, having not power to
produce motion in itself. But let us suppose motion eternal too: yet matter,
incogitative matter and motion , whatever changes it might produce of figure and
bulk, could never produce thought: knowledge will still be as far beyond the
power of motion and matter to produce, as matter is beyond the power of
nothing or nonentity to produce. And I appeal to every one's own thoughts,
whether he cannot as easily conceive matter produced by nothing, as thought to
be produced by pure matter, when, before, there was no such thing as thought or
an intelligent being existing?'
Locke restates the argument up to this point as follows: “So that if we will
suppose nothing first, or eternal; Matter can never begin to be; If we suppose bare
Matter, without Motion, eternal; Motion can never begin to be: If we suppose only
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Matter and Motion first, or eternal; Thought can never begin to be." Next he gives
reason to believe that material being cannot be cogitative. He writes.
For it is impossible to conceive that matter, either with or without motion, could
have, originally, in and from it self sense, perception, and knowledge; as is
Essay IV.x.10, 623. Note that the title of this section is Incogitative Being cannot
produce Cogitative. We must substitute “incogitative matter” in the argument where
Locke has written only “matter.” The emphasis in this section is mine.
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evident from hence, that then sense, perception, and knowledge, must be a
property eternally inseparable from matter and every particle of it."
Locke's argument is that if material being is cogitative from all eternity, then the
property of cogitation must be essential and inseparable from material being. But we
know from experience incogitative material being exists, so material being is not
essentially cogitative.
Next, Locke gives reason for thinking that even if material being were cogitative
from all eternity, material being would not by itself, be sufficient to create all the power,
beauty, and harmony of the world. This bit of reasoning is not necessary for the validity
of his overall argument, but is given as extra evidence for the claim that incogitative
material being is not the eternal source of every real being. Locke writes.
Not to add, that, though our general or specific conception of matter makes us
speak of it as one thing, yet really all matter is not one individual thing, neither
is there any such thing existing as one material being, or one single body that we
know or can conceive. And therefore, if matter were the eternal first cogitative
being, there would not be one eternal, infinite, cogitative being, but an infinite
number of eternal, finite, cogitative beings, independent one of another, of
limited force, and distinct thoughts, which could never produce that order,
harmony, and beauty which are to be found in nature. Since, therefore,
whatsoever is the first eternal being must necessarily be cogitative; and
whatsoever is first of all things must necessarily contain in it. and actually have,
at least, all the perfections that can ever after exist; nor can it ever give to
another any perfection that it hath not either actually in itself, or, at least, in a
higher degree; it necessarily follows, that the first eternal being cannot be
198
matter.
After this, Locke concludes.
Since, therefore, whatsoever is the first eternal being must necessarily be
cogitative; and whatsoever is first of all things must necessarily contain in it, and
actually have, at least, all the perfections that can ever after exist; nor can it ever
give to another any perfection that it hath not either actually in itself, or, at least.
Essay IV.x.10, 624.
Essay IV. x. 10, 624.
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in a higher degree; it necessarily follows, that the first eternal being cannot be
199
matter.
Sections 11-12 argue for the existence of one cogitative eternal being on the basis
that every non-eternal cogitative being has a beginning, and so must be caused to exist
by something else. Furthermore, the cause of all cogitative beings must be the source of
all their knowledge and power (in accordance with the causal principle). Since Locke is
considering the creation of all matter and cognition as a whole, the cause of all the
beings must have more power than the entire collection of them. He writes.
Though this discovery of the necessary existence of an eternal Mind does
sufficiently lead us into the knowledge of God; since it will hence follow, that
all other knowing beings that have a beginning must depend on him, and have
no other ways of knowledge or extent of power than what he gives them; and
therefore, if he made those, he made also the less excellent pieces of this
universe, all inanimate beings, whereby his omniscience, power, and providence
2oo
will be established, and all his other Attributes necessarily follow.
This concludes Locke's fully fleshed version of the cosmological argument. At
this point, Locke turns away from his explication of the premises of the argument to
consider some important objections to the argument. First, and most obviously, he
begins with the objection that the first eternal cogitative being might be material, as he
clearly sees his argument does not rule this out. But before turning to the objections
and Locke’s replies to them, I will formalize the argument as it now stands with the
supporting premises in place.
1. I think, 1 reason, I feel pleasure and pain.
2. Therefore. 1 exist.
3. Therefore, some real being exists. (1,2)
Essay IW.xAO, 624.
Essay IV.x. 12, 625.
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4. Whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence.
5. Nothing, or non-entity, cannot produce any real being (Ex nihilo, nihilfit).
6. Therefore, something has caused a real being to exist. (3, 4. 5)
7. If nothing, or non-entity, cannot produce a real being and there exists some real
beings, then something must have been in existence for all times from eternity.
8. Therefore, something must have been in existence for all times from eternity. (3,
4.5)
9. There cannot be an infinite chain of causes, (suppressed premise)
10. Therefore, there is a first cause of all real beings.
11. Whatever begins to exist must have a cause for its existence, and must get all its
being and power from that same cause.
*'
12. Therefore, the first cause of all real beings has more being and is more powerful
than the entire collection of real beings. (6. 9)
13. All beings are either incogitative material beings or cogitative beings (material
or non-material).
14. Suppose an incogitative material being is the first cause of every real being.
15. If an incogitative material being is the first cause of every real being, and it is
intuitively certain that motion exists, then either motion has existed from all
eternity or it was produced by some being more powerful than an incogitative
material being (since incogitative material being of its own could not have
created motion of its own power unless it already contained it).
16. Suppose an incogitative material being and motion exist from eternity, then
either thought has existed from all eternity or it was produced and added by
some being more powerful than an incogitative material being.
17. Therefore, either incogitative material being is cogitative from all eternity (per
impossible) or thought has been produced and added to matter by something
more powerful than an incogitative material being. (9, 12, 13, 14)
Locke’s principle in full is that whatever gets its being and beginning from another
must have all that which is in it and belongs to its being from another too. All the
powers it has must be owing to and received from the same source. See Essay IV.x.4,
620 .
18. Therefore, an incogitative material being is not the first cause of every real
being. (12, 13, 14, 15)
19. Suppose a cogitative material being is the first cause of every real being.
20. If matter has been cogitative from all eternity, then cogitation is essential to and
inseparable from matter.
2 1 . Some incogitative material being exists.
22. If some incogitative material being exists, then cogitation is not essential to and
inseparable from matter.
23. Therefore, matter has not been cogitative from all eternity. (18, 19, 20)
24. Therefore, a cogitative material being is not the first cause of every real being.
(17, 18, 19, 20. 21)
25. Therefore the first cause of every real being is a non-material cogitative being.
(11, 16, 22)
26. Therefore, the first cause of every real being is a non-material cogitative being
that contains more being and power than every created incogitative and
cogitative being. (9, 10, 23)
27. The first cause of every real being cannot have a beginning or it too would have
a cause. (4)
28. Therefore, the cause of every real being is a non-material cogitative being
containing more being and power than all created incogitative and cogitative
being, and which has no beginning, that is, is eternal. (24, 25)
This is an argument with many parts. The merits and problems with this
argument are the subject of the rest of the chapter. Discussing them will help us to
determine the soundness of the argument. But with the supporting arguments in
place, the task of determining the philosophical import of the argument is more
interesting and challenging than previous commentators have taken it to be. I want
to close this section with several comments in favor of my reading of Locke's
argument.
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First, as Ayers has noted/ Locke’s argument is deeply indebted to Ralph
Cudworth's cosmological argument as given in The True Intellectual System of the
203 ...
Universe. Cudworth s treatise is aimed at materialist atheists. Cudworth's
arguments arc aimed at disproving the claim that “senseless” matter is the origin of
all being. We can see this is very similar to Locke’s concern to show that no
material being can be the first eternal cause. Locke’s discussion is very similarly
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structured to Cudworth s.~ Cudworth, like Locke, first gives a rather brief
statement of the cosmological argument, proceeds next to more detailed arguments
and justifications for the premises of the main argument, and finally goes on to
consider objections to the argument. I think it is clear that Locke borrowed both the
style and structure of his argument from Cudworth.
Second, my reading of Locke's argument banishes a very simple logical mistake
- one that was certainly not befitting Locke’s talents at demonstration. If I am
right about the structure of Locke’s argument, then he does not make an illicit shift
from something exists at all times to there is one thing tht exists at all times .
Locke's causal principle tells us that whatever is caused to exist by a thing gets all
its being and power from the one and the same thing. Thus, when we apply the
causal principle to the creation of every being that exists, we get that there is one
70?
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728-740.
source or cause of all being. Since on my reading Locke does not make the logical
mistake, Bennett's second objection to Locke's argument can be dismissed.
It is easy to see why Locke would not put his very subtle and complex sub-
arguments into the main argument. First, it is a rather complicated bit of reasoning
that requires a good deal of explication. Second, most of his readers would have
been familiar with the cosmological argument in its various forms. They would have
been familiar with preceding forms of the argument from philosophers such as
Aquinas and Descartes. Finally, as said above, this style of giving the “bare bones"
argument and then expanding on it was one Locke had seen before in Cudworth.
Moreover, my interpretation shows the third philosophical mistake Bennett
attributes to Locke is actually not a mistake at all. Recall, Bennett claims that Locke
infers one eternal cause of all existence from one externally existing being.
However, on my reading, Locke does not make this illicit move. Locke begins with
the causal principle whatever begins to exist must have a cause for its existence, and
must get all its being and power from that same cause. After showing that matter,
whether incogitative or cogitative, cannot be the cause of every real being. Locke
says that non-material cogitative being is the cause of every real being. Then he
concludes the non-cogitative cause of every real being must not begin to exist.
Whether the causal principle is philosophically acceptable is a question for the
objections to the argument.
With a valid formulation of Locke’s argument in place, I can now proceed to
discuss objections to the philosophical claims and causal principles Locke makes
use of in his argument.
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Problems and Objections
The reconstruction of Locke’s argument provides a view of Locke's theological
and metaphysical commitments regarding the creation of the world. He is committed to
an eternal cogitative being that is most powerful and knowledgeable, and who is the
cause of all being, power, and knowledge in the world. Locke also is committed to two
causal principles: ( 1 ) nothing comes from nothing, (2) whatever begins to exist must be
caused to do so by something else, and must get all its being and power from that same
cause. In what follows, 1 will discuss several criticisms of Locke’s argument and the
causal principles used in it.
Locke’s Cogito Reasoning
Locke's argument begins with Cogito style reasoning. That is. Locke starts
from his awareness of his own thought, reasoning, and feelings and concludes from this
that he exists. This reasoning is, of course, the same as Descartes' famous argument: I
think; therefore. I exist. A common criticism of Descartes’ argument is that Descartes
205 ...
was not entitled to his conclusion based on the premises." The criticism claims that
Descartes needed to provide a premise such as “Whatever thinks exists’' in order to have
a valid argument. In addition, it is often said even with the addition of this premise
Descartes is only entitled to the conclusion “Therefore, some thinking exists," rather
than “Therefore, I exist.” Locke does not provide the extra premise needed to make a
valid argument in his Cogito either. However, Locke thinks one’s own existence is
known with intuitive certainty whenever one reasons or senses. He is not giving a
' Of course, not all commentators on Descartes think the Cogito is an argument. There
are those who think it an intuition or an epistemic discovery. I am not here committing
myself to the view that it is an argument.
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deductive argument. He believes any proposition known by intuition is more certain
than a proposition arrived at via deduction. He writes.
Experience then convinces us, that we have an intuitive Knowledge of our own
Existence, and an internal infallible Perception that we are. In every Act of
Sensation, Reasoning, or Thinking, we are conscious to our selves of our own
206
Being: and, in this Matter, come not short of the highest degree of Certainty/
For Locke, our intuitive knowledge is still based in experience. This is also true
of the "intuitively known” causal principles. Locke is providing a proposition known
non-deductively by sensation and reflection, but infallibly, whereas Descartes' cogito
may be seen as a deduction. Locke is in a better epistemic position than Descartes to
provide an intuitive non-deductive “proof’ of his own existence because has no
skeptical arguments to overcome, and no reason to doubt his internal perceptions are
veridical (even if such a reason exists unbeknownst to him).
The Causal Principles
Locke’s use of causal principles is essential to his argument for God's existence.
But what reasons, if any, does he have for taking them to be true? I have already
discussed at some length Locke’s commitment to Ex nihilo nihil fit. As 1 have said,
Locke is committed to a qualified version of the principle nothing comes from nothing.
He believes matter and thought can be created out of nothing, but he does not hold they
can be created without a cause. Locke believes that God creates all things from
nothing, but God himself is without a cause, or perhaps, is self-caused. Locke’s causal
principle states that whatever begins to exist is caused to exist by another, and gets all
its being and powerfrom that same cause. According to Locke, the only things that do
not have a cause for their existence are things that exist eternally or without beginning.
J,h
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God creates things from nothing, and he is the cause of all created things. However,
God, being eternal, has no cause outside himself. There is no need to look for a cause
of God's coming into existence as he has always been. Locke’s causal principle is very
different from Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason. Leibniz holds even if the world
were eternal there would still be a cause or reason for its existence, since we need an
explanation for why this world exists rather than some other world. Locke argues that
the world (or at least the collection of created beings in the world) is not co-etemal with
God. because if it were, it would not require a cause for its existence.
Unfortunately, Locke’s argument that matter cannot be eternal is ad hominem.
He argues the reason people think matter is eternal is because they cannot conceive of
its creation out of nothing. To this, he writes.
Others would have Matter to be eternal, notwithstanding that they allow an
eternal, cogitative, immaterial Being. This tho' it take not away the Being of a
GOD, yet since it denies one and the first great piece of his Workmanship, the
Creation, let us consider it a little. Matter must be allowed eternal: Why?
Because you cannot conceive how it can be made out of nothing; why do you
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not also think your self eternal?"
Clearly, Locke accepts God's creation of the world out of nothing as a revealed
truth. We can know matter and spirit can come from nothing because of revelation, but
we cannot conceive how it happens. Locke warns of not using our capacities of
comprehension as a guide as to what is possible for God. He writes.
In the mean time, *tis an overvaluing our selves, to reduce all to the narrow
measure of our Capacities; and to conclude, all things impossible to be done,
whose manner of doing exceeds our Comprehension. This is to make our
Comprehension infinite, or GOD finite, when what he can do, is limited to what
we can conceive of it. If you do not understand the Operations of your own
finite Mind, that thinking Thing within you, do not deem it strange, that you
Essay IV.x.18. 628.
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cannot comprehend the Operations of that eternal infinite Mind, who made and
.
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governs all Things, and whom the Heaven of Heavens cannot contain.
Locke has good theological reasoning for interpreting Ex nihilo nihil fit in a way
that does not disallow for God's creation from nothing. However, many philosophical
theologians, Leibniz included, believed the world eternal. If the world were eternal, then
according to Locke's causal principle, it would not have a cause. Without an argument
to show the world cannot be eternal, Locke is left in the theologically uncomfortable
position of saying if this is true, then the world is not created.
Further, Locke's claim that eternal things do not require a cause seems to limit
God’s power in just the way that he is trying to avoid. God cannot create a world co-
eternal with himself according to Locke. However, one might argue that it is
conceivable he did (as Leibniz does). It is possible Locke wants to hold eternal things
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do not have causes because he does not want to say that God has a cause.’ However,
many theologians have found it sufficient to say God is self-caused. Locke, in trying to
safeguard God as an uncaused cause, has inadvertently limited God's creative powers.
There is another problem with Locke’s causal principle involving his use of the
notion of a “perfection.” Locke's causal principle is close to Descartes' causal principle
regarding ideas - whatever is the cause of an idea must have at least as much formal
210 . .
reality as the idea has objective reality .’ Descartes gives a hierarchy ot being where
each type of being has greater formal reality the more it is able to exist independently of
Essay IV.x.19, 630.
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I can find no text where Locke either affirms or denies that God is selt-caused or
uncaused.
210 CSM II 28.
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other types of being. According to Descartes’ hierarchy of being, a mode, such as a
color, has less formal reality than a plant, a plant has less formal reality than a person,
and a person less than God (who has infinite formal reality). Locke also has a hierarchy
of being. He writes,
...And whatsoever is first of all Things, must necessarily contain in it, and
actually have, at least, all the Perfections that can ever exist; nor can it ever give
to another any perfection that it hath not, either actually in itself, or at least in a
higher degree.
"
From this passage we can see another way of stating Locke's causal principle in
terms of perfections: whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence and must gets
all its perfectionsfrom that cause. Locke's ranking of being has at least one difference
from Descartes' hierarchy. According to Locke, we cannot observe abrupt differences
in the rank of beings. There is a gradual assent from beings with the least amount of
perfection to the one being with infinite perfection. He writes,
Thus finding in all parts of Creation, that fall under humane Observation, that
there is a gradual connexion of one with another, without any great or
discernible gaps between, in all that great variety of Things we see in the World,
which are so closely linked together, that, in the several ranks of Beings, it is not
easy to discover the bounds betwixt them, we have reason to be persuaded, that
by such gentle steps Things ascend upwards in degrees of Perfection.
...Observing, I say. such gradual and gentle descents downwards in those parts
of the Creation, that are beneath Man, the rule of Analogy may make it
probable, that it is also in Things above us, and our Observation; and that there
are several ranks of intelligent Beings, excelling us in several degrees of
Perfection, ascending upwards towards the infinite Perfection of the Creator, by
gentle steps and differences, that are every one at no great difference from the
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next to it.
There are two obvious problems with Locke's causal principle based on this
ranking of being. One problem is that Locke never tells us what the perfections are or
Essay IV.x.10, 624.
212
Essay IV.xvi.12. 666.
131
how we can be certain we know them. He notes that existence, power, and wisdom are
some of the perfections, but he gives no reason for taking these qualities to be
perfections, nor does he say what the other perfections are. In addition, it is not clear
we can have anything but probable knowledge of them. He writes.
The Degrees or Extent, wherein we ascribe Existence, Power, Wisdom, and all
other Perfection, (which we can have any Ideas of) to that Sovereign Being,
which we call God, being all boundless and infinite, we frame the best Idea of
him our Minds are capable of; all which is done, I say, by enlarging those simple
Ideas, we have taken from the Operations of our own Minds, by Reflection; or
by our Senses, from exterior things, to that vastness, to which Infinity can
extend them.
The ideas of things we have through the senses give us what we believe to be
perfections in things. From these ideas, we work by analogy to ascertain what
perfections might exist in beings ranking above us, such as God, Angels, or Devils.
Because we can have no knowledge of these beings through sensation, our ideas of
them and their perfections are attained by analogy from the observation of the so-called
perfections in lower beings. We observe the perfections in plants, animals, and human
beings, and from this we ascertain there must be a continuous and gradual ranking of
beings with greater and greater perfections leading all the way up to the infinitely
perfect being. However, since our knowledge of the ranks of beings is only by analogy
it is only probable. Any causal principle based on this notion of perfections must also
be only probable as well. Thus Locke’s causal principle is not known with inductive or
deductive certainty. Since Locke's cosmological argument is supposed to be a
demonstration of God's existence, the use of a merely probable, but not certain, causal
principle is not sufficient to guarantee the certainty of the conclusion.
1
Essay II.xxiii.34, 315.
The Problem with Eternity
Several critics have noted Locke’s use of eternal in his argument is
suspicious. It is clear Locke sees eternal and infinite as separate concepts. He
uses eternal for temporal extent and infinite for spatial extent. But this is not the
problem. The problem is that Locke mistakes without beginning for eternal. In
his argument he conflates a being that does not come into existence with an
eternal being. However, a being that does not come into existence may still go
out of existence. Locke succeeds in arguing for a being without beginning, but
he does not succeed in arguing for a being without a beginning and end, that is,
an everlasting being. Given this mistake, it seems Locke's creator could have
made the world and then gone out of existence. Although I do not believe that
this oversight invalidates Locke's argument, it is a consequence Locke would
not have wanted or accepted and he seems no where to recognize the mistake.
The Powers of Matter
Locke maintains that bare matter of itself cannot produce motion or thought.
Leibniz rightly criticized this claim by saying there was no way to show matter cannot
cause itself to think or sense without begging the question. Leibniz writes.
But those who believe that matter can have sense will not be inclined to accept
that matter cannot possibly produce sense; at least, it will be hard to adduce a
proof of this which does not also show that matter is entirely incapable of
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sense.
Leibniz’s worry is that if Locke is trying to convince an audience of materialist
atheists who are inclined to believe that matter thinks, his proof will be unconvincing.
While Locke does not assume matter could not move or think, he does seem to assume
214 NE IV.x.6, 436.
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matter is incapable producing motion or thought. Locke’s bare assertions that bare
matter of its own could not have created motion or thought of its own power is not an
argument to show it is impossible matter do so. However, he never gives any reason for
thinking matter cannot have this ability other than its inconceivability.
While Locke maintains we cannot use inconceivability as a guide to what God
can or cannot do. he does use inconceivability as a guide to what is possible for more
mundane beings. However, given our limited ability to know the real essence of
substances according to Locke, it is unwarranted to judge it impossible for matter to
have the ability to cause itself to move or think, regardless of our experience of it.
More will be said about Locke's use of conceivability as a guide to possibility in
Chapter 5, where I examine our knowledge of the world.
The Unity of God
Leibniz notes Locke’s conclusion that there is only one eternal being that is the
cause of all other real being is contentious. Leibniz writes.
Furthermore, there are those who, if they do admit eternal beings (as the
Epicureans do with their atoms), will not regard themselves as committed to
granting that there is an eternal being which is the sole source of all the others.
For though they would acknowledge that whatever confers existence also
confers the thing’s other qualities and powers, they will deny that a single thing
gives existence to the others, and will even say that for each thing the joint
action of several others is required. Thus, we shan’t be brought by that
,
7
1 5
argument, unaided, to one source ol all powers."
Leibniz is criticizing Locke’s causal principle. It seems that there is no reason, even
for one who accepts the existence of eternal beings and accepts that the eternal being
bestows all the powers that created being have upon them, to accept the existence of one
and only one eternal being. Locke thought that his causal principle specified clearly
NE IV.x.6, 436.
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enough that there would be only one cause. We can see that he does not make any
further attempt in his argument to show the unity of God. However, it was brought to
Locke’s attention that many of his readers did not see his argument as guaranteeing the
existence of only one God. Locke, at first, responded that he had adequately provided
for the certainty of there being only one God. But in subsequent correspondence, he
gave several arguments meant to demonstrate God's unity. In the February 21, 1698
letter to van Limborch, Locke gives three proofs for the unity of God, all of which rely
on God’s perfections. These arguments rest of the problematic notion of God’s
perfections, but given that we have reason to reject Locke’s causal principle it is
important to evaluate his subsequent arguments for the unity of God.
Locke begins by defining God as “an infinite eternal incorporeal being perfectly
perfect,”"'
6
and argues that “a perfectly perfect being cannot want any of those attributes
perfections or degrees of perfection which it is better to have than to be without for then
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he would want soe much of being perfectly perfect. ’’" He then goes on to give
arguments based on God's omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence. I will give
Locke’s argument regarding omnipotence because I believe it is the strongest of the
three. Locke tells us “to have power is a greater perfection than to have none; to have
more power is a greater perfection than to have lesse and to have all power (which is to
7 1 g
be omnipotent) is a greater perfection, than not to have power.” Locke continues,
1
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But two omnipotents are inconsistent. Because it must be supposed that it is
necessary for one to will what the other wills; and then he - of the two whose
will is necessarily - determined by the will of the other, is not free: and soe
wants that perfection; it being better to be free than under the determination of
an others will. If they are not both under the necessity of willing always the
same thing, then one may will the doeing of that, which the other may will
should not be done, and then the will of the one must prevail over the other, and
then he of the two, whose power is not able to second his will, is not
omnipotent. For he cannot doe soe much as the other, and then one of them is
not omnipotent and soe there are not nor can be two omnipotents and
219
consequently not two gods/
Locke's argument can be rendered as the following reductio ad absurduni:
1 . Suppose there are two omnipotent gods.
2. If so, then either each god always wills as the other wills, or each god does
not always will as the other wills.
3. If each god always wills as the other wills, then the god whose will is
determined by the other god is not free to will as he chooses.
4. The god who is not free to will as he chooses lacks the power of freedom,
and so is not omnipotent.
5. If each god does not always will as the other wills, then one god might do
what the other god does not will.
6. If one god cannot do something that he wills (because he cannot prevent the
other god from doing what he does not will), then he is not omnipotent.
7. Therefore, whether each god always wills as the other god wills or if each
god does not always will as the other wills, one god is not omnipotent.
8. Therefore, it is impossible that there be two omnipotent gods.
9. God is necessarily omnipotent (as per the definition of 'God').
10. Therefore, there cannot be two gods.
Locke's argument would be successful if he could prove that God necessarily
has the attribute of omnipotence, but his cosmological argument does not prove this.
John Locke, Correspondence ofJohn Locke , Edited by E. S. De Beer (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1981 ), Vol. six, 789.
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His argument, if successful, only proves that God has more power than all created
creatures. In addition to similar arguments based on God's omniscience and
omnipresence, Locke also offers an argument based on what looks like the Identity of
??0
Indiscermbles."" Locke writes.
If to avoid the foresaid arguments it be said that these two (or two hundred
thousand) gods (for by the same reason there can be two there maybe two
millions for there can be noe reason to limit their number) have all perfectly
exactly the same power, the same knowledge, the same will, and exist equally in
the same individual place, this is only to multiply sounds, but in reality to reduce
the supposed plurality only to one. For to suppose two intelligent beings, that
perpetually know will and act the same thing, and have not a separate existence,
is in words to suppose a plurality, but in reality to make but one. For to be
inseparably united in understanding, will, action, and place is to be as much
united as any intelligent being can be united to its self, and to suppose that
where there is such an union there can be two beings is to suppose a division
. . . . , 2 ? l
without a division and a thing divided from itself."
Locke's argument is that there cannot be two beings of the exact same kind,
with all the same properties, in the same place, since there would be no reason to call
this two beings rather than one. After showing that a being of the same kind with the
same properties cannot be co-located with God. Locke gives a second argument about
God's omnipresence. Here the argument is that if God is omnipresent, then there
cannot be any other being of the same kind located anywhere that God exists. The
crucial premise being that two beings of the same kind cannot be co-located because
they exclude each other. These two arguments together preclude the existence of two
gods with all of the same properties and powers, and preclude the existence of two gods
where one has only some of the same properties as the other god. Of course, the second
•>20
For any individuals x and y, for any property P. if x has P if and only if y has P, then
x - y-
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argument rests of the problematic notion of a "kind.” What kind of being is God? Do
these arguments mean that any immaterial cogitative being cannot exist anywhere that
God exists? If so. what should we say about angels or other supposedly intelligent
immaterial beings?
These arguments give us good insight into what Locke thought about the unity
of God, but I do not think that they can provide satisfactory help for Locke’s
cosmological argument without further supporting arguments (which Locke no where
gives).
A Valid Attempt
While I believe 1 have provided a reading of Locke’s text that produces a valid
cosmological argument, I do not believe the argument is sound. There are many
problems with Locke's argument and few remedies to be found. The most glaring
problem is the uncertainty of the causal principle and the reliance upon it to secure the
unity of God. However, on my reading it is possible to rescue Locke's argument from
some of the more embarrassing logical mistakes of which it has been accused. I believe
the more rich and interesting argument rendered here is also more in keeping with
Locke’s stated aims in the text.
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CHAPTER 5
LOCKE ON WHY THE WORLD IS THE WAY IT IS
Introduction
This chapter addresses Locke’s answer to the question, “Why is the world the
way that it is?” Locke does not explicitly address this question in his writing, but an
answer to this question is suggested by his views on our knowledge of the world, God’s
omnipotence and freedom, and our place in the structure of the world. Since Locke’s
epistemological views are central to our understanding of why the world is the way it is,
I begin with a discussion of how we gain knowledge of the world. 1 then proceed to
explain Locke’s views on whether the world could have been different than it is, and if
so. in what way. Finally, I will discuss his views on the structure of the world and our
place within it. 1 will argue that given Locke’s views in epistemology, the theological
foundations of his views of the world and our place in it are undermined.
Our Knowledge of the World
According to Locke, Knowledge is “nothing but the perception of the connexion
222
and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas.” ' This
perception yields three “degrees” of knowledge: Intuitive, Demonstrative, Sensitive.
Although all knowledge comes from what Locke terms the “two fountains of
knowledge,” viz., sensation and reflection, these degrees of knowledge differ from one
another in their evidence and certainty. " Intuitive knowledge is gained by the
Essay IV.i.2, 525.
Essay H.i.l, 104: Essay IV.iii. 1 4. 538.
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immediate comparing of any two ideas. Demonstrative knowledge is gained by the use
of reasoning; that is by examining the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, by the
intervention of other ideas in proofs. Sensitive knowledge is gained by the perception
ot the existence ot particular things." Intuitive knowledge is the most certain
knowledge we have, according to Locke, because it involves the immediate recognition
of the identity, diversity, or relation of any two of our ideas. This sort of knowledge
includes things like “white is white” and “1 is less than 2.” Demonstrative knowledge
is less certain than intuitive knowledge, because it involves reasoning by way of proof
to show that two ideas are related. Since the relation of the two ideas is not immediately
perceived, demonstrative knowledge is open to doubt even after a proof is given. In
order to have a successful proof, each premise and the relations between the premises in
the proof must be known with intuitive certainty. In this way. demonstrative knowledge
is dependent upon intuitive knowledge. Geometrical proofs are an example of
demonstrative knowledge. Sensitive knowledge, however, does not seem to fit Locke's
general account of how we gain knowledge, because it is not the perception of the
relation of two ideas. Sensitive knowledge concerns the perception of the
correspondence of our ideas to the reality of the external world. Given that sensitive
knowledge does not fit Locke's general definition of knowledge, and that sensitive
knowledge is our knowledge of the external world, we must investigate Locke's
justification for including it as knowledge.
Essay IV.iii.3, 539.
14C
Knowledge of the External World
Locke's view is that we can only obtain knowledge of the external world by way
of sensation. He w rites.
The Knowledge of the Existence of any other thing [except our own and God's
existence] we can have only by Sensation: For there being no necessary
connexion of real Existence, with any Idea a Man hath in his Memory, nor of
any other Existence but that of GOD, with the Existence of any particular Man;
no particular Man can know the Existence of any other Being, but only when by
actual operating upon him, it makes it self perceived by him. For having the
Idea of any thing in our Mind, no more proves the Existence of that Thing, than
the picture of a man evidences his being in the World, or the Visions of a Dream
2^5
make thereby a true History/
It often has been objected to Locke's views that since we only have direct access
to our own ideas and not to the objects that our ideas are supposed to represent, we can
never be certain that our ideas do represent the reality of the external world. The
problem of our knowledge of the external world was not unknowm to Locke. He saw
very clearly that his views on this matter seem to imply that knowledge of the external
world is impossible. He writes,
I Doubt not but my Reader, by this time, may be apt to think, that I have been all
this while only building a Castle in the Air; and be ready to say to me. To what
purpose all this stir? Knowledge, say you, is only the perception of the
agreement or disagreement of our own Ideas: but who knows w hat those ideas
226
may be ?
He also understood that it would appear to his critics that he had no way of showing that
our ideas do. in fact, match up to the reality of the world.
But of what use is all this fine Knowledge of Men's own Imaginations, to a Man
that enquires after the reality of Things? It matters not what Men's Fancies are.
'tis the Knowledge of things that is only to be prized: ‘tis this alone gives a
value to our Reasonings, and preference to one Man's Knowledge over
Essay IV.xi. 1 , 630.
Essay IV.iv.l, 562.
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another’s, that it is of Things as they really are, and not of Dreams and
2?7
Fancies."
Locke, however, was not convinced that we must turn to some sort of direct
realism because of these worries. Fie maintained that it is obvious that what we have
direct epistemic access to is our own ideas, not the world itself. Instead. Locke insisted
that we must seek a criterion by which we can tell that our ideas really do conform to
the reality of the external world. He writes,
‘Tis evident, the Mind knows not Things immediately, but only by the
intervention of the Ideas it has of them. Our Knowledge therefore is real, only
so far as there is a conformity between our Ideas and the reality of Things. But
what shall be here the Criterion? How shall the Mind, when it perceives nothing
but its own Ideas, know that they agree with Things themselves?
"
According to Locke, we can know that our simple and complex ideas conform to
the world as it really is. First, we can know that all our simple ideas conform to things
because our mind is not capable of producing these simple ideas by itself. Since simple
ideas, by their very nature, are not built up out of more basic ideas or sensations, they
cannot be constructed by the mind’s imaginative abilities. Locke writes.
First, there are simple Ideas, which since the Mind, as has been shewed, can by
no means make to it self, must necessarily be the product of Things operating on
the Mind in a natural way, and producing therein those Perceptions which by the
Wisdom and Will of our Maker they are ordained and adapted to. From whence
it follows, that simple Ideas are not fictions of our Fancies, but the natural and
regular productions of Things without us, really operating upon us; and so carry
with them all the conformity which is intended; or which our state requires: For
they represent to us Things under those appearances which they are fitted to
produce in us: whereby we are enabled to distinguish the sorts of particular
Substances, to discern the states they are in. and so to take them for our
Necessities, and apply them to our Uses. Thus the Idea of Whiteness, or
Bitterness, as it is in the Mind, exactly answering that Power which is in any
Body to produce it there, has all the real conformity it can, or ought to have.
Essay IV.iv. 1 , 563.
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with Things without us. And this conformity between our simple Ideas and the
, . . . ?29
existence of Things, is sufficient for real Knowledge."
Locke also maintains that we can be certain that our complex ideas, excluding
those ideas of substance, conform to reality because they do not concern the existence
of any entity. Our complex ideas, such as those of color and height, are merely
generalizations or abstractions from our simple ideas, and these conform well enough as
long as they correspond to the way others use the same terms.
Secondly, All our complex Ideas, except those of Substances, being Archetypes
of the Mind’s own making, not intended to be the Copies of any thing, nor
referred to the existence of any thing, as to their Originals, cannot want any
conformity necessary to real Knowledge.
“ °
However, we might object on several grounds to these claims of conformity.
First, as far as our complex ideas are concerned, since these ideas are not “referred to
the existence of any thing” that they conform necessarily to “real Knowledge” seems
irrelevant to a discussion about our knowledge of the reality of the world. Second,
concerning our simple ideas, we might wonder what evidence or justification Locke has
for asserting that these ideas must conform to the reality of the world? It seems possible
that our simple ideas be caused by God, or angels, and so do not relate to the existence
or reality of an outside world. Likewise it seems possible that our simple ideas are
caused by outside existents, but fail to represent the reality of external world with any
accuracy. Locke provides four arguments to show that our simple ideas do conform to
231
the reality of the external world.
Essay IV.iv.4, 563-4.
Essay IV.iv.5, 564.
Essay IV.xi.4-7, 632-3.
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The first argument Locke gives in support of his claim that our simple ideas
conform to the reality of the external world is that people who lack a given sense organ
232
never can have the ideas belonging to that sense produced in their minds.' He argues
that a blind person can never have the idea of a particular color, and that similar cases
can be made for all the other sense organs. This is supposed to show that exterior
objects acting on our senses are the cause of all our sensations. But Locke seems to
ignore the possibility that having the relevant sense organ might be merely coincident
with the mind’s producing what we believe are ideas gathered from experience of
external objects, but that, in fact, these ideas do not come in from the outside. For
instance, having functional optical nerves might trigger the brain to create ideas that are
pictorial and that seem to come from an external source, but these ideas might be no
different in origin than the dreams we have while our eyes are shut.
Locke’s second argument is that our sensations often come involuntarily through
our sense organs.' The argument is based on the claim that we are able to discern
when an idea is one of our own making, or one of memory, because we are able to call
them up and dismiss them at will. In contrast, some of our ideas seem to come without
any effort of will on our part, and indeed, sometimes they even seem to come against
our will, by virtue of the fact that we have functioning sense organs. Locke is correct in
saying that there is a different phenomenological feel to certain of our ideas that we call
memory or imaginings from those that we call perceptions. But not being able to
voluntarily dismiss or call up an idea or sensation does not seem sufficient to show that
Essay IV.xi.4, 632.
Essay fV.xi.4, 632.
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it has an external cause. The argument from dreaming seems to apply. I do not seem
(at least most of the time) to be able to control what sensations or ideas occur to me in
dreams. Yet dream sensations are not caused by external stimuli.
Locke's third argument is that many of our ideas are produced in us with pain
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that we alterwards remember without pain." This argument, it seems, is a variation on
the previous. It also relies on the phenomenological difference between ideas.
However, in this case it is the perceived difference between the same idea as first
. . 235
experienced and as experienced again voluntarily.’ That sometimes an idea is
accompanied by a certain sensation or emotion, and at other times it is not, is not
evidence of its being caused externally. The claim that only ideas involving sensations
coming from without can have a strong phenomenological feel is undermined by things
like phantom pains from missing limbs and sensations of fear and anger in dreams. All
of these sensations might have a strong feel upon their first occurrence, and be recalled
later with a lesser degree of emotion, even though the original ideas were not from
external sources.
Locke's fourth and final argument is that our senses are often corroborated by
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the reports of other persons’ sensory experience.’ Locke’s argues that we seem to be
able to verify each other’s reports about the external world, and this would not be
Essay IV.xi.6, 633.
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Whether, according to Locke, this is the numerically same idea that is recalled again
later voluntarily is an interesting question. However, it is not one to be dealt with here.
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possible were there not a single external source from which we each get our ideas.
However, in this case, appeal to parts of the external world, viz., other persons and their
perceptions, is question-begging. Locke is trying to show that our ideas conform to the
reality of the external world. So appealing to the seeming corroboration of a pail of the
world to our ideas in order to get to the correspondence of the whole of the world to our
ideas is to appeal to what is to be proven.
Each of Locke’s four arguments fails to prove that our simple ideas correspond
with the reality of the external world. However, Locke might reject the objections to
his arguments as demands for certainty when all that is required is probability.
Knowledge comes in "degrees,” and we should expect that it extends from certainty (or
near certainty) down to probability. Locke might be content to say that our ideas of the
external world are fitting for getting by in the world, and so correspond as well as they
need to for our purposes. He writes.
And of this, the greatest assurance I can possibly have, and to which my
Faculties can attain, is the Testimony of my Eyes, which are the proper and sole
Judges of this thing, whose Testimony I have reason to rely on, as so certain,
that I can no more doubt, whilst I write this, that I see White and Black, and that
something really exists, that causes that Sensation in me, than that I write or
move my Hand; which is a Certainty as great, as humane Nature is capable of,
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concerning the existence of any thing, but Man s self alone, and of GOD."
Also, from the passage already quoted, we should note the following:
From whence it follows, that simple Ideas are not fictions of our Fancies, but the
natural and regular productions of Things without us, really operating upon us;
and so carry with them all the conformity which is intended; or which our state
requires: For they represent to us Things under those appearances which they are
fitted to produce in us: whereby we are enabled to distinguish the sorts of
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particular Substances, to discern the states they are in, and so to take them for
. . 238
our Necessities, and apply them to our Uses.'
Given these passages, it seems that Locke’s criterion for knowing that our
simple ideas do conform to the reality of the external world is that they are reliable.
That is, our ideas reflect the world accurately enough to serve as a reliable guide to
getting around in the world, and for predicting with some accuracy what will happen in
the future based on our past experiences. Given that our senses have proven to be a
reliable source for information concerning the states that substances are in and how to
"take them for our Necessities, and apply them to our Uses,” we have reason to believe
that our senses conform to the reality of the world.
However, that our senses have proven in the past to be reliable does not mean
that they generate knowledge about the world. We might think still think that Sensitive
“Knowledge” is not knowledge at all. but rather some sort of probable belief. But
Locke tells us our sensitive knowledge is suited for getting us by in the world, and it
serves the purpose of allowing us to sustain ourselves and to keep ourselves from harm.
Because of this, Locke says that our sensitive knowledge "deserves the name of
Knowledge.” To expect to know the reality of the world by means of our senses and
intellect, is to demand more than what is necessary for our purposes. We cannot know
the external world with "Cartesian,” or indubitable, certainty, so we should not concern
ourselves with metaphysical puzzles that are beyond our abilities. Locke writes.
As to my self, I think GOD has given me assurance enough of the Existence of
Things without me: since by their different application, I can produce in my self
both Pleasure and Pain, which is one great Concernment ot my present state.
s
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Locke’s view is that all our ideas of the world are of something external to us,
but that the reality of external things vastly outstrips our conception of them. It should
be noted, however, that it is perfectly consistent with Locke's views of our knowledge
of the reality of the external world that all our ideas come directly from God. As we will
see. this severe limitation on our knowledge of the reality of the world will have serious
implications for Locke’s theological framework.
The Extent of All Our Know ledge
Locke tells us that we cannot have knowledge regarding all of our ideas. We
cannot have intuitive knowledge of all our ideas because we cannot immediately
perceive all the relations between the ideas we have. We lack rational knowledge of
some of our ideas because we cannot always find the mediate ideas to connect them in
demonstration. Finally, sensitive knowledge only applies to what is actually present to
the senses. Locke concludes, "From all of which it is evident, that the extent of our
knowledge comes not only short of the reality of things, but even of the extent of our
.
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own ideas.”" We are not capable of having knowledge of all of our ideas even within
any of the types of knowledge. This means that the failure of sensitive knowledge to
guarantee the existence of the external world is only one aspect in which our knowledge
falls far short of what we might expect. We not only fail to have certain knowledge of
the reality of the world, we also lack certain understanding of our own ideas. Our
limitations affect not only our ability to know about the real existents of the world, but
also our ability to know about the general principles and laws that we depend on to
understand the workings of the world. The limitations on our knowledge and its effects
240
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can be demonstrated vividly by examining Locke’s views on causation and his causal
principle, viz., whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence.
Locke writes that the relation of cause and effect is the most comprehensive of
?4
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all relations." Our ideas of causation are the ground for many laws and the foundation
for scientific inquiry. Locke says that our idea of causation is derived from sensation
24 1
and reflection." We are told that we get our ideas of cause and effect from noticing
that both qualities and substances come into existence by the operation of other beings.
What produces simple or complex ideas is called the “cause” and the simple or complex
idea that is produced is called the “effect.” From our perception of things coming into
existence in the world, we then infer the two sorts of causation, viz., creation and
generation. While it may be argued that we seem to experience the generation of things
in the world, it is hard to understand how, given that we only have access to our own
ideas, we can be certain that our ideas of cause and effect really do reflect the reality of
the external world. One might wonder if Locke's causal principle based on our ideas of
cause and effect is intended not as a principle about the world in general, but as a
principle about the causation of our ideas. For instance, one might argue that the only
immediate experience of things coming into existence that we can possibly have is the
coming into existence of any of our ideas. Once we experience the generation of one
idea from another, we can reflect upon our own ideas, and note that one seemed to
produce the other. We call the one that produces another ideas the “cause" and the new
idea that comes into being the “effect.” Reflection then shows us the connection
Essay II, xxv. 1 1 , 324.
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between these two ideas “cause” and “effect.” Once we realize that these ideas are
interrelated, we can infer that wherever we find an effect, we can be assured of a cause.
The mere fact that our ideas of “cause” and “effect” are defined in terms of one another
does not mean that our ideas necessarily conform to the reality of the world in any way.
However, it is certain that Locke does not intend his account of causation to be about
ideas only, but also to be about the external world. He writes.
In the notice, that our Senses take of the constant Vicissitude of Things, we
cannot but observe, that several particular, both Qualities and Substances begin
to exist; and that they receive this their Existence, from the due Application and
Operation of some other Being. From this Observation, we get our Ideas of
24 ^
Cause and Ettect.
Certainly our ideas are caused, and they do conform to the relation of cause and
effect, but the causal principle is not supposed to concern only our ideas. Locke wants
to show that our ideas of cause and effect are derived from our experience of the world.
Unfortunately, the relation of cause and effect as a general proposition cannot be
guaranteed. As Locke himself notes.
Now because we cannot be certain of the Truth of any general Proposition,
unless we know the precise bounds and extent of the Species its Terms stand for,
it is necessary we should know the essence of each Species, which is that which
constitutes and bounds it.
According to Locke, we need to understand the bounds of the terms “cause” and
“effect” in order to be certain that we are correctly attributing this relation to the world.
Unfortunately, on Locke's account of knowledge it is unclear that we can know the
extent of our ideas that constitute and bound causation.
Essay Il.xxvi.l, 324.
Essay IV.vi.4. 580.
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In Chapter 4, 1 discussed the failure of the causal principle in the cosmological
argument with respect to Locke's unclear notion of perfections. Here we can see that
there are other, more basic, problems with his notion of causation in general. The
ground of the causal principle must be that it is a universal or general proposition about
the world, not merely a principle about the generation of our ideas or a principle that is
known with mere probable certainty about the world. Without this ground, even if
Locke could have developed a coherent view about the notion of a perfection, the causal
principle fails as an intuitively certain general principle about the reality of the world.
Locke sums up the state of our knowledge as follows:
From all which it is easy to perceive what a darkness we are involved in, how
little it is of Being, and the things that are, that we are capable to know. And
therefore we shall do no injury to our knowledge, when we modestly think with
ourselves, that we are so far from being able to comprehend the whole nature of
the universe and all the things contained in it. that we are not capable of a
philosophical knowledge of the bodies that are about us, and make a pail of us:
concerning their secondary qualities, powers, and operations, we can have no
universal certainty. Several effects come every day within the notice of our
senses, of which we have so far sensitive knowledge: but the causes, manner,
and certainty of their production, for the two foregoing reasons, we must be
content to be very ignorant of. In these we can go no further than particular
experience informs us matter of fact, and by analogy to guess what effects the
like bodies are, upon other trials, like to produce. But as to a perfect science of
natural bodies, (not to mention spiritual beings,) we are, I think, so far from
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being capable ot any such thing, that 1 conclude it lost labour to seek alter it.
Could the World Have Been Different from the Wav It Is?
One might expect that Locke’s views on the question of whether the world could
have been different from what it actually is would be similar to the views of
contemporary empiricists. That is, one might expect that his response to such a
question would be that the question is unanswerable or badly formed in some way.
Essay IV.iii.29, 560.
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However, Locke's theological views make it possible for him to hold that things might
have been very different from the way they actually are. Locke, of course, does not
ever address the question of whether the world could have been different than it actually
is or not, but we may gather what his answer would be on the basis of other things he
does say. The basis for thinking that Locke would say that the world could have been
different from the way it is is found in his views about God's omnipotence, the so-
called “eternal truths," and his views on modality.
it is clear that Locke holds that it is consistent with God's omnipotence that the
world be made differently from the way it was. One example of Locke’s commitment
to this view is found in the sections of the Essay where Locke discusses the possibility
of thinking matter. Locke, famously, asserts that God could have made matter think. He
writes.
We have the Ideas of Matter and Thinking, but possibly shall never be able to
know, whether any mere material Being thinks, or no; it being impossible for us,
by the contemplation of our own Ideas, without revelation, to discover, whether
Omnipotency has not given to some Systems of Matter fitly disposed, a power to
perceive and think, or else joined and fixed to Matter so disposed, a thinking
immaterial Substance: It being, in respect of our Notions, not much more remote
from our Comprehension to conceive, that God can. if he pleases, superadd to
Matter a Faculty of Thinking, than that he should superadd to it another
Substance, with a Faculty of Thinking; since we know not wherein Thinking
consists, nor to what sort of Substances the Almighty has been pleased to give
that Power, which cannot be in any created Being, but merely by the good
pleasure and Bounty of the Creator.'
Detailed discussions of exactly how God could superadd thought to matter, and
whether Locke is suggesting God might have done it in this world, are offered by
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Jonathan Bennett, Margaret Wilson, and Michael Ayers. I will not repeat the debate
here. However, it should be agreed by all that Locke's considered view on the matter
seems to be that matter in our world does not think, but that God could have made
matter such that it did (perhaps even in this world). Locke's arguments show that we
have good reason to believe that matter might be made to think. For instance, our lack
of knowledge of the essence of substances, both material and immaterial, means that we
cannot be certain that matter does not think, so when being philosophically rigorous we
cannot deny the possibility that matter thinks. In addition, we can no more conceive of
how immaterial substance might think than we can conceive of how material substance
might think. Since we know that something thinks, we should be agnostic as to what
substance it is because for all we know it could be matter. We are also certain that God
is omnipotent and that he has created some thinking substance (since we know from
experience that we think). Since God can do as he pleases, we have no grounds to deny
that God is capable of superadding the property of thought to any substance he chooses.
For discussions of the controversy see Michael Ayers, Jonathan Bennett, and
Margaret Wilson.
All of these lines of reasoning suggest that we cannot be certain whether matter, in fact,
does think or not."
4
If, as Locke holds, matter does not think in our world (which we are certain it
does not), but God could have made it such that it did, then it seems that our world
could have been very different from the way it is. But these are not the only reasons to
think that Locke thought the world might have been very different had God chosen to
make it so. Another case can be made for this claim based on Locke’s views on the
eternal truths.
The Eternal Truths
Closely related to the issue of God's omnipotence is Locke’s account of the
eternal truths. The eternal truths are generally understood as universal necessary
propositions such as the truths of mathematics and geometry, the truths of logic, and
(according to some) the truths of morality. Descartes, notoriously, held that God created
the eternal truths by an act of will. If Locke's view about the eternal truths were similar
to Descartes’ view, then we would have good evidence that he thought that world could
See Jonathan Bennett and Peter Remnant, “How Matter Might at First Be Made.” In
C. E. Jarrett, J. King-Farlow, and F. J. Pelletier, Editors, New Essays on Rationalism
and Empiricism: Canadian Journal ofPhilosophy, Supplimentary Volume 4 ( 1978), 1-
1 1. The issue of whether matter thinks is one rife with controversy, and it is unclear
whether Locke was completely forthright on this issue. The mere suggestion that matter
might think could be taken as heretical because it was thought to be a rejection of the
existence or superiority of the soul. However, Locke tries to guard against such claims
of heresy by arguing that if we say that it is impossible that matter be made to think, we
limit God’s power to what we consider possible. The two theological claims - ( 1 ) that
God’s omnipotence entails he can superadd thought to matter, and (2) that the soul is
the superior, and therefore, the thinking substance - seem to be in tension with one
another. Either way of resolving the problem might be taken as a dismissal of a well-
established theological view. This might explain Locke’s seeming wavering on the
issue.
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be very different than it is. In order to understand Locke’s views on the eternal truths, it
might be helpful to examine his views on the truths of morality. Locke is very explicit
about the status of moral truths. The truths of morality are dependent upon God's will.
Locke, as is widely noted, is a voluntarist about morality. That is, he believes
that God is not determined by independent standards of right and wrong when dictating
morality, rather whatever God commands concerning morality determines the facts of
morality. Locke writes that “the true ground of morality...can only be the will and law
of God, who sees Men in the dark, has in his Hand Rewards and Punishments, and
Power enough to call to account the Proudest Offender.” It seems reasonable to hold
that Locke’s view about what me might call the “eternal truths” is similar to his view
about the moral truths (given that the moral truths are often held to be a subset of the
eternal truths). There is only one passage in the Essay where Locke discusses the
eternal truths. Locke writes.
In the former case, our Knowledge is the consequence of the Existence of
Things, producing Ideas in our Minds by our Senses: in the latter, knowledge is
the consequence of the Ideas (be they what they will) that are in our Minds,
producing there general certain Propositions. Many of these are called aetemae
veritates , and all of them indeed are so; not from being written, all or any of
them, in the Minds of all Men; or that they were any of them Propositions in any
ones Mind, till he, having got the abstract Ideas, joyn’d or separated them by
affirmation or negation. But wheresoever we can suppose such a creature as
Man is, endowed with such faculties, and thereby furnished with such Ideas as
we have, we must conclude, he must needs, when he applies his thoughts to the
consideration of his Ideas, know the truth of certain propositions that will arise
from the agreement or disagreement which he will perceive in his own Ideas.
Such Propositions are therefore called Eternal Truths, not because they are
Eternal Propositions actually formed, and antecedent to the Understanding that
at any time makes them; nor because they are imprinted on the Mind from any
patterns that are anywhere out of the Mind, and existed before: but because,
being once made about abstract Ideas, so as to be true, they will, whenever they
can be supposed to be made again at any time, past or to come, by a Mind
having those Ideas, always actually be true. For Names being supposed to stand
perpetually for the same Ideas, and the same Ideas having immutably the same
155
Habitudes one to another. Propositions concerning any abstract Ideas that are
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once true must needs be eternal Verities.
From this passage alone a parallel with moral truths is not clear. More must be
said about Locke's voluntarism in morality. According to Locke, God wills the facts of
morality, but he does not implant them in our hearts and minds, so to speak. That is,
Locke does not hold that moral truths are innate in us. Rather, we discover moral truths
by the proper use of reason. We can infer from God’s omnipotence and our role as his
creation that we owe God our obedience. If we fail to give God our obedience we will
be punished, and if we obey we will be rewarded. God gives a moral law to his
creatures. He is a lawgiver because he has the power to set rewards and punishments
for obeying or disobeying his commands. As Bennett writes, Locke “means morality to
be demonstrable from true non-analytic premises about God's will and our nature.’’
"
In the passage above, Locke explains that the eternal truths, like the moral
truths, are not inscribed in our minds, nor do they exist at any time previous to our
obtaining the ideas from which we abstract them. No mention is made of God's
commanding or decreeing the eternal truths, but it seems clear that the method we use
for discovering such truths, that is, the use of reason in understanding or in
demonstrating the relations between the relevant ideas, is the same. For Locke, the
truths about mathematics, logic, and morality have no independent existence over and
above their instances in this world. So. when God decides how to create the world, he
Essay IV. xi. 14, 638
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decides what truths will hold in the world. By creating the world in one way rather than
in some other, God wills that some truths obtain rather than others.
When we use our reason properly and discern the relations between our ideas,
we can form true general propositions about the world. Locke says in the passage
above that these truths about the world are “eternal” in the sense that once formed they
hold for all times past and future, that is, these truths are not really eternal but
everlasting. However, we must be careful here not to confuse Locke’s understanding of
eternal truths with necessary truths or eternal truths as understood by Descartes or
Leibniz. For Locke, eternal truths are merely truths that hold in our world for all times,
not truths that would have obtained no matter what world God had created or truths that
God was in any way subject to when creating.
Locke's view about the so-called "eternal truths” is very different from that of
Descartes or Leibniz. In Chapter 2, I discussed the views of Descartes and Leibniz on
the eternal truths. Descartes holds that God creates the eternal truths, while Leibniz
holds that the eternal truths exist in God's understanding, but they are not subject to his
will. Both Descartes and Leibniz hold that we have our ideas of the eternal truths
innately. While Locke seems to siding more with Descartes in this debate in that he
holds that God’s will determines which truths will obtain (by way of choosing which
way to create the world), what Locke takes the eternal truths to be is very different from
Descartes. For Locke, the eternal truths are abstractions from our ideas that have no
independent existence apart from our ideas or prior to being abstracted from a person’s
idea, whereas for Descartes the eternal truths are true propositions that are placed in our
minds by God.
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Leibniz saw Locke’s view as differing from his own because Locke seems to
hold that God's will is completely undetermined. Locke, when discussing the issue of
whether God might superadd thought to matter, wrote that we have no reason to deny it
“since we know not wherein Thought consists, nor to what soil of Substances the
Almighty has been pleased to give that Power, which cannot be in any created Being,
?51
but merely by the good pleasure and Bounty of the Creator. In response Leibniz
retorted, “This good pleasure would indeed be neither good nor pleasure if God's power
252
did not perpetually run parallel to his wisdom. According to Leibniz, without some
standard by which to judge of God's decisions, we have no basis for calling them
“good" or “wise,” even though they good be good or wise for all we know. Leibniz
thought that God's doing the best in every situation was the only guarantee that God
took the utmost concern for the wellbeing of all his creation. If we have no basis for
attributing goodness to God's decrees, then we cannot know that they will result in the
pleasure of his creation. In response to Locke’s passage on the eternal truths quoted
above, Leibniz writes.
In response to this it will be asked where these ideas would be if there were no
mind, and what would then become of the real foundation of this certainty of
eternal truths. This question brings us at last to the ultimate foundation of truth,
namely to that Supreme and Universal Mind who cannot fail to exist and whose
understanding is indeed the domain of eternal truths. St. Augustine knew this
and expresses it pretty forcefully [e.g. Free Choice I 1.12], And lest you should
think that it is unnecessary to have recourse to this Mind, it should be bourne in
mind that these necessary truths contain the determining reason and regulating
principle of existent things - the laws of the universe, in short. Therefore, since
these necessary truths are prior to the existence of contingent beings, they must
be grounded in the existence of a necessary substance. That is where I find the
pattern for ideas and truths which are engraved in our souls. They are engraved
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there not in the form of propositions, but rather as sources which, by being
employed in particular circumstances, will give rise to actual assertions.'"
However, Locke's position might not be as bad as Leibniz makes it out. Locke
does hold that we can ascertain moral truths and truths about the world by the proper
use of our reason. This allows a response to Leibniz’s criticism that God's decrees
could not be good unless they are guided by his wisdom. Locke can claim that God has
created the world such that it is, in principle, intelligible to rational creatures. However,
given that we are creatures of very limited rationality, that God has created a world that
is intelligible in principle, but mostly likely not intelligible to us in practice may count
against this attempt to secure God's goodness.
But is it the case that Locke holds that all the truths of mathematics and
geometry are chosen by God's arbitrary will? The Lockean view of freedom supports
the view that God is not constrained by any factors when choosing how to create the
world. Locke holds that a person is free with respect to a certain act if (1) he can do
254
what he wills to do, and (2) if he had be able to do otherwise having willed to do so."
That is, an agent must have a choice about what he does (there must be real alternatives
open to him to choose from), and he must be able to will to do one of the alternatives. A
person’s will is determined by uneasiness. This uneasiness is caused by or is
?55 . .
constituent of a desire for some absent good." According to Locke, our volitions are
determined by our desires, but we are still free agents as long as we meet the above
NE 447.
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stated criteria for freedom. Thus our being free is consistent with having volitions that
are determined by our desires. Locke does not discuss God's freedom, but he clearly
does think that freedom is a perfection (and so God being free does not follow from
God's perfection)/ By analogy with the case of freedom in persons, we can see that
God would be free with respect to his actions if he willed to do something from among
possible alternatives and was able to act on that will. In this way, God's freedom would
be exactly like our own. However, it is unlikely that Locke would say that God's
volitions are in any way determined. God is not affected by desires. After all, God is
perfectly perfect and so lacks no good. Thus, God’s will is not determined in the same
way that ours is. It is still an open question whether God's will is determined by
something else, perhaps his intellect or his goodness. But it seems that Locke’s position
must be that there are no independent standards by which God decides what is true or
good. So it is hard to see how we can avoid the position that God's will is
undetermined, and his actions arbitrary. However, the following passage might be
taken as evidence that mathematical and geometric truths are not due to the arbitrary
will of God. Locke writes.
In some of our ideas there are certain relations, habitudes, and connexions, so
visibly included in the nature of the ideas themselves, that we cannot conceive
them separable from them by any power whatsoever. And in these only we are
capable of certain and universal knowledge. Thus the idea of a right-lined
triangle necessarily carries with it an equality of its angles to two right ones. Nor
can we conceive this relation, this connexion of these two ideas, to be possibly
mutable, or to depend on any arbitrary power, which of choice made it thus, or
could make it otherwise. But the coherence and continuity of the parts of matter;
the production of sensation in us of colours and sounds, &c., by impulse and
motion; nay, the original rules and communication of motion being such,
wherein we can discover no natural connexion with any ideas we have, we
John Locke, Correspondence ofJohn Locke , Edited by E. S. De Beer (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1981), Vol. six, 789.
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cannot but ascribe them to the arbitrary will and good pleasure of the Wise
Architect. 1 need not, I think, here mention the resurrection of the dead, the
future state of this globe of earth, and such other things, which are by every one
257
acknowledged to depend wholly on the determination of a free agent.'
However, the subject of the chapter in which this passage occurs is the extent of
human knowledge, not the extent of God's power. Locke is telling us which of our
ideas we can have the most certainty about, namely, those ideas that seem to be
necessary because they are what we would now call analytic. It is clear from Locke's
discussion of the eternal truths that necessity for him is a relation that holds between
ideas, that is, that the ideas are necessarily connected in our minds. Locke does not
think, as Leibniz does, that there are some truths in the world that would remain
regardless of what world God chose to create or what sort of creatures inhabited it.
Given Locke’s views on God's omnipotence and his freedom, we can see that
the world might have been very different from the way it actually is. God not only
could have made matter think, but had he chosen to create a very different world, even
the so-called eternal truths might have been different. This view of God's omnipotence
causes some problems for Locke's method of determining what is possible and what is
impossible through the use of conceivability and inconceivability arguments.
Conceivability as a Guide to Possibility
It seems that Locke accepts two theses about conceivability and possibility. The
first is that conceivability is a guide to possibility. He writes.
For a man may conceive two bodies at a distance, so as they may approach one
another, without touching or displacing any solid thing, till their superficies
come to meet; whereby, 1 think, we have the clear idea of space without solidity.
For (not to go so far as annihilation of any particular body) I ask, whether a man
cannot have the idea of the motion of one single body alone, without any other
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succeeding immediately into its place? I think it is evident he can: the idea of
motion in one body no more including the idea of motion in another, than the
idea of a square figure in one body includes the idea of a square figure in
another.
s
Locke also seems to accept that inconceivability is not a guide to impossibility.
But how much these few and narrow inlets are disproportionate to the vast
whole extent of all beings, will not be hard to persuade those who are not so
foolish as to think their span the measure of all things. What other simple ideas
it is possible the creatures in other parts of the universe may have, by the
assistance of senses and faculties more or perfecter than we have, or different
from ours, it is not for us to determine. But to say or think there are no such,
because we conceive nothing of them, is no better an argument than if a blind
man should be positive in it. that there was no such thing as sight and colours,
because he had no manner of idea of any such thing, nor could by any means
frame to himself any notions about seeing.259
Locke uses conceivability as a guide to possibility throughout the Essay. But
given Locke's epistemology, how can we know that our imaginations guide us to what
is really possible? Further, Locke here tells us that inconceivability is not a guide to
impossibility, but yet he uses inconceivability argumentsfrequently in connection with
his demonstration of the existence of God. His argument for accepting the thesis that
inconceivability is not a guide to impossibility is that our senses and intellect are not
suited for discerning all things that are possible. This is a reasonable thesis for him to
hold given his epistemological views and God’s omnipotence. In fact, Locke
supplements this argument by reminding us that it is unlikely that we are able to
conceive of the things of which God is capable. He writes.
But you will say. Is it not impossible to admit of the making anything out of
nothing, since we cannot possibly conceive it? I answer. No. Because it is not
reasonable to deny the power of an infinite Being, because we cannot
Essay II.iv.3, 124.
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comprehend its Operations. We do not deny other effects upon this ground,
because we cannot possibly conceive the manner of their Production.'
One might think that acceptance of the principle that inconceivability is not a guide to
impossibility is exactly what Locke should hold. However, one also might think that
Locke is inconsistent in his adherence to this principle. There are at least six
conceivability/inconceivability claims in Locke’s sub-arguments for the cosmological
argument. The first instance comes at Essay
.
IV. x. 9. There Locke writes.
There are but two sorts of Beings in the World, that Man knows or conceives.
M
And at x. 10 he writes.
For it is impossible to conceive, that ever bare incogitative Matter should
produce a thinking intelligent Being, as that nothing of itself produce Matter.
Is it possible to conceive it can add Motion to itself, being purely Matter, or
produce anything?
And I appeal to every one’s own Thoughts, whether he cannot as easily conceive
Matter produced by nothing, as Thought to be produced by pure Matter, when
before there was no such thing as Thought, or an intelligent Being existing.
For it is impossible to conceive that Matter either with or without Motion could
have originally in and from it self. Sense. Perception, and Knowledge, as is
evident from hence, that then Sense. Perception, and Knowledge must be a
property eternally inseparable from Matter and every Particle of it.
...neither is there any such thing existing as one material Being, or one single
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Body that we know or can conceive.'
If Locke were consistent in holding that inconceivability is not a guide to
impossibility, he would not plainly assert the impossibility of incogitative matter as the
Essay IV.x.19. 629.
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source of all thinking intelligent being, nor would he assert that it is impossible that
nothing produce matter.
What reason does Locke have for thinking that our ability or inability to
conceive something is a reliable guide to possibility or impossibility? God has fitted us
with limited senses and faculties, as Locke admits, so how can we be certain we are
“latching on" to truth about possibility? Is it just obvious that anything that we can
conceive of as possible is possible, given that we cannot conceive of very much? But
what if we simply fail to see the hidden contradictions? According to Locke, we can
conceive that God could make matter think, but we cannot conceive of matter (in this
world) as thinking. We cannot conceive of something being created out of nothing, but
neither can we conceive of something being created by nothing. Yet Locke holds that
we should accept one as possible and the other as impossible. Which claims should we
accept and which should we reject, and on what grounds? 1 see no criterion in Locke's
writings for making these judgments about which conceivability claims adequately
reflect possibility. On pain of inconsistency it seems Locke should hold that we must
be agnostic about all claims of possibility and impossibility based on conceivability
arguments.
Locke’s acceptance of conceivability as a guide to possibility should give him
an easy way to explain why the world might have been different from the way it is,
namely, that we can consistently imagine it as different. But his acceptance of these
principles in conjunction with his views about God's omnipotence and freedom raises
more problems than it seems to solve. Given our epistemological limitations, it seems
incredible that we are lucky enough to grasp the truth concerning possibility. We should
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remain agnostic with respect to whether conceivability is a guide to what is possible or
impossible.
What Is the World Like?
In this section, I will discuss several features of the actual world's structure and
our place in it.
The Plentitude of the World
One surprising view that Locke holds about the structure of the world is his view
about the plentitude of the types of creatures contained therein. Locke holds that not
only are there no “gaps” in nature, as Leibniz puts it, but that there is a continual
gradual progression from the least perfect of beings all the way up to the infinitely
perfect being. Locke writes.
Observing, I say, such gradual and gentle descents downwards in those pails of
the Creation, that are beneath Man. the rule of Analogy may make it probable,
that it is so also in Things above us, and our Observation; and that there are
several ranks of intelligent Beings, excelling us in several degrees of Perfection,
ascending upwards tow ards the infinite Perfection of the Creator, by gentle steps
and differences, that are every one at no great distance from the next to it.
Thus finding in all pails of the Creation, that fall under humane Observation,
that there is a gradual connexion of one with another, without any great or
discernible gaps between, in all that great variety of Things we see in the World,
which are so closely linked together, that, in the several ranks of Beings, it is not
easy to discover the bounds betwixt them, we have reason to be perswaded, that
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by such gentle steps Things ascend upwards in degrees ot Perfection.
Locke tells us that there is a plentitude of creatures in the world of varying
perfections. These creatures are all part of God's creation, and God has given them
various faculties of sense and intellect. We discover this truth about the world by
analogy. That is, we observe that below us there is a gradual descent in the perfections
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of creatures that continues until we reach the type of animal (or perhaps plant?) with the
fewest possible perfections. By way of analogy, we can then infer that there is probably
a gradual upward assent in the perfection of beings that continues upward until we reach
the most perfectly perfect being. This upward assent will presumably take us out of the
realm of material, or sensible, beings and into the realm of beings that are purely
intellectual beings. Locke writes.
Only this, I think, 1 may confidently say... that the intellectual and sensible
World, are in this perfectly alike; That that pail, which we see of either of them,
holds no proportion with what we see not; And whatsoever we can reach with
our Eyes, or our thoughts of either of them, is but a point, almost nothing, in
„
,
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comparison ol the rest.
Do we not have experience of at least all the grades of material beings? It seems
that Locke’s answer is that we do not. Other beings that have more or better senses than
us exist in different pails of the universe.
What other simple Ideas 'tis possible the Creatures in other parts of the Universe
may have, by the Assistance of Senses and Faculties more or perfecter, than we
have, or different from ours, "tis not for us to determine. But to say, or think
there are no such, because we can conceive nothing of them, is no better an
argument, than if a blind Man should be positive in it. that there was no such
thing as Sight and Colours, because he had no manner of Idea, of any such thing,
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nor could by any means frame to himself any Notions about Seeing."
It should not be surprising given this view of the varying perfections of
creatures, that Locke holds that our place among the hierarchy is indeed very low. He
writes.
He that will consider the Infinite Power. Wisdom, and Goodness of the Creator
of all Things, will find Reason to think, it was not all laid out upon so
Essay IV.iii.23, 554.
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inconsiderable, mean, and impotent a Creature, as he will find Man to be; who
in all probability, is one of the lowest of all intellectual Beings."
Far from thinking that human beings on Earth are God’s only creation, Locke
holds that we are not even one of his better efforts. We are “inconsiderable, mean, and
impotent” in comparison with the other beings whose perfections we cannot conceive.
Given, Locke’s view of the hierarchy of beings, it is no wonder that we should content
ourselves with being able to secure our own continued survival and not concern
ourselves with questions about the nature of the world or with metaphysical knowledge.
According to Locke, what we should concern ourselves with is morality.
The Great Concernment of Our Lives
Locke writes concerning what we, as human beings, are fitted for.
From whence it is obvious to conclude that, since our faculties are not fitted to
penetrate into the internal fabric and real essences of bodies; but yet plainly
discover to us the being of a God and the knowledge of ourselves, enough to
lead us into a full and clear discovery of our duty and great concernment; it will
become us, as rational creatures, to employ those faculties we have about what
they are most adapted to. and follow the direction of nature, where it seems to
point us out the way. For it is rational to conclude that our proper employment
lies in those inquiries, and in that sort of knowledge which is most suited to our
natural capacities, and carries in it our greatest interest, i.e. the condition of our
eternal estate. Hence I think I may conclude thatmorality is the proper science
and business ofmankind in general , (who are both concerned and fitted to
search out their Snmmum Bonum\ ) as several arts, conversant about several parts
of nature, are the lot and private talent of particular men for the common use of
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human life and their own particular subsistence in this world.
I have already briefly discussed Locke’s views on morality. Locke’s
voluntarism about moral truths is widely acknowledged, and the problems inherent in
such a view are as well. However, since morality is supposed to be the main concern of
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creatures like us. it is important to discuss more fully Locke’s views on how we should
live.
Locke's views of morality are grounded in God's law. We derive the moral
truths by demonstrations from the facts of God's omnipotence and facts about our
nature. Since God can punish and reward us. we are motivated to do as we are
commanded. However, given Locke's views in epistemology, we can have no
guarantee that God exists. Further, even we accept Locke's demonstration of the
existence of God, we would still have no reason to accept that God is good, because
Locke’s demonstration only proves that God is more powerful and knowledgeable than
all of his creation. For. given Voluntarism, no matter how God acts it will be good
since there is no objective standard by which to judge that God as good. And, given
that God is omnipotent, no matter what God wills as the moral law, we should do it.
because he can do much worse things to us if we fail to obey him. Morality, according
to Locke is derived from adherence to a law. Since there is no law or lawgiver above
God. moral terms do not apply to him.
In addition to these problems, Locke has failed to supply us with a reason to
believe that it is possible that we be punished in the afterlife. We are told that there can
be no demonstration of the soul's immortality. It is a revealed truth, but Locke tells us
that all the truths of morality and religion are “well enough secured without
philosophical proofs of the soul's immortality.” He writes,
[For] the state we are at present in. not being that of vision, we must, in many
things, content our selves with Faith and Probability: and in the present
Question, about the immortality of the Soul, if our Faculties cannot arrive at
demonstrative Certainty, we need not think it strange. All the great Ends of
Morality and Religion, are well enough secured, without philosophical Proofs of
the Soul’s Immortality; since it is evident, that he who made us at first begin to
1 68
subsist here, sensible intelligent Beings, and for several years continued us in
such a state, can and will restore us to the like state of Sensibility in another
World, and make us capable there to receive the Retribution he has designed to
. 268
Men, according to their doings in this Life."
Unfortunately, Locke's views in epistemology seem to entail that we are as little
capable of being certain of the truths of morality and religion as we are the soul's
immortality. Locke’s empiricism in epistemology simply does not afford him the types
of arguments and the certainty that rationalists such a Descartes and Leibniz are capable
of attaining. Locke's epistemology has been extremely influential, but his religious and
moral philosophy has not received many accolades. Locke has the theological and
metaphysical framework to answer the sorts of questions that Leibniz poses about the
origin of the world, but Locke’s epistemological views undermine this framework. In
the end, Locke's philosophical system works against itself.
Essay IV.iii.6. 542.
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